Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.

Assessment of environment, land management, and spatial variables on recent changes in montado land cover in southern Portugal

Montado decline has been reported since the end of the nineteenth century in southern Portugal and increased markedly during the 1980s. Consensual reports in the literature suggest that this decline is due to a number of factors, such as environmental constraints, forest diseases, inappropriate management, and socioeconomic issues. An assessment on the pattern of montado distribution was conducted to reveal how the extent of land management, environmental variables, and spatial factors contributed to montado area loss in southern Portugal from 1990 to 2006. A total of 14 independent variables, presumably related to montado loss, were grouped into three sets: environmental variables, land management variables, and spatial variables. From 1990 to 2006, approximately 90,054 ha disappeared in the montado area, with an estimated annual regression rate of 0.14 % year-1. Variation partitioning showed that the land management model accounted for the highest percentage of explained variance (51.8 %), followed by spatial factors (44.6 %) and environmental factors (35.5 %). These results indicate that most variance in the large-scale distribution of recent montado loss is due to land management, either alone or in combination with environmental and spatial factors. The full GAM model showed that different livestock grazing is one of the most important variables affecting montado loss. This suggests that optimum carrying capacity should decrease to 0.18–0.60 LU ha-1 for livestock grazing in montado under current ecological conditions in southern Portugal.