Estética e Desporto

Apesar de o desporto ter desempenhado desde sempre um papel importante na minha vida, quer como modesto jogador de ténis, quer como apaixonado adepto sobretudo de futebol e de rugby, a verdade é que apenas fiz dele assunto de estudo e de reflexão mais sistemática, quando comecei a leccionar na Universidade de Évora diversas disciplinas da área epistemológica da filosofia aos cursos de Educação Física e Desporto. Depressa se tornou claro para mim que a área da filosofia do desporto é um enorme campo de possibilidades de investigação que tenho procurado desenvolver desde então. Nesse quadro, a estética fenomenológica de Merleau-Ponty e de Dufrenne desempenham um papel decisivo na abordagem que procuro efectuar no presente volume. Por outro lado, desde que comecei a estudar e a ensinar filosofia do desporto, a obra de Sílvio Lima revelou-se um interlocutor privilegiado para esta componente da minha actividade académica, como se pode observar nos dois últimos capítulos de "Estética e Desporto".

‘Crows’ vs. ‘Avatar’, or: 3D vs. total-dimensional immersion

3D film’s explicit new space depth arguably provides both an enhanced realistic quality to the image and a wealth of more acute visual and haptic sensations (a ‘montage of attractions’) to the increasingly involved spectator. But David Cronenberg’s related ironic remark that ‘cinema as such is from the outset a «special effect»’ should warn us against the geometrical naiveté of such assumptions, within a Cartesian ocularcentric tradition for long overcome by Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment of perception and Deleuze’s notion of the self-consistency of the artistic sensation and space. Indeed, ‘2D’ traditional cinema already provides the accomplished «fourth wall effect», enclosing the beholder behind his back within a space that no longer belongs to the screen (nor to ‘reality’) as such, and therefore is no longer ‘illusorily’ two-dimensional. This kind of totally absorbing, ‘dream-like’ space, metaphorical for both painting and cinema, is illustrated by the episode ‘Crows’ in Kurosawa’s Dreams. Such a space requires the actual effacement of the empirical status of spectator, screen and film as separate dimensions, and it is precisely the 3D caracteristic unfolding of merely frontal space layers (and film events) out of the screen towards us (and sometimes above the heads of the spectators before us) that reinstalls at the core of the film-viewing phenomenon a regressive struggle with reality and with different degrees of realism, originally overcome by film since the Lumière’s Arrival of a Train at Ciotat seminal demonstration. Through an analysis of crucial aspects in Avatar and the recent Cave of Forgotten Dreams, both dealing with historical and ontological deepening processes of ‘going inside’, we shall try to show how the formal and technically advanced component of those 3D-depth films impairs, on the contrary, their apparent conceptual purpose on the level of contents, and we will assume, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, that this technological mistake is due to a lack of recognition of the nature of perception and sensation in relation to space and human experience.

The Worldhood of the Cinematic Image

A close analysis of the specifically cinematographic procedure in Akira Kurosawa’s ‘Dream’ Crows reveals it as an articulated and insightful philosophical statement, endowed with general relevance concerning ‘natural’ perception, phenomenological Erlebnis, mechanical image and aesthetic rapture. The antagonism between the Benjaminian lineage of a mechanical irreducibility of the cinematic image to anthropocentric categories, and the Cartesian tradition of a film-philosophy still relying on the equally irreducible structure of the intentional act, be it the one of a deeply embodied and enworlded counsciousness, in accounting for the essential structure of film and spectator (and their relation), i.e., the antagonism between the decentering primacy of the image and the self-centered primacy of perception, cannot be settled through a simple Phenomenological shift from occularcentric, intentional counsciousness to its embodyment ‘in-the-world’ as yet another carrier of intentionality. Still it remains to be explained what is it in the mechanical image that is able to so deeply affect the human flesh, and conversely, to what features in the human bodily experience is its mechanical other, the fascinating image, so successfuly adressing? It should be expected from the anti-Cartesianism of both the early and the late Merleau-Ponty the textual support for an approach to the essential condition of passivity in movie watching, that would be convergent with Benjamin. The Chapter ‘Le sentir’, in Phénoménologie de la perception, will offer us the proper guide to elucidate what we are already perceiving and conceiving in Kurosawa’s film, where the ex-static phenomenological body of the aesthetical contemplator ‘enters the frame’ like the Benjaminian surgeon enters the body and like the painter - and always already like our deepest level of ‘sensing’, previously to any act of cousciousness - ‘just looses himself in the scene before him’. The Polichinello secret of cinema watching is nonetheless too evident to be seen, and that is where Phenomenological description and reduction are still required.

Para uma pedagogia do reconhecimento: da concriação à pratica vocativa

Esta dissertação assume, na sua maior abrangência, a feitura de uma articulação entre a sustentação originária e constitutiva do ser humano, a manifestação concreta do sentido existencial do ato pedagógico e os seus modos de realização: dialógico, comunitário, personalista e humanista. Neste sentido, a nossa proposta passa inicialmente por uma procura do sujeito através do alcance da pessoa, do homem ao indivíduo (nas suas diversas vicissitudes), até à sua concretização numa consciência pedagógica precursora do agir, do conhecer, do sentir e, fundamentalmente, do ato de “Reconhecer”, este tido, por nós, como o processo fundamentador e fomentador de uma Pedagogia do Reconhecimento. É um percurso inovador na medida em que parte de uma Antropologia Filosófica e de uma Antroposofia, passando pelos meandros processuais da consciência lonerganiana e da fenomenologia buberiana da relação, pretendendo promover, no seu culminar, uma ambiência cultural de pedagogia dialógica inserida num topos comunitário, pressuposta e implicitamente proposta numa Teoria do Reconhecimento, que se situa na geografia disciplinar da Filosofia da Educação, e nas “Dinâmicas das Relações Interpessoais”. Temos, pois, que o seu epílogo é o reconhecimento: como resultado radical e subtil manifestado na intersubjetividade. A Pedagogia do Reconhecimento como concriação e ação vocativa está fundamentada num itinerário de estruturas idiossincráticas de sustentação do modo como “ser-aí” se faz (constrói e realiza). Partiremos da desaxialização do “Eu” tópico (anthropos) para uma estrutura transversal dialógica. Entendemos que toda a vida verdadeira é relação, afirmação buberiana que, só por si, derruba a clássica fronteira tópica e abre espaço à condição dialógica e essencial do fazer do ser humano. O papel do reconhecimento do “outro”, no homem, é um fenómeno de dialogicidade que abole as fronteiras dialéticas da pura argumentação e permite o brotar da reciprocidade; Abstract: This dissertation intends, in its greater scope, to make a link between the original and constitutive support of the human being, the concrete manifestation of pedagogical act's existential sense and its embodiments: dialogical, personalistic, communitarian and humanist. Our proposal initially goes through a search of the Self through the achievement of the person, from Man to the individual (in its various vicissitudes), till its development in a pedagogical conscience that is a precursor of action, knowing, feeling and, fundamentally, of the act of “Recognize”, as a justifying and instigating process of a Pedagogy of Recognition. It is an innovative path in the sense that it initiates itself from a Philosophical Anthropology and from an Anthroposophy and it continues through the procedural intricacies of lonerganian consciousness and buberian phenomenology of relation, intending to promote, in its culmination, a cultural ambience of dialogic pedagogy, inserted in a communitarian topos, presupposed and implicitly proposed in a Recognition Theory, that places itself in the disciplinary geography of Philosophy of Education and in the “Dynamics of Interpersonal Relationships”. Therefore, the epilogue is the recognition: as a radical and subtle outcome, expressed in the intersubjectivity. The Pedagogy of Recognition as co-creation and vocative practice is based on a route of idiosyncratic structures of support of the way in how to be there is done (built and accomplished). We start from the de-axialization of the topic “Self” (anthropos) to a transversal dialogical structure. We defend that all true life is relationship, a buberian statement that all alone drops the topical classical border and makes room for the dialogical and essential condition of doing of the human being. The role of recognition of the “other”, in Man, is a dialogical phenomenon that abolishes the dialectic borders of pure argument and allows the sprouting of reciprocity.

A auto-interpretação de Husserl em 1930-31: o Nachwort às Ideen como escrito polémico

This essay seeks to expose Husserl’s defensive attitude towards what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology, in the Epilogue to his Ideas. While the polemic side of Husserl’s project, basically but tacitly against Heidegger, is underlined, it is also sustained that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus in that it defines the direction of the phenomenological project. At the centre of the controversy are the answer to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.