Humanness and Dehumanization

What does it mean to be human? Why do people dehumanize others (and sometimes themselves)? These questions have only recently begun to be investigated in earnest within psychology. This volume presents the latest thinking about these and related questions from research leaders in the field of humanness and dehumanization in social psychology and related disciplines. Contributions provide new insights into the history of dehumanization, its different types, and new theories are proposed for when and why dehumanization occurs. While people’s views about what humanness is, and who has it, have long been known as important in understanding ethnic conflict, contributors demonstrate its relevance in other domains, including medical practice, policing, gender relations, and our relationship with the natural environment. Cultural differences and similarities in beliefs about humanness are explored, along with strategies to overcome dehumanization. In highlighting emerging ideas and theoretical perspectives, describing current theoretical issues and controversies and ways to resolve them, and in extending research to new areas, this volume will influence research on humanness and dehumanization for many years.

Folk conceptions of humanness: Beliefs about distinctive and core human characteristics in Australia, Italy, and China

The present research explores cultural understandings of what it means to be human. We used open-ended responses to examine whether the most culturally salient aspects of humanness are captured by two theoretical dimensions: human uniqueness (HU) and human nature (HN). Australians, Italians, and Chinese (N = 315) showed differences in the characteristics considered human and in the emphasis placed on HU and HN. These findings contribute to developing cross-cultural folk psychological models of humanness.

Attributing and denying humanness to others

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other—human nature—those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon’s cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.

Humanizing the self: Moderators of the attribution of lesser humanness to others

Three studies investigated moderators of the tendency to attribute greater humanness to the self than to others, an interpersonal counterpart of outgroup infra-humanization. Study 1 demonstrated that this self-humanizing effect is reduced when the other is the focus of comparison. Study 2 showed that the effect is reduced when the other is individuated. Study 3 indicated that empathy does not moderate self-humanizing: Self-humanizing failed to correlate negatively with dispositional empathy or perspective-taking. Study 3 also indicated that abstract construal moderates the self-humanizing effect using a temporal comparison. Participants rated their future self, but not their past self, as less human than their present self. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that selfhumanizing is greater for undesirable traits: People may view their failings as “only human.” All findings were distinct from those attributable to self-enhancement. Self-humanizing may reflect a combination of egocentrism, focalism, abstract representation of others, and motivated processes.

More human than you: Attributing humanness to self and others

People typically evaluate their in-groups more favorably than out-groups and themselves more favorably than others. Research on infrahumanization also suggests a preferential attribution of the “human essence” to in-groups, independent of in-group favoritism. The authors propose a corresponding phenomenon in interpersonal comparisons: People attribute greater humanness to themselves than to others, independent of self-enhancement. Study 1 and a pilot study demonstrated 2 distinct understandings of humanness—traits representing human nature and those that are uniquely human—and showed that only the former traits are understood as inhering essences. In Study 2, participants rated themselves higher than their peers on human nature traits but not on uniquely human traits, independent of selfenhancement. Study 3 replicated this “self-humanization” effect and indicated that it is partially mediated by attribution of greater depth to self versus others. Study 4 replicated the effect experimentally. Thus, people perceive themselves to be more essentially human than others.

Living the nation

Belonging to and identifying with a nation has, since the latter half of the 18th century, been a distinctly human quality. To be human is to be part of a nation. Yet, contemporary theorists such as Appadurai and Fukuyama argue this universal human trait is undergoing vast change, threatened, it seems, by irrelevance and obsolescence, a return to tribalism and widened conceptual horizons represented by the likes of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. These same threats are often attributed to the changing ideas and experience of spatiality and temporality enabled by information and communication technologies such as the Internet, spurred on by the rising intensity of flow amongst and within the human population. This paper argues that in the analysis of changes to the nation—which I suggest is best considered as the nexus of the body politic, the social body and human bodies—it is the notion of lived time and lived space that is most appropriate. The notion of the lived is borrowed and extended from Henri Lefebvre, who theorises that between mentally conceived and physically perceived space, lies its socially lived counterpart, which he defines as “the materialisation of social being”. As such, lived space (and time) draws on both its material and mental aspects. It is the thesis of this paper that against such a background as lived time and lived space the nation becomes much more than a political concept and/or project and is revealed as lived phenomenon, experienced in and through the dynamics of everyday praxis. Inherent to this argument is the understanding that it is the interplay between the possibilities imagined of the nation and; its eventual realisation through social acts and practices that marks it as a profoundly human institution.

Attributing human uniqueness and human nature to cultural groups : distinct forms of subtle dehumanization

Research on subtle dehumanization has focused on the attribution of human uniqueness to groups (infrahumanization), but has not examined another sense of humanness, human nature. Additionally, research has not extended far beyond Western cultures to examine the universality of these forms of dehumanization. Hence, the attribution of both forms of humanness was examined in three cross-cultural studies. Anglo-Australian and ethnic Chinese attributed values and traits (Study 1, N = 200) and emotions (Study 2, N = 151) to Australian and Chinese groups, and rated these characteristics on human uniqueness and human nature. Both studies found evidence of complementary attributions of humanness for Australians, who denied Chinese human nature but attributed them with greater human uniqueness. Chinese denied Australians human uniqueness, but their attributions of human nature varied for traits, values, and emotions. Study 3 (N = 54) demonstrated similar forms of dehumanization using an implicit method. These results and their implications for dehumanization and prejudice suggest the need to broaden investigation and theory to encompass both forms of humanness, and examine the attribution of both lesser and greater humanness to outgroups.

Embracing humanity in the face of death: Why do existential concerns moderate ingroup humanization?

People humanize their ingroup to address existential concerns about their mortality, but the reasons why they do so remain ambiguous. One explanation is that people humanize their ingroup to bolster their social identity in the face of their mortality. Alternatively, people might be motivated to see their ingroup as more uniquely human (UH) to distance themselves from their corporeal “animal” nature. These explanations were tested in Australia, where social identity is tied less to UH and more to human nature (HN) which does not distinguish humans from animals. Australians attributed more HN traits to the ingroup when mortality was salient, while the attribution of UH traits remained unchanged. This indicates that the mortality-buffering function of ingroup humanization lies in reinforcing the humanness of our social identity, rather than just distancing ourselves from our animal nature. Implications for (de)humanization in intergroup relations are discussed.