Moments of flux in intermediary liability for copyright infringement

This chapter provides an overview of a recent shift in regulatory strategies to address copyright infringement toward enlisting the assistance of general purpose Internet Service Providers. In Australia, the High Court held in 2012 that iiNet, a general purpose ISP, had no legal duty to police what its subscribers did with their internet connections. We provide an overview of three recent developments in Australian copyright law since that decision that demonstrate an emerging shift in the way that obligations are imposed on ISPs to govern the actions of their users without relying on secondary liability. The first is a new privately negotiated industry code that introduces a 'graduated response' system that requires ISPs to pass on warnings to subscribers who receive allegations of infringement. The second involves a recent series of Federal Court cases where rightsholders made a partially successful application to require ISPs to hand over the identifying details of subscribers whose households are alleged to have infringed copyright. The third is a new legislative scheme that will require ISPs to block access to foreign websites that 'facilitate' infringement. We argue that these shifts represent a greater sophistication in approaches to enrolling general purpose intermediaries in the regulatory project. We also suggest that these shifts represent a potentially disturbing trend towards enforcement of copyright law in a way that does not provide strong safeguards for the legitimate constitutional due process interests of users. We conclude with a call for greater attention and research to better understand how intermediaries make decisions when governing the conduct of users, how those decisions may be influenced by both state and non-state actors, and how the rights of individuals to due process can be adequately protected.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Internet and e-commerce law, business and policy

Over the last two decades, the internet and e-commerce have reshaped the way we communicate, interact and transact. In the converged environment enabled by high speed broadband, web 2.0, social media, virtual worlds, user-generated content, cloud computing, VoIP, open source software and open content have rapidly become established features of our online experience. Business and government alike are increasingly using the internet as the preferred platform for delivery of their goods and services and for effective engagement with their clients. New ways of doing things online and challenges to existing business, government and social activities have tested current laws and often demand new policies and laws, adapted to the new realities. The focus of this book is the regulation of social, cultural and commercial activity on the World Wide Web. It considers developments in the law that have been, and continue to be, brought about by the emergence of the internet and e-commerce. It analyses how the law is applied to define rights and obligations in relation to online infrastructure, content and practices.

Breakfast at Tiffany's': eBay Inc., trade mark law, and counterfeiting

In an exploration of intellectual property and fashion, this article examines the question of the intermediary liability of online auction-houses for counterfeiting. In the United States, the illustrious jewellery store, Tiffany & Co, brought a legal action against eBay Inc, alleging direct trademark infringement, contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition and trademark dilution. The luxury store depicted the online auction-house as a pirate bazaar, a flea-market and a haven for counterfeiting. During epic litigation, eBay Inc successfully defended itself against these allegations in a United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Tiffany & Co made a desperate, unsuccessful effort to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court of the United States. The matter featured a number of interventions from amicus curiae — Tiffany was supported by Coty, the Fashion Designer's Guild, and the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, while eBay was defended by publicly-spirited civil society groups such as Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Citizen, and Public Knowledge as well as Yahoo!, Google Inc, Amazon.com, and associations representing telecommunications carriers and internet service providers. The litigation in the United States can be counterpointed with the fusillade of legal action against eBay in the European Union. In contrast to Tiffany & Co, Louis Vuitton triumphed over eBay in the French courts — claiming its victory as vindication of the need to protect the commercial interests and cultural heritage of France. However, eBay has fared somewhat better in a dispute with L’Oréal in Great Britain and the European Court of Justice. It is argued that, in a time of flux and uncertainty, Australia should follow the position of the United States courts in Tiffany & Co v eBay Inc. The final part examines the ramifications of this litigation over online auction-houses for trade mark law reform and consumer rights; parallel disputes over intermediary liability and safe harbours in the field of copyright law and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2010. The conclusion calls for a revision of trade mark law, animated by a respect for consumers’ rights and interests in the electronic marketplace.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Australian court holds Google is responsible for linking to defamatory website

The South Australian Supreme Court this week found that Google is legally responsible when its search results link to defamatory content on the web. In this long-running case, Dr Janice Duffy has been trying for more than six years to clear her name and remove links to defamatory material when people search for her using Google. The main culprit is the US based website Ripoff Reports, where people have posted negative reviews of Dr Duffy. Under United States law, defamation is very hard to prove, and US websites are not liable for comments made by their users. Since it was not possible to get harmful or abusive comments removed from the source, Dr Duffy instead asked Google to remove the links from its search results. Google removed some of these links, but only from its Australian domain (google.com.au), and it left many of them active. This latest court decision is a big win for Dr Duffy. The court found that once Google was alerted to the defamatory material, it was then under an obligation to act to censor its search results and prevent further harm to Dr Duffy’s reputation.

Google, online search and consumer confusion in Australia

The legality of the operation of Google’s search engine, and its liability as an Internet intermediary, has been tested in various jurisdictions on various grounds. In Australia, there was an ultimately unsuccessful case against Google under the Australian Consumer Law relating to how it presents results from its search engine. Despite this failed claim, several complex issues were not adequately addressed in the case including whether Google sufficiently distinguishes between the different parts of its search results page, so as not to mislead or deceive consumers. This article seeks to address this question of consumer confusion by drawing on empirical survey evidence of Australian consumers’ understanding of Google’s search results layout. This evidence, the first of its kind in Australia, indicates some level of consumer confusion. The implications for future legal proceedings in against Google in Australia and in other jurisdictions are discussed.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Beyond Bryan: Builders' liability and pure economic loss

In Bryan v Maloney, the High Court extended a builder’s duty of care to encompass a liability in negligence for the pure economic loss sustained by a subsequent purchaser of a residential dwelling as a result of latent defects in the building’s construction. Recently, in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd, the Court refused to extend this liability to defects in commercial premises. The decision therefore provides an opportunity to re-examine the rationale and policy behind current jurisprudence governing builders’ liability for pure economic loss. In doing so, this article considers the principles relevant to the determination of a duty of care generally and whether the differences between purchasers of residential and commercial properties are as great as the case law suggests

Developing capabilities for ongoing learning and change in intermediary programs

In dynamic environments, firms seek to build capabilities which will permit them to become innovation and change ready. Programs offered by intermediaries, while varying greatly in content and format, are designed to support those firms wishing to enhance their competitiveness. Firms which participate in intermediary programs have displayed their willingness to overcome deficiencies or barriers to competitiveness through acquiring knowledge which is external to the firm. This paper reports on interviews with 24 firms who were involved in a MAP or TAP program offered by QMI Solutions. The findings of the research suggest that knowledge intermediaries serve to disrupt organisational paths and in so doing establish mechanisms for ongoing learning and change. They do this first by disrupting the firm with a positive learning experience and also by establishing processes for developing new relationships and access to knowledge which are critical for learning and change. It is the experience of learning through knowledge exchange which can trigger the pursuit of new paths and it is the processes involving new relations and knowledge processing that provides the micro-foundations for ongoing learning and change. This suggests that the role of intermediaries goes well beyond merely knowledge transfer to include longer term effects on the capability of organisations to innovate, which is critical to economic competitiveness and the survival rate of firms.

The knowledge exchange intermediary as service provider : a discussion and an Australian case

The critical impact of innovation on national and the global economies has been discussed at length in the literature. Economic development requires the diffusion of innovations into markets. It has long been recognised that economic growth and development depends upon a constant stream of innovations. Governments have been keenly aware of the need to ensure this flow does not dry to a trickle and have introduced many and varied industry policies and interventions to assist in seeding, supporting and diffusing innovations. In Australia, as in many countries, Government support for the transfer of knowledge especially from publicly funded research has resulted in the creation of knowledge exchange intermediaries. These intermediaries are themselves service organisations, seeking innovative service offerings for their markets. The choice for most intermediaries is generally a dichotomous one, between market-pull and technology-push knowledge exchange programmes. In this article, we undertake a case analysis of one such innovative intermediary and its flagship programme. We then compare this case with other successful intermediaries in Europe. We put forward a research proposition that the design of intermediary programmes must match the service type they offer. That is, market-pull programmes require market-pull design, in close collaboration with industry, whereas technology programmes can be problem-solving innovations where demand is latent. The discussion reflects the need for an evolution in knowledge transfer policies and programmes beyond the first generation ushered in with the US Bayh-Dole Act (1980) and Stevenson-Wydler Act (1984). The data analysed is a case study comparison of market-pull and technology-push programmes, focusing on primary and secondary socio-economic benefits (using both Australian and international comparisons).

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.