Corporate governance and misappropriation

This study examines the occurrence of misappropriation-type fraud within Australian listed firms and the relation between the incidence of this type of fraud and a firm's governance strength. We measure governance strength using factors relating to traditional corporate governance, such as board composition, CEO duality, and audit committee composition, as well as factors relating to information technology governance. In our study, we use actual dollar amount of fraud reported by listed companies responding to the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey as one of three different misappropriation measures and publicly available firm-specific data to measure the other variables in the model. Our study found that where the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson of the board of directors, the likelihood of fraud increases. We also find that the greater the number of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Taken together, these results are particularly encouraging as they provide support for regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which place considerable emphasis on the importance of establishing good corporate governance practices. The study provides empirical evidence that employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the misappropriation of assets.

Critical review of Queensland's Crime and Misconduct Commission Inquiry into abuse of children in foster care : social work's contribution to reform

This paper profiles Queensland's recent Crime and Misconduct Commission Inquiry into the abuse of children in foster care. The authors welcome the outcome as an opportunity to highlight the problems encountered by child protection jurisdictions in Australia and internationally, and they applaud some of the Inquiry's findings. However, the paper argues that the path to reform is hampered by insufficient accountability by government and management, and an inadequate challenge to the ideologies underpinning contemporary child protection policy and practice. The authors conclude with a call to value and assert social work's contribution to child protection systems so as to vastly improve outcomes for children and families.

Corporate fraud and misconduct : investigative and regulatory priorities

This article investigates the profile of the companies that have been investigated for corporate fraud and misconduct. Our definition of fraud includes financial statement fraud, market misconduct fraud such as insider trading or false disclosures, and managerial fraud. The particular evidence presented relates to those instances of corporate fraud and misconduct investigated by the Australian corporate regulatory, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and relates to sanctions for fraud, misconduct or compliance breaches. Using data compiled from the public announcements in the ASIC reports over the period 2004-2008, we categorise the type of fraud and misconduct breaches ASIC chooses to report and investigate.

Pleading - self-incrimination and penalty privileges

In Anderson v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] QCA 301 the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the decision of the primary judge (ASIC v Managed Investments Ltd No 3 [2012] QSC 74. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the defendants’ non-compliance with the pleading rules in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) was justified by the claims to privilege against self-incrimination or exposure to a penalty.

A toothless chihuahua? : the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, neoliberalism and supermarket power in Australia

During the Senate Inquiry into 'milk price wars' in 2011, Senator Nick Xenophon accused the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) of being 'less effective than a toothless Chihuahua'. This follows the ACCC's lack of action regarding the reported abuse of market power of Australia's supermarket duopoly, where an extensive inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices in 2008 found grocery retailing to be 'workably competitive' despite numerous claims to the contrary. How can farmers' submissions to the inquiry that cite market abuse be reconciled with the ACCC's finding that all is well in the food supply chain? Following an in-depth examination of 53 farmer submissions to the inquiry, we conclude that the findings of the ACCC are commensurate with the neoliberal economisation of the political sphere, where commercial entities 'legitimately' govern beyond their corporate boundaries, often using disciplinary measures that were once exclusive to governments. We argue that such clear structural inequalities between farmers and major corporations is reason to re-regulate markets and reinsert a stronger role for government to 'level the playing field'.

Asset lending, unconscionable conduct and intermediaries

This article deals with cases where borrowers of loans for business or investment claimed their lender had engaged in asset lending which amounted to unconscionable conduct under the equitable doctrine or under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). The article reviews recent cases, seeking to identify the key factors influencing a conclusion of, or against, unconscionable conduct. The article examines the practice of lending through intermediaries and how the application of agency law can insulate lenders from the wrongful conduct of intermediaries. The article explains the gap in the current position and discusses possible law reform which may remedy that.

Kumarina and bidders voting in transfer schemes

Transfer schemes are an alternative means of acquiring control of a company to making a takeover bid under the provisions in Ch 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The recent decision Re Kumarina Resources Ltd [2013] FCA 549 overturned long-standing practice in relation to a certain type of transfer scheme. If followed, the decision would allow a “bidder” to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of the target shares are shares in another company, and the scheme results in a merger. But the bidder is not allowed to vote where the scheme consideration is cash. The article points out the difficulties arising from this decision and argues that it should not be followed. In providing a “no objection” statement, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has created uncertainty as to the approach it will take towards the bidders being allowed to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of target shares are shares in another company. The article also points out that in providing the no objection statement in Kumarina, ASIC appears to have ignored breaches of s 606(1) of the Corporations Act. There is a pressing need for ASIC to clarify its position and, in particular, whether or not it will provide a no objection statement in respect of future transfer schemes where a bidder (or its parent company) votes at the scheme meeting.

The 2006 CSRC guidelines for articles of Association of Chinese listed companies : critiquing from an Australian perspective

Compares the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission's guidelines for articles of association of listed companies issued in 2006 with 'replaceable' rules in the Australian Corporations Act 2001. Discusses the provisions of the Chinese guidelines and the Australian rules on corporate constitution, interpretation, a company's representative, object clauses, shareholders' powers and meetings and directors. Questions whether the Chinese guidelines facilitate effective corporate governance.

Joint consumer submission to the review of the code of banking practice

This submission has been prepared on behalf of Australian consumer advocates by Nicola Howell, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology (‘the researcher’), under a consultancy arrangement with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The researcher has been engaged by ASIC to consult with consumer advocates across Australia in order to prepare a detailed consumer submission to the Review of the Code of Banking Practice and the Review Issues Paper.

The regulation of insurance intermediaries in the Australian financial services market

The insurance industry discharges a critical role in the Australian economy and is a significant part of the Australian financial services market. The industry relies upon intermediaries, the principal types being brokers and agents, to promote, arrange and distribute their products and services in the market. The pivotal role that they play in this context and sensitivities associated with the consumer oriented products, such as house and contents insurance, has ensured close regulatory attention. Of particular importance was the passage of the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984 (Cth), a comprehensive attempt to address the responsibilities of intermediaries as well as particular problem areas associated with the handling of money. However, with the introduction of financial services and market reform early in the new millennium this insurance intermediary specific regulatory approach was abandoned in favour of a market-wide strategy; that is, market reform was based upon across-the-board licensing, disclosure, conduct and fairness standards, and all financial products and services are now regulated at a generic level under Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article briefly explores the categories of insurance intermediaries and the relevant distinctions between them but focuses mainly upon the regulatory context in which they operate. This context transcends a strictly legal framework as the regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), has sought to inform and guide the market through Policy Statements and Regulatory Guides. The usefulness of these guides as an adjunct to the legislation in explaining the scope and operation of regulatory framework is examined. In addition, the article looks at the self-regulatory and dispute resolution practices in this area and their impact. In conclusion an assessment of this across-the-board regulatory regime is advanced.

Phase two of the National Credit Reforms : examining the regulation of payday lenders

This study seeks to analyse the adequacy of the current regulation of the payday lending industry in Australia, and consider whether there is a need for additional regulation to protect consumers of these services. The report examines the different regulatory approaches adopted in comparable OECD countries, and reviews alternative models for payday regulation, in particular, the role played by responsible lending. The study also examines the consumer protection mechanisms now in existence in Australia in the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (NCCP) and the National Credit Code (NCC) contained in Schedule 1 of that Act and in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).

Disclosure of proxy voting information by Australian managed investment schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Comission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practises. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.

The Australian corporate rescue provisions : how do they compare?

A notable feature of corporate legislative development in western countries for the past 30 years is the various mechanisms introduced to facilitate the survival of company structures facing insolvency. Australia’s corporate rescue version, called a “voluntary administration”, is now contained in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), although first introduced in 1993. The Australian provisions apply to all corporate entities and commence with a short moratorium followed by a meeting of creditors. At the creditors’ meeting a “rescue” plan called a deed of company arrangement may be entered into, or, alternatively the company may be liquidated. The voluntary administration provisions have become a significant part of Australia’s corporate insolvency landscape and are critical to the operation of corporate law outside of insolvency. Australia does not have a specialist bankruptcy court, rather it utilises the English approach where insolvency practitioners are accountants and appointed to the insolvent company as administrators. In Australia, insolvency practitioners must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”), the corporate and securities regulator. A voluntary administration is usually commenced by the board of directors appointing an insolvency practitioner to the company. There exists no opportunity for a voluntary administration to commence at the creditors’ or court’s behest. This chapter seeks to address the comparative necessity of Australia’s corporate regime.