Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.

"Portuguese Observatory of Taeniasis and Cysticercosis": A "One Health" example for epidemiological surveillance of one neglected disease in a European country

Cysticercosis results from the ingestion Taenia solium eggs directly by faecal-oral route or contaminated food or water. Human tapeworm carriers who have become infected after ingesting pork meat contaminated with cysticerci release these eggs. Cysticercosis occurs after tapeworm eggs are ingested by an intermediate host (pig or human) and then hatch, migrate, and lodge in the host's tissues, where they develop onto larval cysticerci. When they lodged in the central nervous system of humans, results in the disease condition called Neurocysticercosis (NCC), with a heterogeneous manifestations depending of the locations of cysts, number, size and their stage of evolution (1). Consequently the prognostic ranges from asymptomatic to situations leading to death in 2% to 9.8%. of cases (7) In swine’s there are few studies, but recent works have proved that animals, for the same reasons, also have neurological abnormalities, expressed by seizures, stereotypic walk in circles, chewing motions with foamy salivation included tonic muscle contractions followed by a sudden diminution in all muscle tone leading to collapse (2). Conventional domestic wastewater treatment processes may not be totally effective in inactivating parasites eggs from Taenia solium, allowing some contamination of soils and agricultural products (11). In Portugal there are some evidence of aggregation of human cysticercosis cases in specific regions, bases in ecological design studies (6). There are few information about human tapeworm carriers and social and economic factors associated with them. Success in knowledge and consequently in lowering transmission is limited by the complex network of biological and social factors that maintain the spread. Effective control of mostly zoonosis require One Health approach, after a real knowledge and transparency in the information provided by the institutions responsible for both animal and human health, allowing sustained interventions targeted at the transmission cycle's crucial nodes. In general, the model used to control, reflects a rural reality, where pigs are raised freely, poor sanitation conditions and incipient sanitary inspection. In cysticercosis, pigs are obligate intermediate hosts and so considered as first targets for control and used as sentinels to monitor environmental T. solium contamination (3). Usually environmental contamination with Taenia spp. eggs is a key issue in most of studies with landscape factors influencing presence of Taenia spp. antigens in both pigs and humans (5). Soil-related factors as well as socio-economic and behavioural factors are associated with the emergence of significant clustering human cysticercosis (4,5). However scarce studies has been produced in urban environmental and in developed countries with the finality to characterize the spatial pattern. There are still few data available regarding its prevalence and spatial distribution; Transmission patterns are likely to exhibit correlations as housing conditions, water supply, basic sanitation, schooling and birthplace of the individual or relatives, more than pigs rearing free, soil conditions (9). As a matter of fact, tapeworm carriers from endemic zones can auto-infect or transmit infection to other people or arrive already suffering NCC (as a result of travelling to or being a citizen from an endemic cysticercosis country) to a free cysticercosis country. Transmission is fecal-oral; this includes transmission through person-to-person contact, through autoinfection, or through contaminated food This has been happening in different continents as North America (5.4–18% been autochthonous), Europe and Australia (7). Recently, case reports of NCC have also emerged from Muslim countries. (10). Actually, different papers relate an epidemic situation in Spain and Portugal (7, 8). However the kind of study done does not authorize such conclusion. There are no evidence that infections were acquired in Portugal and there are not characterized the mode of transmission. Papers with these kind of information will be allow to have economic consequences resulted from artificial trade barriers with serious consequences for pig producers and pig meat trade. We need transparency in information’s that allow provide the basis to support the development and targeting of future effective control programmes (and prove we need that). So, to have a real picture of the disease, it is necessary integrate data from human, animal and environmental factors surrounding human and pig cases to characterize the pattern of the transmission. The design needs to be able to capture unexpected, and not common outcomes (routine data). We need to think “One Health” to get a genuine image of the situation.