The Waitangi Tribunal and the regulation of Maori protest

Much of the current academic and political discourse related the development and operations of the Waitangi Tribunal over its first twenty years portray it as a forum that provided Māori with a meaningful avenue for settling Treaty grievances compared to the formal legal systems performance in the preceding 100 years. In contrast, we argue that from its inception and throughout much of the 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal functioned primarily as an informal justice forum that assisted the New Zealand state’s regulation of Māori Treaty activism during the transition from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist mode of capital accumulation.

Canadian Charity Tribunal : a proposal for implementation

This paper is our attempt to focus the ongoing debate in Canada about the federal regulation of charities. More precisely, the paper examines the desirability of having an independent federal body assume some of the key roles which Revenue Canada currently plays in the charity field, as well as offering ideas about that body’s structure and operations.

Popular participation in labour law: The new labour dispute resolution tribunal

The Labour Tribunal Law (No. 45 of 2004) ushered in a new court-annexed dispute resolution system for industrial relations disputes in Japan (outlined generally in Sugeno, 2004). Similar to the lay judge system for criminal trials (Johnson and Shinomiya, Chapter 2), the new tribunal adopts an adjudicative model that blends professional and lay expertise with decisions heard by a tripartite panel comprising a professional judge and two lay judges recommended by management and labour unions respectively. The new tribunal system came into operation on 1 April 2006.

Regulating supply chains to protect road transport workers: An early assessment of the road safety remuneration tribunal

The Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) (the Act) explicitly enables the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal to make orders that can impose binding requirements on all the participants in the road transport supply chain, including consignors and consignees at the apex the chain, for the pay and safety of both employee and independent contractor drivers. The tribunal is also specifically empowered to make enforceable orders to reduce or remove remuneration related incentives and pressures that contribute to unsafe work practices in the road transport industry. Recently the tribunal handed down its first order. The article considers whether, and the degree to which, the tribunal has been willing to exercise its explicit power to impose enforceable obligations on consignors and consignees — such as large supermarket chains — at the apex of road transport supply chains. It examines the substance and extent of the obligations imposed by the tribunal, including whether the tribunal has exercised the full range of powers vested in it by the Act. We contend that the tribunal’s first order primarily imposes obligations on direct work providers and drivers without making large, powerful consignors and consignees substantively responsible for driver pay and safety. We argue that the tribunal’s first order could have more comprehensively fulfilled the objectives of the Act by more directly addressing the root causes of low pay and poor safety in the road transport industry.