Institutional specifics and unemployment insurance eligibility in Canada : how sensitive are employment duration effects?

The paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance on the duration of employment spells in Canada using the 1988–90 Labour Market Activity Survey. The primary focus of the paper is to evaluate whether estimated UI effects are sensitive to the degree to which institutional rules and regulations governing UI eligibility and entitlement are explicitly modelled. The key result of the paper is that it is indeed important to allow for institutional detail when estimating unemployment insurance effects. Estimates using simple proxies for eligibility indicate small, often insignificant UI effects. The size and significance of the effects rise as more realistic versions of the variables are adopted. The estimates using the eligibility variables incorporating the greatest level of institutional detail suggest that a jump in the hazard rate by a factor of 2.3 may not be an unreasonable estimate of the effect.

Neoliberal austerity and unemployment

Neoliberal fiscal austerity policies decrease public expenditure through cuts to central and local government budgets, welfare services and benefits and privatisation of public resources resulting in job losses. This article interrogates the empirical, theoretical, methodological and ideological relationships between neoliberalism, unemployment and the discipline of psychology, arguing that neoliberalism constitutes rather than causes unemployment...

Tied aid, unemployment and welfare

The effect of foreign aid on the welfare levels of both the recipient and the donor country has been a much analysed topic for research in both the theory of international trade and development economics. In the development economics literature, concerns have been raised since the 1960s on the possible adverse effect of foreign aid on domestic savings and growth.1 The trade theory literature in this respect is much older and dates back to the 1920s when Professors Keynes and Ohlin debated on the effect of foreign aid on international terms of trade.2 Ever since, the terms of trade effect has been the cornerstone in the analysis of the welfare effect of foreign aid in the trade theory literature.3 After some early confusion, it is now well established that in a Walrasian stable world economy with two countries, a necessary condition for foreign aid to have perverse effects is that there is some distortion in either of the two countries.4 It is also known that, under normality and substitutability of goods, untied aid cannot be strictly Pareto-improving in a tariff distorted world.5