From Civil Strife to Civil Society: civil and military responsibilities in disrupted states

"The 1990s saw the United Nations, the militaries of key member states, and NGOs increasingly entangled in the complex affairs of disrupted states. Whether as deliverers of humanitarian assistance or as agents of political, social, and civic reconstruction, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, these actors have had to learn ways of interacting with each other in order to optimize the benefits for the populations they seek to assist. Yet the challenges have proved daunting. Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures and standard operating procedures and are confronted with the need to work together to perform tasks to which different actors may attach quite different priorities."--BOOK JACKET.

Introduction

The 1990s saw the United Nations, the militaries of key member states, and NGOs increasingly entangled in the complex affairs of disrupted states. Whether as deliverers of humanitarian assistance or as agents of political, social, and civic reconstruction, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, these actors have had to learn ways of interacting with each other in order to optimize the benefits for the populations they seek to assist. Yet the challenges have proved daunting. Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures and standard operating procedures and are confronted with the need to work together to perform tasks to which different actors may attach quite different priorities. From Civil Strife to Civil Society explores the nature of these challenges, blending the experience of scholars and practitioners. It is underpinned by an understanding that recovery from disruption is a laborious process that can easily be de-railed. The first part of the book offers a rigorous examination of the dimensions of state disruption and the roles of the international community in responding to it; the second part looks at military doctrine for dealing with disorder and humanitarian emergencies; the third part examines mechanisms for ending violence and delivering justice in post-conflict times; the fourth part investigates the problems of rebuilding trust and promoting democracy; the fifth part deals with the reconstitution of the rule of law; while the sixth and seventh parts address the reestablishment of social and civil order.

The experience of xenophobia in South Africa

In May 2008, xenophobic violence erupted in South Africa. The targets were individuals who had migrated from the north in search of asylum. Emerging first in township communities around Johannesburg, the aggression spread to other provinces. Sixty-two people died, and 100,000 (20,000 in the Western Cape alone) were displaced. As the attacks escalated across the country, thousands of migrants searched for refuge in police stations and churches. Chilling stories spread about mobs armed with axes, metal bars, and clubs. The mobs stormed from shack to shack, assaulted migrants, locked them in their homes, and set the homes on fire. The public reaction was one of shock and horror. The Los Angeles Times declared, “Migrants Burned Alive in S. Africa.” The South African president at the time, Thabo Mbeki, called for an end to “shameful and criminal attacks.” Commentators were stunned by the signs of hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) that emerged in the young South African democracy. The tragedy of the violence in South Africa was magnified by the fact that many of the victims had fled from violence and persecution in their countries of origin. Amid genocidal violations of human rights that had recently occurred in some countries in sub- Saharan Africa, the new South Africa stood as a beacon of democracy and respect for human dignity. With this openness in mind, many immigrants to South Africa sought safety and refuge from the conflicts in their homelands. More than 43,500 refugees and 227,000 asylum seekers now live in South Africa. The majority of people accorded refugee status came from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. South Africa also hosts thousands of other migrants who remain undocumented.

Journalists at war

Journalism is an especially hazardous profession when it takes the reporter into zones of war and conflict. The Committee to Protect Journalists records that in 2010 44 journalists were killed while carrying out their duties. Some of these were reporting conflict in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere. Others were on assignments covering crime and corruption in Mexico, Russia, Venezuela*all places where telling truth to power can easily get you killed, beaten or banged up. In the last 20 years some 874 journalists have been killed on the job, and we salute them all. Journalists get criticised a lot by we scholars, and often for good reason. They can be villains, for sure, but they can also be heroes, when they lay down their lives in the pursuit of the truth. As this piece was being edited, photojournalists Tim Hetherington and Chris Hondros were killed in Libya.

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.

Is there an international obligation to prosecute pirates

Combating piracy at sea and apprehending pirates have been a long-standing problem for the global community. Increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia have prompted the UN Security Council to intervene in the matter. The Council, through several resolutions, has authorised states to take action against Somali pirates in the territorial waters and land territory of Somalia and recently adopted a resolution urging all states to fully implement relevant international conventions in their domestic legal systems. However, despite the Security Council's intervention in the matter most states are still reluctant to prosecute Somali pirates in their domestic courts. Considering the most recent Security Council resolution and existing international law, this article examines whether there is an international obligation to criminalise piracy under domestic legal frameworks and to prosecute pirates in domestic courts. It submits that existing international law arguably imposes an obligation to prosecute pirates, at least in certain circumstances, and the recently adopted Security Council resolution reinforces this obligation.

Prosecution of maritime pirates : the national court is dead—long live the national court

Piracy is one of the main maritime security concerns in the contemporary world. The number of piracy incidents is increasing rapidly, which is highly problematic for maritime security. Although international law provides universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of maritime pirates, the actual number of prosecutions is alarmingly low compared to the number of incidents of piracy. Despite many states becoming parties to the relevant international conventions, they are reluctant to establish the necessary legal and institutional frameworks at the national level for the prosecution of pirates. The growing incidences of piracy and the consequential problems associated with prosecuting pirates have created doubts about the adequacy of the current international legal system, which is fully dependent on national courts for the prosecution of pirates. This article examines the possible ways for ensuring the effective prosecution of pirates. Contrary to the different proposals forwarded by researchers in the wake of Somali piracy for the establishment of international judicial institutions for the prosecution of pirates, this article argues that the operationalization of national courts through the proper implementation of relevant international legal instruments within domestic legal systems is the most viable solution. However, this article submits that the operationalization of national courts will not be very successful following the altruistic model of universal adjudicative jurisdiction. A state may enact legislation implementing universal jurisdiction but will not be very interested in prosecuting a pirate in its national court if it has no relation with the piratical incident. Rather, it will be successful if the global community seriously implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), which obligates the states that have some connection with a piratical incident to prosecute pirates in their national courts.