143 resultados para message authentication code
em Queensland University of Technology - ePrints Archive
Resumo:
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. AE is potentially more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message and in a separate pass, providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. This paper presents results on the analysis of three AE stream ciphers submitted to the recently completed eSTREAM competition. We classify the ciphers based on the methods the ciphers use to provide authenticated encryption and discuss possible methods for mounting attacks on these ciphers.
Resumo:
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. This approach is more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message, and in a separate pass providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC). AE using symmetric ciphers can be provided by either stream ciphers with built in authentication mechanisms or block ciphers using appropriate modes of operation. However, stream ciphers have the potential for higher performance and smaller footprint in hardware and/or software than block ciphers. This property makes stream ciphers suitable for resource constrained environments, where storage and computational power are limited. There have been several recent stream cipher proposals that claim to provide AE. These ciphers can be analysed using existing techniques that consider confidentiality or integrity separately; however currently there is no existing framework for the analysis of AE stream ciphers that analyses these two properties simultaneously. This thesis introduces a novel framework for the analysis of AE using stream cipher algorithms. This thesis analyzes the mechanisms for providing confidentiality and for providing integrity in AE algorithms using stream ciphers. There is a greater emphasis on the analysis of the integrity mechanisms, as there is little in the public literature on this, in the context of authenticated encryption. The thesis has four main contributions as follows. The first contribution is the design of a framework that can be used to classify AE stream ciphers based on three characteristics. The first classification applies Bellare and Namprempre's work on the the order in which encryption and authentication processes take place. The second classification is based on the method used for accumulating the input message (either directly or indirectly) into the into the internal states of the cipher to generate a MAC. The third classification is based on whether the sequence that is used to provide encryption and authentication is generated using a single key and initial vector, or two keys and two initial vectors. The second contribution is the application of an existing algebraic method to analyse the confidentiality algorithms of two AE stream ciphers; namely SSS and ZUC. The algebraic method is based on considering the nonlinear filter (NLF) of these ciphers as a combiner with memory. This method enables us to construct equations for the NLF that relate the (inputs, outputs and memory of the combiner) to the output keystream. We show that both of these ciphers are secure from this type of algebraic attack. We conclude that using a keydependent SBox in the NLF twice, and using two different SBoxes in the NLF of ZUC, prevents this type of algebraic attack. The third contribution is a new general matrix based model for MAC generation where the input message is injected directly into the internal state. This model describes the accumulation process when the input message is injected directly into the internal state of a nonlinear filter generator. We show that three recently proposed AE stream ciphers can be considered as instances of this model; namely SSS, NLSv2 and SOBER-128. Our model is more general than a previous investigations into direct injection. Possible forgery attacks against this model are investigated. It is shown that using a nonlinear filter in the accumulation process of the input message when either the input message or the initial states of the register is unknown prevents forgery attacks based on collisions. The last contribution is a new general matrix based model for MAC generation where the input message is injected indirectly into the internal state. This model uses the input message as a controller to accumulate a keystream sequence into an accumulation register. We show that three current AE stream ciphers can be considered as instances of this model; namely ZUC, Grain-128a and Sfinks. We establish the conditions under which the model is susceptible to forgery and side-channel attacks.
Resumo:
At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).
Resumo:
This paper describes a number of techniques for GNSS navigation message authentication. A detailed analysis of the security facilitated by navigation message authentication is given. The analysis takes into consideration the risk of critical applications that rely on GPS including transportation, finance and telecommunication networks. We propose a number of cryptographic authentication schemes for navigation data authentication. These authentication schemes provide authenticity and integrity of the navigation data to the receiver. Through software simulation, the performance of the schemes is quantified. The use of software simulation enables the collection of authentication performance data of different data channels, and the impact of various schemes on the infrastructure and receiver. Navigation message authentication schemes have been simulated at the proposed data rates of Galileo and GPS services, for which the resulting performance data is presented. This paper concludes by making recommendations for optimal implementation of navigation message authentication for Galileo and next generation GPS systems.
Resumo:
Robust hashing is an emerging field that can be used to hash certain data types in applications unsuitable for traditional cryptographic hashing methods. Traditional hashing functions have been used extensively for data/message integrity, data/message authentication, efficient file identification and password verification. These applications are possible because the hashing process is compressive, allowing for efficient comparisons in the hash domain but non-invertible meaning hashes can be used without revealing the original data. These techniques were developed with deterministic (non-changing) inputs such as files and passwords. For such data types a 1-bit or one character change can be significant, as a result the hashing process is sensitive to any change in the input. Unfortunately, there are certain applications where input data are not perfectly deterministic and minor changes cannot be avoided. Digital images and biometric features are two types of data where such changes exist but do not alter the meaning or appearance of the input. For such data types cryptographic hash functions cannot be usefully applied. In light of this, robust hashing has been developed as an alternative to cryptographic hashing and is designed to be robust to minor changes in the input. Although similar in name, robust hashing is fundamentally different from cryptographic hashing. Current robust hashing techniques are not based on cryptographic methods, but instead on pattern recognition techniques. Modern robust hashing algorithms consist of feature extraction followed by a randomization stage that introduces non-invertibility and compression, followed by quantization and binary encoding to produce a binary hash output. In order to preserve robustness of the extracted features, most randomization methods are linear and this is detrimental to the security aspects required of hash functions. Furthermore, the quantization and encoding stages used to binarize real-valued features requires the learning of appropriate quantization thresholds. How these thresholds are learnt has an important effect on hashing accuracy and the mere presence of such thresholds are a source of information leakage that can reduce hashing security. This dissertation outlines a systematic investigation of the quantization and encoding stages of robust hash functions. While existing literature has focused on the importance of quantization scheme, this research is the first to emphasise the importance of the quantizer training on both hashing accuracy and hashing security. The quantizer training process is presented in a statistical framework which allows a theoretical analysis of the effects of quantizer training on hashing performance. This is experimentally verified using a number of baseline robust image hashing algorithms over a large database of real world images. This dissertation also proposes a new randomization method for robust image hashing based on Higher Order Spectra (HOS) and Radon projections. The method is non-linear and this is an essential requirement for non-invertibility. The method is also designed to produce features more suited for quantization and encoding. The system can operate without the need for quantizer training, is more easily encoded and displays improved hashing performance when compared to existing robust image hashing algorithms. The dissertation also shows how the HOS method can be adapted to work with biometric features obtained from 2D and 3D face images.
Resumo:
In this paper we tackle the problem of finding an efficient signature verification scheme when the number of signatures is signi.- cantly large and the verifier is relatively weak. In particular, we tackle the problem of message authentication in many-to-one communication networks known as concast communication. The paper presents three signature screening algorithms for a variant of ElGamal-type digital signatures. The cost for these schemes is n applications of hash functions, 2n modular multiplications, and n modular additions plus the verification of one digital signature, where n is the number of signatures. The paper also presents a solution to the open problem of finding a fast screening signature for non-RSA digital signature schemes.
Resumo:
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are a growing concern to networked services like the Internet. In recent years, major Internet e-commerce and government sites have been disabled due to various DoS attacks. A common form of DoS attack is a resource depletion attack, in which an attacker tries to overload the server's resources, such as memory or computational power, rendering the server unable to service honest clients. A promising way to deal with this problem is for a defending server to identify and segregate malicious traffic as earlier as possible. Client puzzles, also known as proofs of work, have been shown to be a promising tool to thwart DoS attacks in network protocols, particularly in authentication protocols. In this thesis, we design efficient client puzzles and propose a stronger security model to analyse client puzzles. We revisit a few key establishment protocols to analyse their DoS resilient properties and strengthen them using existing and novel techniques. Our contributions in the thesis are manifold. We propose an efficient client puzzle that enjoys its security in the standard model under new computational assumptions. Assuming the presence of powerful DoS attackers, we find a weakness in the most recent security model proposed to analyse client puzzles and this study leads us to introduce a better security model for analysing client puzzles. We demonstrate the utility of our new security definitions by including two hash based stronger client puzzles. We also show that using stronger client puzzles any protocol can be converted into a provably secure DoS resilient key exchange protocol. In other contributions, we analyse DoS resilient properties of network protocols such as Just Fast Keying (JFK) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). In the JFK protocol, we identify a new DoS attack by applying Meadows' cost based framework to analyse DoS resilient properties. We also prove that the original security claim of JFK does not hold. Then we combine an existing technique to reduce the server cost and prove that the new variant of JFK achieves perfect forward secrecy (the property not achieved by original JFK protocol) and secure under the original security assumptions of JFK. Finally, we introduce a novel cost shifting technique which reduces the computation cost of the server significantly and employ the technique in the most important network protocol, TLS, to analyse the security of the resultant protocol. We also observe that the cost shifting technique can be incorporated in any Diffine{Hellman based key exchange protocol to reduce the Diffie{Hellman exponential cost of a party by one multiplication and one addition.
Resumo:
In this chapter, we discuss four related areas of cryptology, namely, authentication, hashing, message authentication codes (MACs), and digital signatures. These topics represent active and growing research topics in cryptology. Space limitations allow us to concentrate only on the essential aspects of each topic. The bibliography is intended to supplement our survey. We have selected those items which providean overview of the current state of knowledge in the above areas. Authentication deals with the problem of providing assurance to a receiver that a communicated message originates from a particular transmitter, and that the received message has the same content as the transmitted message. A typical authentication scenario occurs in computer networks, where the identity of two communicating entities is established by means of authentication. Hashing is concerned with the problem of providing a relatively short digest–fingerprint of a much longer message or electronic document. A hashing function must satisfy (at least) the critical requirement that the fingerprints of two distinct messages are distinct. Hashing functions have numerous applications in cryptology. They are often used as primitives to construct other cryptographic functions. MACs are symmetric key primitives that provide message integrity against active spoofing by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message that is verifiable only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of the most important ways of ensuring the integrity of information that is transferred by electronic means. Digital signatures provide electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They preserve the essential features of handwritten signatures and can be used to sign electronic documents. Digital signatures can potentially be used in legal contexts.
Resumo:
The power of sharing computation in a cryptosystem is crucial in several real-life applications of cryptography. Cryptographic primitives and tasks to which threshold cryptosystems have been applied include variants of digital signature, identification, public-key encryption and block ciphers etc. It is desirable to extend the domain of cryptographic primitives which threshold cryptography can be applied to. This paper studies threshold message authentication codes (threshold MACs). Threshold cryptosystems usually use algebraically homomorphic properties of the underlying cryptographic primitives. A typical approach to construct a threshold cryptographic scheme is to combine a (linear) secret sharing scheme with an algebraically homomorphic cryptographic primitive. The lack of algebraic properties of MACs rules out such an approach to share MACs. In this paper, we propose a method of obtaining a threshold MAC using a combinatorial approach. Our method is generic in the sense that it is applicable to any secure conventional MAC by making use of certain combinatorial objects, such as cover-free families and their variants. We discuss the issues of anonymity in threshold cryptography, a subject that has not been addressed previously in the literature in the field, and we show that there are trade-offis between the anonymity and efficiency of threshold MACs.
Resumo:
Cryptographic hash functions are an important tool of cryptography and play a fundamental role in efficient and secure information processing. A hash function processes an arbitrary finite length input message to a fixed length output referred to as the hash value. As a security requirement, a hash value should not serve as an image for two distinct input messages and it should be difficult to find the input message from a given hash value. Secure hash functions serve data integrity, non-repudiation and authenticity of the source in conjunction with the digital signature schemes. Keyed hash functions, also called message authentication codes (MACs) serve data integrity and data origin authentication in the secret key setting. The building blocks of hash functions can be designed using block ciphers, modular arithmetic or from scratch. The design principles of the popular Merkle–Damgård construction are followed in almost all widely used standard hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1.
Resumo:
The NLM stream cipher designed by Hoon Jae Lee, Sang Min Sung, Hyeong Rag Kim is a strengthened version of the LM summation generator that combines linear and non-linear feedback shift registers. In recent works, the NLM cipher has been used for message authentication in lightweight communication over wireless sensor networks and for RFID authentication protocols. The work analyses the security of the NLM stream cipher and the NLM-MAC scheme that is built on the top of the NLM cipher. We first show that the NLM cipher suffers from two major weaknesses that lead to key recovery and forgery attacks. We prove the internal state of the NLM cipher can be recovered with time complexity about nlog7×2, where the total length of internal state is 2⋅n+22⋅n+2 bits. The attack needs about n2n2 key-stream bits. We also show adversary is able to forge any MAC tag very efficiently by having only one pair (MAC tag, ciphertext). The proposed attacks are practical and break the scheme with a negligible error probability.
Resumo:
Multiple-time signatures are digital signature schemes where the signer is able to sign a predetermined number of messages. They are interesting cryptographic primitives because they allow to solve many important cryptographic problems, and at the same time offer substantial efficiency advantage over ordinary digital signature schemes like RSA. Multiple-time signature schemes have found numerous applications, in ordinary, on-line/off-line, forward-secure signatures, and multicast/stream authentication. We propose a multiple-time signature scheme with very efficient signing and verifying. Our construction is based on a combination of one-way functions and cover-free families, and it is secure against the adaptive chosen-message attack.
Resumo:
Digital signatures are often used by trusted authorities to make unique bindings between a subject and a digital object; for example, certificate authorities certify a public key belongs to a domain name, and time-stamping authorities certify that a certain piece of information existed at a certain time. Traditional digital signature schemes however impose no uniqueness conditions, so a trusted authority could make multiple certifications for the same subject but different objects, be it intentionally, by accident, or following a (legal or illegal) coercion. We propose the notion of a double-authentication-preventing signature, in which a value to be signed is split into two parts: a subject and a message. If a signer ever signs two different messages for the same subject, enough information is revealed to allow anyone to compute valid signatures on behalf of the signer. This double-signature forgeability property discourages signers from misbehaving---a form of self-enforcement---and would give binding authorities like CAs some cryptographic arguments to resist legal coercion. We give a generic construction using a new type of trapdoor functions with extractability properties, which we show can be instantiated using the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer.
Resumo:
A parallel authentication and public-key encryption is introduced and exemplified on joint encryption and signing which compares favorably with sequential Encrypt-then-Sign (ɛtS) or Sign-then-Encrypt (Stɛ) schemes as far as both efficiency and security are concerned. A security model for signcryption, and thus joint encryption and signing, has been recently defined which considers possible attacks and security goals. Such a scheme is considered secure if the encryption part guarantees indistinguishability and the signature part prevents existential forgeries, for outsider but also insider adversaries. We propose two schemes of parallel signcryption, which are efficient alternative to Commit-then-Sign-and- Encrypt (Ct&G3&S). They are both provably secure in the random oracle model. The first one, called generic parallel encrypt and sign, is secure if the encryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and the signature scheme prevents existential forgeries against random-message attacks. The second scheme, called optimal parallel encrypt. and sign, applies random oracles similar to the OAEP technique in order to achieve security using encryption and signature components with very weak security requirements — encryption is expected to be one-way under chosen-plaintext attacks while signature needs to be secure against universal forgeries under random-plaintext attack, that is actually the case for both the plain-RSA encryption and signature under the usual RSA assumption. Both proposals are generic in the sense that any suitable encryption and signature schemes (i.e. which simply achieve required security) can be used. Furthermore they allow both parallel encryption and signing, as well as parallel decryption and verification. Properties of parallel encrypt and sign schemes are considered and a new security standard for parallel signcryption is proposed.