Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Corporate governance in China

So far as Asia is concerned, corporate governance is an import. The concept itself was virtually unknown in China ¬a decade ago. Yet corporate governance has now been enthusiastically embraced in China, to the point that the year 2005 was declared the Year of Corporate Governance and extensive amendments have been made to several laws and regulations with an emphasis on corporate governance. This essay will consider the effectiveness of China’s corporate governance law on paper and in practice with the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance acting as a general guide.

Corporate profit and impression management in developing markets

In this study, we examine how organisations in Fiji communicate or legitimise their profit. We base the need for understanding this phenomenon on the following premise. Organisations are part of a wider society, and in competition for scarce resources. Organisations obtain the rights to consume resources upon conception, but must continually legitimise their rights of existence and the need to access the resources. Legitimacy is the ability to continue to justify one’s authority to exist in a society. Organisations rights to resources are contractual, and have a moral obligation to act in a responsible manner and justify their outcomes, actions, and activities to external stakeholders. Such justifications would be an attempt at legitimizing their existence by some form of impression management. Impression management refers to the process by which individuals attempt to influence the impression of others (Melo et al. 2009). In corporate reporting, impression management occurs when management selects, display, and presents that information in a manner that distorts readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Neu 1991; Patten 2002), and is managed best through disclosures (O’Donovan 2002). In developing economies, there is significant Government protection that creates near-monopoly sectors and industries. The rendered protection permits organisations to provide essential services to the community at reasonable costs. Organisations in these sectors and industries have an ominous need to legitimise their position and actions. The bond between the organisations and the society is much stronger, making organisations devote more effort in communicating their activities. Protection permits organisations to make reasonable profits to sustain their operations. Society may not accept abnormal profits from operational efficiencies. Profit is fundamental to the society’s perception of an organisation, amplifying the need for the firm to justify a level of profit. Abnormal profit for organisations construes bad news, and organisations would make relevant disclosures to manage stakeholder impressions on profit (Patten 2002). Organisations can manage impressions by disclosing information in a particular way. That is, organisations would want to put the impression that the abnormal profit is justified and the society will obtain its benefits in future. Such form of impression management requires unambiguous disclosure of information. The readability of corporate disclosures is an important indicator of organisational abnormal profit-related legitimacy efforts in developing economies.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime and corporate disclosure behaviour : does corporate governance matter?

Since 1 December 2002, the New Zealand Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated with statutory backing. To test the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime, we compare the change in quantity of market announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) released to the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory backing. We also extend our study in investigating whether the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime is diminished or augmented by corporate governance mechanisms including board size, providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board gender diversity and audit committee independence. Our findings provide a qualified support for the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime regarding the quantity of market disclosures. There is strong evidence that the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime was augmented by providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board gender diversity and audit committee independence, and diminished by board size. In addition, there is significant evidence that share price queries do impact corporate disclosure behaviour and this impact is significantly influenced by corporate governance mechanisms. Our findings provide important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for...

What drives the commodity price beta of oil industry stocks

We test theoretical drivers of the oil price beta of oil industry stocks. The strongest statistical and economic support comes for market conditions-type variables as the prime drivers: namely, oil price (+), bond rate (+), volatility of oil returns (−) and cost of carry (+). Though statistically significant, exogenous firm characteristics and oil firms' financing decisions have less compelling economic significance. There is weaker support for the prediction that financial risk management reduces the exposure of oil stocks to crude oil price variation. Finally, extended modelling shows that mean reversion in oil prices also helps explain cross-sectional variation in the oil beta.

Statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime and corporate disclosure behaviour : does corporate governance matter?

Since 1 December 2002, the New Zealand Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated with statutory backing. To test the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime, we compare the change in quantity of market announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) released to the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory backing. We also extend our study in investigating whether the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime is diminished or augmented by corporate governance mechanisms including board size, providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board gender diversity and audit committee independence. Our findings provide a qualified support for the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime regarding the quantity of market disclosures. There is strong evidence that the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime was augmented by providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board gender diversity and audit committee independence, and diminished by board size. In addition, there is significant evidence that share price queries do impact corporate disclosure behaviour and this impact is significantly influenced by corporate governance mechanisms. Our findings provide important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.

Transfer pricing and multinational financial institutions : the case for replacing arm’s length price with a unitary approach

The international tax system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace with the modern multinational entity rendering it ineffective in taxing many modern businesses according to economic activity. One of those modern multinational entities is the multinational financial institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and significant example of the failure of the current system on a global scale. The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading operations. A primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in developing countries grew by 122 per cent. The same study indicates that foreign banks have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and developing countries. Hence, most significant is that fact that MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as mining and tourism. IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies. The difficulties for developing countries in applying current international tax rules, especially the current traditional transfer pricing regime, are particularly acute in relation to MNFIs, which are the biggest users of tax havens and offshore finance. This paper investigates whether a unitary taxation approach which reflects economic reality would more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions which give rise to those profits. It has previously been argued that the uniqueness of MNFIs results in a failure of the current system to accurately allocate profits and that unitary tax as an alternative could provide a sounder allocation model for international tax purposes. This paper goes a step further, and examines the practicalities of the implementation of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, along with their their implications. This paper adopts a two-step approach in considering the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which requires international acceptance and agreement. First, the definitional issues of the unitary MNFI are examined and second, an appropriate allocation formula for this sector is investigated. To achieve this, the paper asks first, how the financial sector should be defined for the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector and second, what is the ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.

The impact of corporate governance on private placements in Australia

In private placement transactions, issuing firms sell a block of securities to just a small group of investors at a discounted price. Non-participating shareholders suffer from ownership dilution and lose the opportunity to receive the discount. This thesis provides the first evidence on whether and how corporate governance can protect non-participating shareholders' interests. Results from an examination of 329 private placements issued by the top 250 Australian firms between 2002 and 2009 demonstrate that firms with higher governance quality are more likely to issue a share purchase plan (SPP) along with the private placement, thus providing greater protection to non-participating shareholders' interests.