Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.

Allergenic profile of Quercus rotundifolia pollen in Alentejo, Portugal

Background and Aim: Grasses and olive are the most relevant allergenic species in the Alentejo region. However, aggravation of allergic symptoms has been reported in the early spring, before grass and olive pollen seasons. Quercus pollen is the most abundant pollen type in the early spring in Alentejo, nonetheless its allergen profile has not yet been evaluated. The aim of this work was to characterize the allergen profile of pollen from Quercus rotundifolia among the most representative species showing pollination in April, prior to the main pollen season in Alentejo. Methods: Pollen from Quercus rotundifolia, Olea europaea and Dactylis glomerata was extracted with ammonium bicarbonate buffer, lyophilized and stored at -80ºC until analysis. Extract from Quercus ilex pollen was kindly offered by Bial. Protein content was determined by the Bradford method. SDS-PAGE followed by western blot, using allergic patient sera (obtained from the Hospital do Espírito Santo de Évora – HESE), were performed to evaluate the allergen profile of the pollen. Sensitization and cross-reactivity was assessed by solid phase immunoblot. Results: Most of the patient evidenced sensitization to pollen extracts of Q. rotundifolia. Protein profile of Q. rotundifolia has shown several bands in the Mr 10-90 kDa, mostly overlapping with Q. ilex. Western blot have shown several immunoreactive bands. Immunoreactive bands were also observed in the protein profile according to the pI in the range 4.0-6.1. Cross-reactivity between Q. rotundifolia with O. europaea and D. glomerata was found. Conclusion: These results evidenced allergens found in Q. rotundifolia pollen. It also shows that protein profile of Q. rotundifolia and Q. ilex are mostly alike suggesting that similarities in allergen profile are expected. Moreover, cross–reactivity between Q. rotundifolia and highly allergenic species such as O. europaea and D. glomerata was found which probably contributes to the aggravation of pollinosis in the early spring. Acknowledgments: This work was supported by FEDER through the “Programa Operacional Fatores de Competitividade – COMPETE” (Strategic projects of ICAAM and ICT 2013-2015). We also aknowledge Bial-Aristegui for supplying pollen and extract samples of Q. ilex.