The nine lives of Vietnam's new competition law

Vietnam's present draft of the proposed new Law on Competition is currently in its ninth version. Although there is a need to enact legislation as quickly as possible, Vietnam cannot rush the drafting process. Under its Bilateral Trade Agreement with the USA, Vietnam has committed to improve the quality of its laws and consistency of its legislative framework. Since the Law on Competition will be fundamental in establishing the legal framework for a more coherent and effective competition regime, and will have profound influences on Vietnam's objective of becoming a socialist-oriented market economy, its provisions must be well constructed and well considered, and this takes time. This article shows how the proposed Law is being crafted as compared to older drafts which sheds light on changes in policy during the drafting process. Where possible, the Draft is also compared with the laws in other jurisdictions for any assistance they might lend. In this author's opinion not all the changes are positive but any defects in the draft are not intractable and can be remedied prior to promulgation.

More legislative traffic on the 'Doi Moi' superhighway : technology transfer, IP and competition law in Vietnam

Since 1986 Vietnam has been engaged in the transition from a centrally-controlled economy to a socialist-oriented market economy (the 'doi moi' renovation). The process for global economic integration has been slow given the magnitude of necessary reforms. Consequently technology entrepreneurs often discount Vietnam as a possible commercialization base which means that it is not realising its economic potential as a hub of technology transfer in the Asia-Pacific region. Three significant factors in the current uncertainty are Vietnam's laws on competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Another problem is the lack of literature on these laws. This article first discusses the conceptual relationship between competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Hopefully the article will provide some guidance for the technology entrepreneur considering foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. The bottom line is that these laws still need further reform to bolster entrepreneurial confidence.

Standardisation and patent ambush : potential liability under Australian competition law

This article examines the problem of patent ambush in standard setting, where patent owners are sometimes able to capture industry standards in order to secure monopoly power and windfall profits. Because standardisation generally introduces high switching costs, patent ambush can impose significant costs on downstream manufacturers and consumers and drastically reduce the efficiency gains of standardisation.This article considers how Australian competition law is likely to apply to patent ambush both in the development of a standard (through misrepresenting the existence of an essential patent) and after a standard is implemented (through refusing to license an essential patented technology either at all or on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms). This article suggests that non-disclosure of patent interests is unlikely to restrained by Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA), and refusals to license are only likely to be restrained if the refusal involves leveraging or exclusive dealing. By contrast, Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) which seek to limit this behaviour through private ordering may face considerable scrutiny under the new cartel provisions of the TPA. This article concludes that SSOs may be best advised to implement administrative measures to prevent patent hold-up, such as reviewing which patents are essential for the implementation of a standard, asking patent holders to make their licence conditions public to promote transparency, and establishing forums where patent licensees can complain about licence terms that they consider to be unreasonable or discriminatory. Additionally, the ACCC may play a role in authorising SSO policies that could otherwise breach the new cartel provisions, but which have the practical effect of promoting competition in the standards setting environment.

Breakfast at Tiffany's': eBay Inc., trade mark law, and counterfeiting

In an exploration of intellectual property and fashion, this article examines the question of the intermediary liability of online auction-houses for counterfeiting. In the United States, the illustrious jewellery store, Tiffany & Co, brought a legal action against eBay Inc, alleging direct trademark infringement, contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition and trademark dilution. The luxury store depicted the online auction-house as a pirate bazaar, a flea-market and a haven for counterfeiting. During epic litigation, eBay Inc successfully defended itself against these allegations in a United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Tiffany & Co made a desperate, unsuccessful effort to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court of the United States. The matter featured a number of interventions from amicus curiae — Tiffany was supported by Coty, the Fashion Designer's Guild, and the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, while eBay was defended by publicly-spirited civil society groups such as Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Citizen, and Public Knowledge as well as Yahoo!, Google Inc, Amazon.com, and associations representing telecommunications carriers and internet service providers. The litigation in the United States can be counterpointed with the fusillade of legal action against eBay in the European Union. In contrast to Tiffany & Co, Louis Vuitton triumphed over eBay in the French courts — claiming its victory as vindication of the need to protect the commercial interests and cultural heritage of France. However, eBay has fared somewhat better in a dispute with L’Oréal in Great Britain and the European Court of Justice. It is argued that, in a time of flux and uncertainty, Australia should follow the position of the United States courts in Tiffany & Co v eBay Inc. The final part examines the ramifications of this litigation over online auction-houses for trade mark law reform and consumer rights; parallel disputes over intermediary liability and safe harbours in the field of copyright law and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2010. The conclusion calls for a revision of trade mark law, animated by a respect for consumers’ rights and interests in the electronic marketplace.

Competition Law in Australia [6th ed.]

Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.

No logo: Brand bullies, trade mark law, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a sweeping trade agreement, spanning the Pacific Rim, and covering an array of topics, including intellectual property. There has been much analysis of the recently leaked intellectual property chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by WikiLeaks. Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’ Editor-in-Chief, observed “The selective secrecy surrounding the TPP negotiations, which has let in a few cashed-up megacorps but excluded everyone else, reveals a telling fear of public scrutiny. By publishing this text we allow the public to engage in issues that will have such a fundamental impact on their lives.” Critical attention has focused upon the lack of transparency surrounding the agreement, copyright law and the digital economy; patent law, pharmaceutical drugs, and data protection; and the criminal procedures and penalties for trade secrets. The topic of trade mark law and related rights, such as internet domain names and geographical indications, deserves greater analysis.

Free software and the law. Out of the frying pan and into the fire: How shaking up intellectual property suits competition law just fine

Free software is viewed as a revolutionary and subversive practice, and in particular has dealt a strong blow to the traditional conception of intellectual property law (although in its current form could be considered a 'hack' of IP rights). However, other (capitalist) areas of law have been swift to embrace free software, or at least incorporate it into its own tenets. One area in particular is that of competition (antitrust) law, which itself has long been in theoretical conflict with intellectual property, due to the restriction on competition inherent in the grant of ‘monopoly’ rights by copyrights, patents and trademarks. This contribution will examine how competition law has approached free software by examining instances in which courts have had to deal with such initiatives, for instance in the Oracle Sun Systems merger, and the implications that these decisions have on free software initiatives. The presence or absence of corporate involvement in initiatives will be an important factor in this investigation, with it being posited that true instances of ‘commons-based peer production’ can still subvert the capitalist system, including perplexing its laws beyond intellectual property.

Competition laws and policies in China and Hong Kong : a tale of two regulatory journeys

Reviews the background to China's enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007 and compares the debate surrounding the proposed introduction of similar legislation in Hong Kong. Examines the main issues arising during the Law's 13 year drafting stage, its key provisions and the remaining areas of uncertainty concerning its enforcement. Discusses ongoing efforts to introduce competition law regulations in Hong Kong, the main features of the draft General Competition Law and the shortcomings of its approach to penalties and exemptions.

Post-WTO China : competition and technology transfer laws in the 'new' socialist market economy

China has been the focus of much academic and business scrutiny of late. Its economic climate is changing and its huge new market opportunities seem quite tantalizing to the would-be 'technology entrepreneur'. But China's market is a relatively immature one; it is still in the process of being opened up to real competition. The corollary of this is that, at this stage of the transitional process, there is still significant State control of market function. This article discusses Chinese competition law, the technology transfer system, how the laws are being reformed and how the technology entrepreneur fares under them. The bottom line is that while opportunities beckon, the wise entrepreneur will nevertheless continue to exercise caution.

The Australian clean energy package and the law of the world trade organisation : an analysis of compliance issues

This thesis is a study of whether the Australian Clean Energy Package complies with the rules of the World Trade Organization. It examines the legal framework for the Australian carbon pricing mechanism and related arrangements, using World Trade Organization law as the framework for analysis. In doing so, this thesis deconstructs the Clean Energy Package by considering the legal properties of eligible emissions units, the assistance measures introduced by the Package and the liabilities created by the carbon pricing mechanism.

From Kafka to KAFTA: Intellectual property, and the Korea-Australia free trade agreement

This paper provides a critical examination of the intellectual property sections of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. Chapter 13 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 deals with the subject of intellectual property law. The Chapter covers such topics as the purposes and objectives of intellectual property law; copyright law; trade mark law; patent law; and intellectual property enforcement. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament highlighted the controversy surrounding this chapter of the agreement: The intellectual property rights chapter of KAFTA has drawn considerable attention from academics and stakeholders regarding the proposed need for changes to Australian intellectual property law and the inclusion of intellectual property in the definition of investment with regard to the investor-state dispute mechanism. Other concerns raised with the Committee include the prescriptive nature of the chapter, the lack of recognition of the broader public interests of intellectual property rights, and possible changes to fair use provisions. Article 13.1.1 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 provides that: ‘Each Party recognises the importance of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce those rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.’ This is an unsatisfactory description of the objectives and purposes of intellectual property law in both Australia and Korea. There is a failure to properly consider the range of public purposes served by intellectual property law – such as providing for access to knowledge, promoting competition and innovation, protecting consumer rights, and allowing for the protection of public health, food security, and the environment. Such a statement of principles and objectives detracts from the declaration in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 of the public interest objectives to be served by intellectual property. Chapter 11 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 is an investment chapter, with an investor-state dispute settlement regime. This chapter is highly controversial – given the international debate over investor-state dispute settlement; the Australian context for the debate; and the text of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. In April 2014, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released a report on Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement. The overall figures are staggering. UNCTAD reports a significant growth in investment-state dispute settlement, across a wide array of different fields of public regulation. Given the broad definition of investment, intellectual property owners will be able to use the investor-state dispute settlement regime in the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. This will have significant implications for all the various disciplines of intellectual property – including copyright law, trade mark law, and patent law.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.