Experimenting with an intrusion detection system for encrypted networks

Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) analyse network traffic to detect instances of malicious activity. Typically, this is only possible when the network traffic is accessible for analysis. With the growing use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that encrypt network traffic, the NIDS can no longer access this crucial audit data. In this paper, we present an implementation and evaluation of our approach proposed in Goh et al. (2009). It is based on Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and allows a NIDS to function normally in a VPN without any modifications and without compromising the confidentiality afforded by the VPN.

Intrusion detection system for encrypted networks using secret-sharing schemes

Secret-sharing schemes describe methods to securely share a secret among a group of participants. A properly constructed secret-sharing scheme guarantees that the share belonging to one participant does not reveal anything about the shares of others or even the secret itself. Besides the obvious feature which is to distribute a secret, secret-sharing schemes have also been used in secure multi-party computations and redundant residue number systems for error correction codes. In this paper, we propose that the secret-sharing scheme be used as a primitive in a Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to detect attacks in encrypted networks. Encrypted networks such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) fully encrypt network traffic which can include both malicious and non-malicious traffic. Traditional NIDS cannot monitor encrypted traffic. Our work uses a combination of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and randomised network proxies to enable a traditional NIDS to function normally in a VPN environment. In this paper, we introduce a novel protocol that utilises a secret-sharing scheme to detect attacks in encrypted networks.

Detecting attacks in encrypted networks using secret-sharing schemes

Secret-sharing schemes describe methods to securely share a secret among a group of participants. A properly constructed secret-sharing scheme guarantees that the share belonging to one participant does not reveal anything about the shares of others or even the secret itself. Besides being used to distribute a secret, secret-sharing schemes have also been used in secure multi-party computations and redundant residue number systems for error correction codes. In this paper, we propose that the secret-sharing scheme be used as a primitive in a Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to detect attacks in encrypted Networks. Encrypted networks such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) fully encrypt network traffic which can include both malicious and non-malicious traffic. Traditional NIDS cannot monitor such encrypted traffic. We therefore describe how our work uses a combination of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and randomised network proxies to enable a traditional NIDS to function normally in a VPN environment.

Intrusion detection framework for encrypted networks

Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) monitor network traffic for signs of malicious activities that have the potential to disrupt entire network infrastructures and services. NIDS can only operate when the network traffic is available and can be extracted for analysis. However, with the growing use of encrypted networks such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that encrypt and conceal network traffic, a traditional NIDS can no longer access network traffic for analysis. The goal of this research is to address this problem by proposing a detection framework that allows a commercial off-the-shelf NIDS to function normally in a VPN without any modification. One of the features of the proposed framework is that it does not compromise on the confidentiality afforded by the VPN. Our work uses a combination of Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme and randomised network proxies to securely route network traffic to the NIDS for analysis. The detection framework is effective against two general classes of attacks – attacks targeted at the network hosts or attacks targeted at framework itself. We implement the detection framework as a prototype program and evaluate it. Our evaluation shows that the framework does indeed detect these classes of attacks and does not introduce any additional false positives. Despite the increase in network overhead in doing so, the proposed detection framework is able to consistently detect intrusions through encrypted networks.

Using Web2.0 applications to close the digital divide in Western Australia

The research reported in this paper documents the use of Web2.0 applications with six Western Australian schools that are considered to be regional and/or remote. With a population of two million people within an area of 2,525,500 square kilometres Western Australia has a number of towns that are classified as regional and remote. Each of the three education systems have set up telecommunications networks to improve learning opportunities for students and administrative services for staff through a virtual private network (VPN) with access from anywhere, anytime and ultimately reduce the feeling of professional and social dislocation experienced by many teachers and students in the isolated communities. By using Web2.0 applications including video conferencing there are enormous opportunities to close the digital divide within the broad directives of the Networking the Nation plan. The Networking the Nation plan aims to connect all Australians regardless of where they are hence closing the digital divide between city and regional living. Email and Internet facilities have greatly improved in rural, regional and remote areas supporting every day school use of the Internet. This study highlights the possibilities and issues for advanced telecommunications usage of Web2.0 applications discussing the research undertaken with these schools. (Contains 1 figure and 3 tables.)