Synopolies: The use of cryptographic technologies to impede competition in multiple jurisdictions

Many jurisdictions have developed mature infrastructures, both administratively and legislatively, to promote competition. Substantial funds have been expended to monitor activities that are anticompetitive and many jurisdictions also have adopted a form of "Cartel Leniency Program", first developed by the US Federal Trade Commission, to assist in cartel detection. Further, some jurisdictions are now criminalizing cartel behaviour so that cartel participants can be held criminally liable with substantial custodial penalties imposed. Notwithstanding these multijurisdictional approaches, a new form of possibly anticompetitive behaviour is looming. Synergistic monopolies („synopolies‟) involve not competitors within a horizontal market but complimentors within separate vertical markets. Where two complimentary corporations are monopolists in their own market they can, through various technologies, assist each other to expand their respective monopolies thus creating a barrier to new entrants and/or blocking existing participants from further participation in that market. The nature of the technologies involved means that it is easy for this potentially anti-competitive activity to enter and affect the global marketplace. Competition regulators need to be aware of this potential for abuse and ensure that their respective competition frameworks appropriately address this activity. This paper discusses how new technologies can be used to create a synopoly.

Standardisation and patent ambush : potential liability under Australian competition law

This article examines the problem of patent ambush in standard setting, where patent owners are sometimes able to capture industry standards in order to secure monopoly power and windfall profits. Because standardisation generally introduces high switching costs, patent ambush can impose significant costs on downstream manufacturers and consumers and drastically reduce the efficiency gains of standardisation.This article considers how Australian competition law is likely to apply to patent ambush both in the development of a standard (through misrepresenting the existence of an essential patent) and after a standard is implemented (through refusing to license an essential patented technology either at all or on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms). This article suggests that non-disclosure of patent interests is unlikely to restrained by Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA), and refusals to license are only likely to be restrained if the refusal involves leveraging or exclusive dealing. By contrast, Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) which seek to limit this behaviour through private ordering may face considerable scrutiny under the new cartel provisions of the TPA. This article concludes that SSOs may be best advised to implement administrative measures to prevent patent hold-up, such as reviewing which patents are essential for the implementation of a standard, asking patent holders to make their licence conditions public to promote transparency, and establishing forums where patent licensees can complain about licence terms that they consider to be unreasonable or discriminatory. Additionally, the ACCC may play a role in authorising SSO policies that could otherwise breach the new cartel provisions, but which have the practical effect of promoting competition in the standards setting environment.

Joint Ventures Law in Australia (3rd ed.)

Following on from the 2nd edition published in 2005, this new edition updates its predecessor and adds considerable new material as a result of changes in the law generally and commercial approaches to financing joint ventures in particular. Of special note, Financing of Joint Ventures has been completely re-written with considerable additions to take account of the new legislative regimes such as the Personal Property Securities. The impact of climate change legislation has been covered, specifically carbon pricing with additional material on structuring generally and particularly in relation to large joint ventures with governments through Public Private Partnerships. A new Chapter has been added called Resources Joint Ventures and undertakes a thorough analysis of a typical resources joint venture and is heavily cross referenced into the chapter on Default which has also been updated. In addition, International Joint Ventures now includes additional material on structuring and dispute resolution and Joint Ventures and the Competition and Consumer Act has been substantially re-written to take account of 2009 legislative amendments on cartel conduct, and the impact of changes wrought by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. All other chapters and material has been updated to accommodate other legislative changes and new case law over the seven years since the last edition.

Intellectual Property and Joint Ventures

Following upon the success of the 2nd edition published in 2005, this new edition not only updates its predecessor but also adds considerable new material in consequences of changes in the law generally and commercial approaches to financing joint ventures in particular. Of special note are the following: Financing of Joint Ventures has been completely re-written with considerable additions to take account of the new legislative regimes such as the Personal Property Securities, the impact of climate change legislation, specifically carbon pricing with additional material on structuring generally and particularly in relation to large joint ventures with governments through Public Private Partnerships. A new Chapter called Resources Joint Ventures undertakes a thorough analysis of a typical resources joint venture and is heavily cross referenced into the chapter on Default which has also been updated. International Joint Ventures now includes additional material on structuring and dispute resolution. Joint Ventures and the Competition and Consumer Act has been substantially re-written to take account of 2009 legislative amendments on cartel conduct, and the impact of changes wrought by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. All other chapters and material has been updated to accommodate other legislative changes and new case law over the seven years since the last edition.

Agents as intermediaries : when do they compete with their suppliers?

In cases involving allegations of price fixing under the former s 45A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), it was necessary to prove that at least two parties to the arrangement or understanding at issue were “in competition with each other”. The same requirement is contained in the cartel provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) that replaced s 45A. The so-called “competition condition” is set out in s 44ZZRD (4) of the CCA. Where a supplier enters into vertical supply arrangements with agents or brokers, problems can arise if the supplier also has a downstream presence. At that functional level there may be a horizontal and therefore competitive dimension, and the competition condition may be satisfied. In such circumstances, great care will need to be taken in any discussions between the supplier and its downstream agents or distributors about the prices, discounts, allowances, rebates or credits that the agent or distributor may charge. Whether agents or brokers competed with their suppliers in vertical supply arrangements arose for consideration in two decisions handed down by the Federal Court in Brisbane...