Quantification of free auxins in semi-hardwood plant cuttings and microshoots by dispersive liquid–liquid microextraction/microwave derivatization and GC/MS analysis

Several studies have suggested that differences in the natural rooting ability of plant cuttings could be attributed to differences in endogenous auxin levels. Hence, during rooting experiments, it is important to be able to routinely monitor the evolution of endogenous levels of plant hormones. This work reports the development of a new method for the quantification of free auxins in auxin-treated Olea europaea (L.) explants, using dispersive liquid–liquid microextraction (DLLME) and microwave assisted derivatization (MAD) followed by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) analysis. Linear ranges of 0.5–500 ng mL 1 and 1–500 mg mL 1 were used for the quantification of indole-3-acetic acid (IAA) and indole-3-butyric acid (IBA), respectively. Determined by serial dilutions, the limits of detection (LOD) and quantification (LOQ) were 0.05 ng mL 1 and 0.25 ng mL 1, respectively for both compounds. When using the calibration curve for determination, the LOQ corresponded to 0.5 ng mL 1 (IAA) and 0.5 mg mL 1 (IBA). The proposed method proved to be substantially faster than other alternatives, and allowed free auxin quantification in real samples of semi-hardwood cuttings and microshoots of two olive cultivars. The concentrations found in the analyzed samples are in the range of 0.131–0.342 mg g 1 (IAA) and 20–264 mg g 1 (IBA).

Fluorinated surfactants in solution: Diffusion coefficients of fluorinated alcohols in water

Intra-diffusion coefficients of three fluorinated alcohols, 2,2,3,3,3-pentafluoropropan-1-ol (PFP), 2,2,3,3,4,4,4-heptafluorobutan-1-ol (HFB) and 2,2,3,3,4,4,5,5,5-nonafluoropentan-1-ol (NFP) in water have been measured by the PFG–NMR spin-echo technique as a function of temperature and composition, focusing on the alcohol dilute region. For comparison, intra-diffusion coefficients of 2,2,2- trifluoroethanol (TFE) and HFB have also been measured in heavy water using the same method and conditions. As far as we know, these are the first experimental measurements of this property for these binary systems. Intra-diffusion coefficients for NFP in water and for TFE and HFB in heavy water have also been obtained by molecular dynamics simulation, complementing those for TFE, PFP and HFB reported in a previous work. The agreement between experimental and simulated results for PFP, HFB and NFP in water is reasonable, although presenting higher deviations than for the TFE/water system. From the dependence of the intra-diffusion coefficients on temperature, diffusion activation energies were estimated for all the solutes in water and heavy water.

Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.