Foundations of International Climate Law : Objectives, principles and methods

This chapter explores the objectives, principle and methods of climate law. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) lays the foundations of the international regime by setting out its ultimate objectives in Article 2, the key principles in Article 3, and the methods of the regime in Article 4. The ultimate objective of the regime – to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference – is examined and assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are considered when seeking to understand the definition of this concept. The international environmental principles of: state sovereignty and responsibility, preventative action, cooperation, sustainable development, precaution, polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibility are then examined and their incorporation within the international climate regime instruments evaluated. This is followed by an examination of the methods used by the mitigation and adaptation regimes in seeking to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC. Methods of the mitigation regime include: domestic implementation of policies, setting of standards and targets and allocation of rights, use of flexibility mechanisms, and reporting. While it is noted that methods of the adaptation regime are still evolving, the latter includes measures such as impact assessments, national adaptation plans and the provision of funding.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

Australia's adoption of an international tax regime : to engage or not to engage?

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia's future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

Neither an international tax, nor an international taxing body exists. Rather, there are domestic taxing rules adopted by jurisdictions which, coupled with double tax treaties, apply to cross-border transactions and international taxation issues. International bodies such as the OECD and UN, which provide guidance on tax issues, often steer and supplement these domestic adoptions but have no binding international taxing powers. These pragmatic realities, together with the specific use of the word ‘regime’ within the tax community, lead many to argue that an international tax regime does not exist. However, an international tax regime should be defined no differently to any other area of international law and when we step outside the confines of tax law to consider the definition of a ‘regime’ within international relations it is possible to demonstrate that such a regime is very real. The first part of this article, by defining an international tax regime in a broader and more traditional context, also outlining both the tax policy and principles which frame that regime, reveals its existence. Once it is accepted that an international tax regime exists, it is possible to consider its adoption by jurisdictions and subsequent constraints it places on them. Using the proposed changes to transfer pricing laws as the impetus for assessing Australia’s adoption of the international tax regime, the constraints on sovereignty are assessed through a taxonomy of the level adoption. This reveals the subsequent constraints which flow from the broad acceptance of an international tax regime through to the specific adoption of technical detail. By undertaking this analysis, the second part of this article demonstrates that Australia has inherently adopted an international tax regime, with a move towards explicit adoption and a clear embedding of its principles within the domestic tax legislation.

Opportunities for forest finance under the International climate change regime

The international climate change regime has the potential to increase revenue available for forest restoration projects in Commonwealth nations. There are three mechanisms which could be used to fund forest projects aimed at forest conservation, forest restoration and sustainable forest management. The first forest funding opportunity arises under the clean development mechanism, a flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. The clean development mechanism allows Annex I parties (industrialised nations) to invest in emission reduction activities in non-Annex 1 (developing countries) and the establishment of forest sinks is an eligible clean development mechanism activity. Secondly, parties to the Kyoto Protocol are able to include sustainable forest management activities in their national carbon accounting. The international rules concerning this are called the Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Guidelines. Thirdly, it is anticipated that at the upcoming Copenhagen negotiations that a Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) instrument will be created. This will provide a direct funding mechanism for those developing countries with tropical forests. Payments made under a REDD arrangement will be based upon the developing country with tropical forest cover agreeing to protect and conserve a designated forest estate. These three funding options available under the international climate change regime demonstrate that there is potential for forest finance within the regime. These opportunities are however hindered by a number of technical and policy barriers which prevent the ability of the regime to significantly increase funding for forest projects. There are two types of carbon markets, compliance carbon markets (Kyoto based) and voluntary carbon markets. Voluntary carbon markets are more flexible then compliance markets and as such offer potential to increase revenue available for sustainable forest projects.

The Rise of the BASIC Group Within the International Climate Regime : The Challenge of Ensuring Equitable Mitigation Obligations

The chapter examines the current emission reduction obligations within the climate regime. It looks at the formation and rise of the BASIC negotiation group within the international climate COP negotiations and examines the role that BASIC nations are now playing shaping international mitigation policy.

The desirability of depoliticization: Compliance in the international climate regime

The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable among global multilateral environmental agreements for its efforts to depoliticize compliance. However, attempts to create autonomous, arm’s length and rule-based compliance processes with extensive reliance on putatively neutral experts were only partially realized in practice in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, the procedurally constrained facilitative powers vested in the Facilitative Branch were circumvented, and expert review teams (ERTs) assumed pivotal roles in compliance facilitation. The ad hoc diplomatic and facilitative practices engaged in by these small teams of technical experts raise questions about the reliability and consistency of the compliance process. For the future operation of the Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be confined to more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. There would then be greater scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in accordance with its mandate. However, if – as appears likely – the future compliance trajectories under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, it is important to develop appropriate procedural safeguards that reflect and shape the various technical and political roles these teams currently play.

The function of property in creating an effective legal regime for trade in environmental offsets

Market-based environmental regulation is becoming increasingly common within international and national frameworks. Environmental offset and trading regimes are part of the market-based instrument revolution. This paper proposes that environmental market mechanisms could be used to introduce an ethic of land holder responsibility. In order for market based regimes to attract sufficient levels of stakeholder engagement, participants within such scheme require an incentive to participate and furthermore need to feel a sense of security about investing in such processes. A sense of security is often associated with property based interests. This paper explores the property related issues connected with environmental offset and trading scheme initiatives. Relevant property-related considerations include land tenure considerations, public versus private management of land choices, characteristics and powers associated with property interests, theories defining property and the recognition of legal proprietal interests. The Biodiversity Banking Scheme in New South Wales is then examined as a case study followed by a critique on the role of environmental markets.

Flow regime transition criteria for two-phase flow at reduced gravity conditions

Flow regime transition criteria are of practical importance for two-phase flow analyses at reduced gravity conditions. Here, flow regime transition criteria which take the friction pressure loss effect into account were studied in detail. Criteria at reduced gravity conditions were developed by extending an existing model with various experimental datasets taken at microgravity conditions showed satisfactory agreement. Sample computations of the model were performed at various gravity conditions, such as 0.196, 1.62, 3.71, and 9.81 m/s2 corresponding to micro-gravity and lunar, Martian and Earth surface gravity, respectively. It was found that the effect of gravity on bubbly-slug and slug-annular (churn) transitions in a two-phase flow system was more pronounced at low liquid flow conditions, whereas the gravity effect could be ignored at high mixture volumetric flux conditions. While for the annular flow transitions due to flow reversal and onset of dropset entrainment, higher superficial gas velocity was obtained at higher gravity level.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.