Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.

Coordinated Scheduling of Wind-Thermal Gencos in Day-Ahead Markets

This paper presents a stochastic mixed-integer linear programming approach for solving the self-scheduling problem of a price-taker thermal and wind power producer taking part in a pool-based electricity market. Uncertainty on electricity price and wind power is considered through a set of scenarios. Thermal units are modeled by variable costs, start-up costs and technical operating constraints, such as: ramp up/down limits and minimum up/down time limits. An efficient mixed-integer linear program is presented to develop the offering strategies of the coordinated production of thermal and wind energy generation, aiming to maximize the expected profit. A case study with data from the Iberian Electricity Market is presented and results are discussed to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Bidding strategy of wind-thermal energy producers

This paper presents a stochastic mixed-integer linear programming approach for solving the self-scheduling problem of a price-taker thermal and wind power producer taking part in a pool-based electricity market. Uncertainty on electricity price and wind power is considered through a set of scenarios. Thermal units are modelled by variable costs, start-up costs and technical operating constraints, such as: forbidden operating zones, ramp up/down limits and minimum up/down time limits. An efficient mixed-integer linear program is presented to develop the offering strategies of the coordinated production of thermal and wind energy generation, having as a goal the maximization of profit. A case study with data from the Iberian Electricity Market is presented and results are discussed to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

The Branches of Large Electricity Companies in Portugal: From Trade to the Transfer and Adaptation of Technology (20th Century)

In the last decade of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century there was a movement of capital and engineers from the central and northern Europe to the countries of southern Europe and other continents. Large companies sought to obtain concessions and establish branches in Portugal, favouring the circulation of technical knowledge and transfer of technology for Portuguese industry. Among the various examples of the representatives of foreign companies in Portugal we find Jayme da Costa Ltd. established in 1916 in Lisbon, which was a branch of the Swedish company ASEA, as well as STAAL, ATLAS DIESEL (Sweden), Landis & GYR (Switzerland), Electro Helios, etc.. Another example is EFACEC a company founded in 1948 in Porto, that was a partnership between the Portuguese company CUF – Companhia União Fabril, and ACEC – Ateliers de Constructions Électriques de Charleroi and a small entreprise Electro-Moderna Ldª. This enterprise started the industrial production of electric motors and transformers, and later on acquired a substantial share of the national production of electrical equipment. Using Estatística das Instalações Elétricas em Portugal (Statistics on Electrical Installations in Portugal) from 1928 until 1950 we can identify the foreign enterprises acting in the Portuguese market: Siemens, B.B.C, ASEA, Oerlikon, etc. We can also establish a relationship between the development of the electric network and the growth of production and consumption of electricity in the principal urban centres. Finally we see how foreign firms were a stimulus to the creation of national enterprises, especially those of small scale, in Portugal.

PRICE TRANSMISSION ON THE MILK PORTUGUESE MARKET

This paper aims to analyze the milk prices transmission along the food chain in Portugal, temporally and spatially. The results show that the volatility on retail prices is small but happens after 2008. The farm gate price does not change when the price of package milk changes. In mainland, price transmission does not happen but for Azores the transmission is effective. In the intensive systems, the risk to collapse is bigger than in the extensive systems, where the volatility of prices reflects the process of markets adjustment.