kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent thirty years little progress has been made - due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. This paper resumes the debate by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to assure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of twelve construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Residential sales by auction : a property type or geographic consideration

The sale of residential property by auction is a preferred sale method by real estate agents, but not always preferred by some vendors and most residential property buyers. In many residential property markets, the performance and measure of residential property market activity is based on the number of properties offered for sale by auction, auction clearance rates and the number of properties sold prior to auction. However, in many specific residential property markets, sale by auction may not be the preferred or supported method of sale. This paper will review the type of residential property sale within the Sydney residential property market and track the auction sales and clearance rates for Sydney over the past 5 months and compare these results in relation to clearance rates, passed in sales, and properties sold prior to auction This will provide a breakdown of real estate agency sale practice over a large metropolitan region to determine the impact of geographic location and socio-economic factors on the auction of residential property. In addition the paper will analyse the weekly auction sales in the Sydney residential property market to determine what areas of Sydney have the greatest number of house auctions and the performance of the auctions in relation location and socio economic factors.

Investigating customer click through behaviour with integrated sponsored and nonsponsored results

This paper reports findings from a study investigating the effect of integrating sponsored and nonsponsored search engine links into a single web listing. The premise underlying this research is that web searchers are chiefly interested in relevant results. Given the reported negative bias that web searchers have concerning sponsored links, separate listings may be a disservice to web searchers as it might not direct them to relevant websites. Some web meta-search engines integrate sponsored and nonsponsored links into a single listing. Using a web search engine log of over 7 million interactions from hundreds of thousands of users from a major web meta-search engine, we analysed the click-through patterns for both sponsored and nonsponsored links. We also classified web queries as informational, navigational and transactional based on the expected type of content and analysed the click-through patterns of each classification. The findings show that for more than 35% of queries, there are no clicks on any result. More than 80% of web queries are informational in nature and approximately 10% are transactional, and 10% navigational. Sponsored links account for approximately 15% of all clicks. Integrating sponsored and nonsponsored links does not appear to increase the clicks on sponsored listings. We discuss how these research results could enhance future sponsored search platforms.

Cryptographic techniques for managing computational effort

Availability has become a primary goal of information security and is as significant as other goals, in particular, confidentiality and integrity. Maintaining availability of essential services on the public Internet is an increasingly difficult task in the presence of sophisticated attackers. Attackers may abuse limited computational resources of a service provider and thus managing computational costs is a key strategy for achieving the goal of availability. In this thesis we focus on cryptographic approaches for managing computational costs, in particular computational effort. We focus on two cryptographic techniques: computational puzzles in cryptographic protocols and secure outsourcing of cryptographic computations. This thesis contributes to the area of cryptographic protocols in the following ways. First we propose the most efficient puzzle scheme based on modular exponentiations which, unlike previous schemes of the same type, involves only a few modular multiplications for solution verification; our scheme is provably secure. We then introduce a new efficient gradual authentication protocol by integrating a puzzle into a specific signature scheme. Our software implementation results for the new authentication protocol show that our approach is more efficient and effective than the traditional RSA signature-based one and improves the DoSresilience of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, the most widely used security protocol on the Internet. Our next contributions are related to capturing a specific property that enables secure outsourcing of cryptographic tasks in partial-decryption. We formally define the property of (non-trivial) public verifiability for general encryption schemes, key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), and hybrid encryption schemes, encompassing public-key, identity-based, and tag-based encryption avors. We show that some generic transformations and concrete constructions enjoy this property and then present a new public-key encryption (PKE) scheme having this property and proof of security under the standard assumptions. Finally, we combine puzzles with PKE schemes for enabling delayed decryption in applications such as e-auctions and e-voting. For this we first introduce the notion of effort-release PKE (ER-PKE), encompassing the well-known timedrelease encryption and encapsulated key escrow techniques. We then present a security model for ER-PKE and a generic construction of ER-PKE complying with our security notion.

Generalised gamma bidding model

A generalised gamma bidding model is presented, which incorporates many previous models. The log likelihood equations are provided. Using a new method of testing, variants of the model are fitted to some real data for construction contract auctions to find the best fitting models for groupings of bidders. The results are examined for simplifying assumptions, including all those in the main literature. These indicate no one model to be best for all datasets. However, some models do appear to perform significantly better than others and it is suggested that future research would benefit from a closer examination of these.

An efficient eAuction potocol

A secure protocol for electronic, sealed-bid, single item auctions is presented. The protocol caters to both first and second price (Vickrey) auctions and provides full price flexibility. Both computational and communication cost are linear with the number of bidders and utilize only standard cryptographic primitives. The protocol strictly divides knowledge of the bidder's identity and their actual bids between, respectively, a registration authority and an auctioneer, who are assumed not to collude but may be separately corrupt. This assures strong bidder-anonymity, though only weak bid privacy. The protocol is structured in two phases, each involving only off-line communication. Registration, requiring the use of the public key infrastructure, is simultaneous with hash-sealed bid-commitment and generates a receipt to the bidder containing a pseudonym. This phase is followed by encrypted bid-submission. Both phases involve the registration authority acting as a communication conduit but the actual message size is quite small. It is argued that this structure guarantees non-repudiation by both the winner and the auctioneer. Second price correctness is enforced either by observing the absence of registration of the claimed second-price bid or, where registered but lower than the actual second price, is subject to cooperation by the second price bidder - presumably motivated through self-interest. The use of the registration authority in other contexts is also considered with a view to developing an architecture for efficient secure multiparty transactions