SKMA - A Key Management Architecture for SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used in the management of critical infrastructure such as electricity and water distrubution systems. Currently there is little understanding of how to best protect SCADA systems from malicious attacks. We review the constraints and requirements for SCADA security and propose a suitable architecture (SKMA) for secure SCADA communications. The architecture includes a proposed key management protocol (SKMP). We compare the architecture with a previous proposal from Sandia Labs.

Multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange

We consider a new form of authenticated key exchange which we call multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange, where session establishment depends on successful authentication of multiple short secrets that are complementary in nature, such as a long-term password and a one-time response, allowing the client and server to be mutually assured of each other's identity without directly disclosing private information to the other party. Multi-factor authentication can provide an enhanced level of assurance in higher-security scenarios such as online banking, virtual private network access, and physical access because a multi-factor protocol is designed to remain secure even if all but one of the factors has been compromised. We introduce a security model for multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange protocols, propose an efficient and secure protocol called MFPAK, and provide a security argument to show that our protocol is secure in this model. Our security model is an extension of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model for password-authenticated key exchange and accommodates an arbitrary number of symmetric and asymmetric authentication factors.

On forward secrecy in one-round key exchange

Most one-round key exchange protocols provide only weak forward secrecy at best. Furthermore, one-round protocols with strong forward secrecy often break badly when faced with an adversary who can obtain ephemeral keys. We provide a characterisation of how strong forward secrecy can be achieved in one-round key exchange. Moreover, we show that protocols exist which provide strong forward secrecy and remain secure with weak forward secrecy even when the adversary is allowed to obtain ephemeral keys. We provide a compiler to achieve this for any existing secure protocol with weak forward secrecy.

Active security in multiparty computation over black-box groups

Most previous work on unconditionally secure multiparty computation has focused on computing over a finite field (or ring). Multiparty computation over other algebraic structures has not received much attention, but is an interesting topic whose study may provide new and improved tools for certain applications. At CRYPTO 2007, Desmedt et al introduced a construction for a passive-secure multiparty multiplication protocol for black-box groups, reducing it to a certain graph coloring problem, leaving as an open problem to achieve security against active attacks. We present the first n-party protocol for unconditionally secure multiparty computation over a black-box group which is secure under an active attack model, tolerating any adversary structure Δ satisfying the Q 3 property (in which no union of three subsets from Δ covers the whole player set), which is known to be necessary for achieving security in the active setting. Our protocol uses Maurer’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) but preserves the essential simplicity of the graph-based approach of Desmedt et al, which avoids each shareholder having to rerun the full VSS protocol after each local computation. A corollary of our result is a new active-secure protocol for general multiparty computation of an arbitrary Boolean circuit.

An efficient eAuction potocol

A secure protocol for electronic, sealed-bid, single item auctions is presented. The protocol caters to both first and second price (Vickrey) auctions and provides full price flexibility. Both computational and communication cost are linear with the number of bidders and utilize only standard cryptographic primitives. The protocol strictly divides knowledge of the bidder's identity and their actual bids between, respectively, a registration authority and an auctioneer, who are assumed not to collude but may be separately corrupt. This assures strong bidder-anonymity, though only weak bid privacy. The protocol is structured in two phases, each involving only off-line communication. Registration, requiring the use of the public key infrastructure, is simultaneous with hash-sealed bid-commitment and generates a receipt to the bidder containing a pseudonym. This phase is followed by encrypted bid-submission. Both phases involve the registration authority acting as a communication conduit but the actual message size is quite small. It is argued that this structure guarantees non-repudiation by both the winner and the auctioneer. Second price correctness is enforced either by observing the absence of registration of the claimed second-price bid or, where registered but lower than the actual second price, is subject to cooperation by the second price bidder - presumably motivated through self-interest. The use of the registration authority in other contexts is also considered with a view to developing an architecture for efficient secure multiparty transactions

An hybrid approach for efficient multicast stream authentication over unsecured channels

We study the multicast stream authentication problem when an opponent can drop, reorder and inject data packets into the communication channel. In this context, bandwidth limitation and fast authentication are the core concerns. Therefore any authentication scheme is to reduce as much as possible the packet overhead and the time spent at the receiver to check the authenticity of collected elements. Recently, Tartary and Wang developed a provably secure protocol with small packet overhead and a reduced number of signature verifications to be performed at the receiver. In this paper, we propose an hybrid scheme based on Tartary and Wang’s approach and Merkle hash trees. Our construction will exhibit a smaller overhead and a much faster processing at the receiver making it even more suitable for multicast than the earlier approach. As Tartary and Wang’s protocol, our construction is provably secure and allows the total recovery of the data stream despite erasures and injections occurred during transmission.

Secure communication protocol for preserving E-tendering integrity.

This paper presents a secure communication protocol which can be used as the framework for an e-tendering scheme. This protocol is focused on securing the integrity of tendering documents and ensuring that a secure record of document generation is kept. Our protocol provides a mechanism to manage e-tendering contract evidence as a legal record in a unique and effective manner. It is the starting point of reliable record keeping. To a certain extent, it also addresses existing security problems in the traditional tendering processes.

Towards a provably secure DoS-Resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy

Just Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al. (ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows’ cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when reusing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol.

Towards a secure human-and-computer mutual authentication protocol

We blend research from human-computer interface (HCI) design with computational based crypto- graphic provable security. We explore the notion of practice-oriented provable security (POPS), moving the focus to a higher level of abstraction (POPS+) for use in providing provable security for security ceremonies involving humans. In doing so we high- light some challenges and paradigm shifts required to achieve meaningful provable security for a protocol which includes a human. We move the focus of security ceremonies from being protocols in their context of use, to the protocols being cryptographic building blocks in a higher level protocol (the security cere- mony), which POPS can be applied to. In order to illustrate the need for our approach, we analyse both a protocol proven secure in theory, and a similar proto- col implemented by a �nancial institution, from both HCI and cryptographic perspectives.

An on-line secure e-passport protocol

The first generation e-passport standard is proven to be insecure and prone to various attacks. To strengthen, the European Union (EU) has proposed an Extended Access Control (EAC) mechanism for e-passports that intends to provide better security in protecting biometric information of the e-passport bearer. But, our analysis shows, the EU proposal fails to address many security and privacy issues that are paramount in implementing a strong security mechanism. In this paper we propose an on-line authentication mechanism for electronic passports that addresses the weakness in existing implementations, of both The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and EU. Our proposal utilises ICAO PKI implementation, thus requiring very little modifications to the existing infrastructure which is already well established.