Towards beneficence for young children in research : challenges for bioethics committees

Bioethics committees are the focus of international scrutiny,particularly in relation to their application of the principle of beneficence,ensuring that risks incurred in research are outweighed by benefits to those involved directly and to the broader society. Beneficence, in turn, has become an international focus in research with young children, who hitherto had been rarely seen or heard in their own right in research.Twenty years ago, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 raised global awareness of children’s human rights to both participation and protection, and articulation of children’s rights came to inform understandings of young children’s rights in research. In the intervening period, countries such as Australia came to favour child protection and risk minimisation in research over the notion of children’s bone fide participation in research. A key element of the protection regime was the theoretical understanding of young children as developmentally unable and, therefore, unfit to understand, consent to and fully participate as research participants. This understanding has been challenged in recent decades by new theoretical understandings of children’s competence, where children can be seen to demonstrate competence, even at an early age, in consenting to, participating in and withdrawing from research. The paper draws on these understandings to provide insights for human research gatekeepers, such as bioethics committees, to deal with the challenges of research with young children and to realize the benefits that may accrue to children in research.

Globalisation and Health : Challenges for Health Law and Bioethics

This timely collection explores ethical and legal dilemmas in healthcare arising from globalization. Conflicts between public interests and individual rights, the challenge of regulating professionals and access to health services, and the effects of a global market all feature prominently in contemporary debates in this area. As a result of globalization, issues in health law and bioethics can no longer be understood solely within political boundaries that define traditional notions of individuals and communities. Rather, solutions for emerging problems require a global conception of rights and obligations, including the re-evaluation of ethical frameworks and legal regimes that currently govern exchanges in healthcare. Leading scholars in bioethics, law, medicine and philosophy from various jurisdictions engage these themes in this volume, and demonstrate the need for transnational solutions in a global age of healthcare.

Who owns your body? Patricia Piccinini and the future of bioethics

This article analyses some popular cultural representations of biotechnology, especially the artistic work of the Australian artist Patricia Piccinini to reflect on the role of law, technology and ethics in relation to bodily material. Her view that "with creation...comes an obligation to care for the result", so evident in her poignant pictures, is a sober reminder to us of our responsibilities in regulating new technologies.

Ethics and public health

Note: see later edition of this work at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/47632/ This chapter introduces you to the basic ethical principles that underpin public health practice. The themes to be considered in this chapter include: the characteristics of ‘ethics’, the justification for reflecting on ethics and values, the foundations of public health ethics, whether and how we can incorporate ethics and values into our practice and the nature of some of the potential ethical complications of public health practice.

Deliberative assessment of surrogate consent in dementia research

Background Research involving incapacitated persons with dementia entails complex scientific, legal, and ethical issues, making traditional surveys of layperson views on the ethics of such research challenging. We therefore assessed the impact of democratic deliberation (DD), involving balanced, detailed education and peer deliberation, on the views of those responsible for persons with dementia. Methods One hundred and seventy-eight community-recruited caregivers or primary decision-makers for persons with dementia were randomly assigned to either an all-day DD session group or a control group. Educational materials used for the DD session were vetted for balance and accuracy by an interdisciplinary advisory panel. We assessed the acceptability of family-surrogate consent for dementia research (“surrogate-based research”) from a societal policy perspective as well as from the more personal perspectives of deciding for a loved one or for oneself (surrogate and self-perspectives), assessed at baseline, immediately post-DD session, and 1 month after DD date, for four research scenarios of varying risk-benefit profiles. Results At baseline, a majority in both the DD and control groups supported a policy of family consent for dementia research in all research scenarios. The support for a policy of family consent for surrogate-based research increased in the DD group, but not in the control group. The change in the DD group was maintained 1 month later. In the DD group, there were transient changes in attitudes from surrogate or self-perspectives. In the control group, there were no changes from baseline in attitude toward surrogate consent from any perspective. Conclusions Intensive, balanced, and accurate education, along with peer deliberation provided by democratic deliberation, led to a sustained increase in support for a societal policy of family consent in dementia research among those responsible for dementia patients.

Mapping the ethical journey of experienced nurses now practising in rural and remote hospitals in central and south-west Queensland and in domiciliary services in Brisbane : a grounded theory approach

The aim of this thesis has been to map the ethical journey of experienced nurses now practising in rural and remote hospitals in central and south-west Queensland and in domiciliary services in Brisbane. One group of the experienced nurses in the study were Directors of Nursing in rural and remote hospitals. These nurses were “hands on”, “multi-skilled “ nurses who also had the task of managing the hospital. Also there were two Directors of Nursing from domiciliary services in Brisbane. A grounded theory method was used. The nurses were interviewed and the data retrieved from the interviews was coded, categorised and from these categories a conceptual framework was generated. The literature which dealt with the subject of ethical decision making and nurses also became part of the data. The study revealed that all these nurses experienced moral distress as they made ethical decisions. The decision making categories revealed in the data were: the area of financial management; issues as end of life approaches; allowing to die with dignity; emergency decisions; experience of unexpected death; the dilemma of providing care in very difficult circumstances. These categories were divided into two chapters: the category related to administrative and financial constraints and categories dealing with ethical issues in clinical settings. A further chapter discussed the overarching category of coping with moral distress. These experienced nurses suffered moral distress as they made ethical decisions, confirming many instances of moral distress in ethical decision making documented in the literature to date. Significantly, the nurses in their interviews never mentioned the ethical principles used in bioethics as an influence in their decision making. Only one referred to lectures on ethics as being an influence in her thinking. As they described their ethical problems and how they worked through them, they drew on their own previous experience rather than any knowledge of ethics gained from nursing education. They were concerned for their patients, they spoke from a caring responsibility towards their patients, but they were also concerned for justice for their patients. This study demonstrates that these nurses operated from the ethic of care, tempered with the ethic of responsibility as well as a concern for justice for their patients. Reflection on professional experience, rather than formal ethics education and training, was the primary influence on their ethical decision making.

Ending the life of the act/omission dispute: Causation in withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures

My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Me and my body : the relevance of the difference for the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia

In this paper I discuss David Shaw’s claim that the body of a terminally ill person can be conceived as a kind of life-support, akin to an artificial ventilator. I claim that this position rests upon an untenable dualism between the mind and the body. Given that dualism continues to be attractive to some thinkers, I attempt to diagnose the reasons why it continues to be attractive, as well as to demonstrate its incoherence, drawing on some recent work in the philosophy of psychology. I conclude that, if my criticisms are sound, Shaw’s attempt to deny the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia fails.

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

When does pain and distress relief hastening death become killing?

This paper discusses the question of when pain and distress relief known to hasten death would cross the line between permissible conduct and killing. The issue is discussed in the context of organ donation after cardiac death, and considers the administration of analgesics, sedatives, and the controversial use of paralysing agents in the provision and withdrawal of ventilation.