6 resultados para opportunism
em Queensland University of Technology - ePrints Archive
Resumo:
The institution the police force has been established to protect citizens and their property from harm and predatory opportunism. However, there have been occasions when the very people assigned to protect become part of the predatory force against society. Predatory policing occurs when the police use their powers to extort money in the form of bribes. While, the concept is receiving attention in Europe but there have not been any direct studies in Australia. To overcome this research deficit and determine the extent, if any, of predatory policing in Australia data is interrogated from four police corruption inquiries in the Australian states of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. In addition, it examines the role of the type of networks used by corrupt police officers. The synthesis and application of public corruption and network literatures to the predatory policing domain provides new and relevant insights to assist those responsible for the administration of our institutions of justice. The paper concludes with a framework, drawn from the first stage of the project, to assist in the conceptualisation and monitoring of this public problem.
Resumo:
This article explores an important temporal aspect of the design of strategic alliances by focusing on the issue of time bounds specification. Time bounds specification refers to a choice on behalf of prospective alliance partners at the time of alliance formation to either pre-specify the duration of an alliance to a specific time window, or to keep the alliance open-ended (Reuer & Ariňo, 2007). For instance, Das (2006) mentions the example of the alliance between Telemundo Network and Mexican Argos Comunicacion (MAC). Announced in October 2000, this alliance entailed a joint production of 1200 hours of comedy, news, drama, reality and novella programs (Das, 2006). Conditioned on the projected date of completing the 1200 hours of programs, Telemundo Network and MAC pre-specified the time bounds of the alliance ex ante. Such time-bound alliances are said to be particularly prevalent in project-based industries, like movie production, construction, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals (Schwab & Miner, 2008). In many other instances, however, firms may choose to keep their alliances open-ended, not specifying a specific time bound at the time of alliance formation. The choice between designing open-ended alliances that are “built to last”, versus time bound alliances that are “meant to end” is important. Seminal works like Axelrod (1984), Heide & Miner (1992), and Parkhe (1993) demonstrated that the choice to place temporal bounds on a collaborative venture has important implications. More specifically, collaborations that have explicit, short term time bounds (i.e. what is termed a shorter “shadow of the future”) are more likely to experience opportunism (Axelrod, 1984), are more likely to focus on the immediate present (Bakker, Boros, Kenis & Oerlemans, 2012), and are less likely to develop trust (Parkhe, 1993) than alliances for which time bounds are kept indeterminate. These factors, in turn, have been shown to have important implications for the performance of alliances (e.g. Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000). Thus, there seems to be a strong incentive for organizations to form open-ended strategic alliances. And yet, Reuer & Ariňo (2007), one of few empirical studies that details the prevalence of time-bound and open-ended strategic alliances, found that about half (47%) of the alliances in their sample were time bound, the other half were open-ended. What conditions, then, determine this choice?
Resumo:
This paper reviews the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics jointly awarded to Oliver Williamson for his work on governance in organizations and the boundaries of the firm, and to Elinor Ostrom for her work on the governance of common pool resources. We review the careers and the research contributions of Williamson and Ostrom to the theory and analysis of economic institutions of governance. Both winners of this Prize for 'economic governance' are thoroughly deserved, yet like the Hayek- Myrdal Prize of 1974 their respective approaches, methods and findings are almost diametrically opposed. Williamson offers a top-down contracts-based solution to the incentive problems of opportunism in corporate governance, whereas Ostrom offers a bottom-up communication-based solution to the governance opportunities of community resources. We offer some critical comments on Williamson's analytic work and discussion of the potential for further application of Ostrom's case-study based experimental methodology. We conclude with a suggested third nominee to make better sense of how these two great scholars' works fit together, namely George Richardson'
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to document and explain the allocation of takeover purchase price to identifiable intangible assets (IIAs), purchased goodwill, and/or target net tangible assets in an accounting environment unconstrained with respect to IIA accounting policy choice. Using a sample of Australian acquisitions during the unconstrained accounting environment from 1988 to 2004, we find the percentage allocation of purchase price to IIAs averaged 19.09%. The percentage allocation to IIAs is significantly positively related to return on assets and insignificantly related to leverage, contrary to opportunism. Efficiency suggests an explanation: profitable firms acquire and capitalise a higher percentage of IIAs in acquisitions. The target's investment opportunity set is significantly positively related to the percentage allocation to IIAs, consistent with information-signalling. The paper contributes to the accounting policy choice literature by showing how Australian firms make the one-off accounting policy choice in regards allocation of takeover purchase price (which is often a substantial dollar amount to) in an environment where accounting for IIAs was unconstrained.
Resumo:
A salient but rarely explicitly studied characteristic of interfirm relationships is that they can intentionally be formed for finite periods of time. What determines firms' intertemporal choices between different alliance time horizons? Shadow of the future theorists suggest that when an alliance has an explicitly set short-term time frame, there is an increased risk that partners may behave opportunistically. This does not readily explain the high incidence of time-bound alliances being formed. Reconciling insights from the shadow of the future perspective with nascent research on the flexibility of temporary organizations, and shifting the focus from the level of individual transactions to that of strategic alliance portfolios, we argue that firms may be willing to accept a higher risk of opportunism when there are offsetting gains in strategic flexibility in managing their strategic alliance portfolio. Consequently, we hypothesize that environmental factors that increase the need for strategic flexibility—namely, dynamism and complexity in the environment—are likely to increase the relative share of time-bound alliances in strategic alliance portfolios. Our analysis of longitudinal data on the intertemporal alliance choices of a large sample of small and medium-sized enterprises provides support for this argument. Our findings fill an important gap in theory about time horizons in interfirm relationships and temporary organizations and show the importance of separating planned terminations from duration-based performance measures.
Resumo:
This paper uses transaction cost theory to study cloud computing adoption. A model is developed and tested with data from an Australian survey. According to the results, perceived vendor opportunism and perceived legislative uncertainty around cloud computing were significantly associated with perceived cloud computing security risk. There was also a significant negative relationship between perceived cloud computing security risk and the intention to adopt cloud services. This study also reports on adoption rates of cloud computing in terms of applications, as well as the types of services used.