Automating computational proofs for public-key-based key exchange

We present an approach to automating computationally sound proofs of key exchange protocols based on public-key encryption. We show that satisfying the property called occultness in the Dolev-Yao model guarantees the security of a related key exchange protocol in a simple computational model. Security in this simpler model has been shown to imply security in a Bellare {Rogaway-like model. Furthermore, the occultness in the Dolev-Yao model can be searched automatically by a mechanisable procedure. Thus automated proofs for key exchange protocols in the computational model can be achieved. We illustrate the method using the well-known Lowe-Needham-Schroeder protocol.

Automated proofs for Diffie–Hellman–based key exchanges

We present an automated verification method for security of Diffie–Hellman–based key exchange protocols. The method includes a Hoare-style logic and syntactic checking. The method is applied to protocols in a simplified version of the Bellare–Rogaway–Pointcheval model (2000). The security of the protocol in the complete model can be established automatically by a modular proof technique of Kudla and Paterson (2005).

A security architecture for cloud storage combining proofs of retrievability and fairness

We investigate existing cloud storage schemes and identify limitations in each one based on the security services that they provide. We then propose a new cloud storage architecture that extends CloudProof of Popa et al. to provide availability assurance. This is accomplished by incorporating a proof of storage protocol. As a result, we obtain the first secure storage cloud computing scheme that furnishes all three properties of availability, fairness and freshness.

Geoproof : proofs of geographic location for cloud computing environment

Cloud computing has emerged as a major ICT trend and has been acknowledged as a key theme of industry by prominent ICT organisations. However, one of the major challenges that face the cloud computing concept and its global acceptance is how to secure and protect the data that is the property of the user. The geographic location of cloud data storage centres is an important issue for many organisations and individuals due to the regulations and laws that require data and operations to reside in specific geographic locations. Thus, data owners may need to ensure that their cloud providers do not compromise the SLA contract and move their data into another geographic location. This paper introduces an architecture for a new approach for geographic location assurance, which combines the proof of storage protocol (POS) and the distance-bounding protocol. This allows the client to check where their stored data is located, without relying on the word of the cloud provider. This architecture aims to achieve better security and more flexible geographic assurance within the environment of cloud computing.

Computationally sound automated proofs of cryptographic schemes

Proving security of cryptographic schemes, which normally are short algorithms, has been known to be time-consuming and easy to get wrong. Using computers to analyse their security can help to solve the problem. This thesis focuses on methods of using computers to verify security of such schemes in cryptographic models. The contributions of this thesis to automated security proofs of cryptographic schemes can be divided into two groups: indirect and direct techniques. Regarding indirect ones, we propose a technique to verify the security of public-key-based key exchange protocols. Security of such protocols has been able to be proved automatically using an existing tool, but in a noncryptographic model. We show that under some conditions, security in that non-cryptographic model implies security in a common cryptographic one, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. The implication enables one to use that existing tool, which was designed to work with a different type of model, in order to achieve security proofs of public-key-based key exchange protocols in a cryptographic model. For direct techniques, we have two contributions. The first is a tool to verify Diffie-Hellmanbased key exchange protocols. In that work, we design a simple programming language for specifying Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange algorithms. The language has a semantics based on a cryptographic model, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. From the semantics, we build a Hoare-style logic which allows us to reason about the security of a key exchange algorithm, specified as a pair of initiator and responder programs. The other contribution to the direct technique line is on automated proofs for computational indistinguishability. Unlike the two other contributions, this one does not treat a fixed class of protocols. We construct a generic formalism which allows one to model the security problem of a variety of classes of cryptographic schemes as the indistinguishability between two pieces of information. We also design and implement an algorithm for solving indistinguishability problems. Compared to the two other works, this one covers significantly more types of schemes, but consequently, it can verify only weaker forms of security.

Automated proofs of computational indistinguishability

We present a tool for automatic analysis of computational indistinguishability between two strings of information. This is designed as a generic tool for proving cryptographic security based on a formalism that provides computational soundness preservation. The tool has been implemented and tested successfully with several cryptographic schemes.

Formalising human recognition : a fundamental building block for security proofs

A fundamental part of many authentication protocols which authenticate a party to a human involves the human recognizing or otherwise processing a message received from the party. Examples include typical implementations of Verified by Visa in which a message, previously stored by the human at a bank, is sent by the bank to the human to authenticate the bank to the human; or the expectation that humans will recognize or verify an extended validation certificate in a HTTPS context. This paper presents general definitions and building blocks for the modelling and analysis of human recognition in authentication protocols, allowing the creation of proofs for protocols which include humans. We cover both generalized trawling and human-specific targeted attacks. As examples of the range of uses of our construction, we use the model presented in this paper to prove the security of a mutual authentication login protocol and a human-assisted device pairing protocol.

Efficient one-round key exchange in the standard model

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

Efficient one-round key exchange in the efficient one-round key exchange in the standard model

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

Efficient one-round key exchange in the standard model

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

Some applications of logic to feasibility in higher types

While it is commonly accepted that computability on a Turing machine in polynomial time represents a correct formalization of the notion of a feasibly computable function, there is no similar agreement on how to extend this notion on functionals, that is, what functionals should be considered feasible. One possible paradigm was introduced by Mehlhorn, who extended Cobham's definition of feasible functions to type 2 functionals. Subsequently, this class of functionals (with inessential changes of the definition) was studied by Townsend who calls this class POLY, and by Kapron and Cook who call the same class basic feasible functionals. Kapron and Cook gave an oracle Turing machine model characterisation of this class. In this article, we demonstrate that the class of basic feasible functionals has recursion theoretic properties which naturally generalise the corresponding properties of the class of feasible functions, thus giving further evidence that the notion of feasibility of functionals mentioned above is correctly chosen. We also improve the Kapron and Cook result on machine representation.Our proofs are based on essential applications of logic. We introduce a weak fragment of second order arithmetic with second order variables ranging over functions from NN which suitably characterises basic feasible functionals, and show that it is a useful tool for investigating the properties of basic feasible functionals. In particular, we provide an example how one can extract feasible programs from mathematical proofs that use nonfeasible functions.

A framework for reasoning about inherent parallelism in modern object-oriented languages

With the emergence of multi-core processors into the mainstream, parallel programming is no longer the specialized domain it once was. There is a growing need for systems to allow programmers to more easily reason about data dependencies and inherent parallelism in general purpose programs. Many of these programs are written in popular imperative programming languages like Java and C]. In this thesis I present a system for reasoning about side-effects of evaluation in an abstract and composable manner that is suitable for use by both programmers and automated tools such as compilers. The goal of developing such a system is to both facilitate the automatic exploitation of the inherent parallelism present in imperative programs and to allow programmers to reason about dependencies which may be limiting the parallelism available for exploitation in their applications. Previous work on languages and type systems for parallel computing has tended to focus on providing the programmer with tools to facilitate the manual parallelization of programs; programmers must decide when and where it is safe to employ parallelism without the assistance of the compiler or other automated tools. None of the existing systems combine abstraction and composition with parallelization and correctness checking to produce a framework which helps both programmers and automated tools to reason about inherent parallelism. In this work I present a system for abstractly reasoning about side-effects and data dependencies in modern, imperative, object-oriented languages using a type and effect system based on ideas from Ownership Types. I have developed sufficient conditions for the safe, automated detection and exploitation of a number task, data and loop parallelism patterns in terms of ownership relationships. To validate my work, I have applied my ideas to the C] version 3.0 language to produce a language extension called Zal. I have implemented a compiler for the Zal language as an extension of the GPC] research compiler as a proof of concept of my system. I have used it to parallelize a number of real-world applications to demonstrate the feasibility of my proposed approach. In addition to this empirical validation, I present an argument for the correctness of the type system and language semantics I have proposed as well as sketches of proofs for the correctness of the sufficient conditions for parallelization proposed.

Automated proof for formal indistinguishability and its applications

Bana et al. proposed the relation formal indistinguishability (FIR), i.e. an equivalence between two terms built from an abstract algebra. Later Ene et al. extended it to cover active adversaries and random oracles. This notion enables a framework to verify computational indistinguishability while still offering the simplicity and formality of symbolic methods. We are in the process of making an automated tool for checking FIR between two terms. First, we extend the work by Ene et al. further, by covering ordered sorts and simplifying the way to cope with random oracles. Second, we investigate the possibility of combining algebras together, since it makes the tool scalable and able to cover a wide class of cryptographic schemes. Specially, we show that the combined algebra is still computationally sound, as long as each algebra is sound. Third, we design some proving strategies and implement the tool. Basically, the strategies allow us to find a sequence of intermediate terms, which are formally indistinguishable, between two given terms. FIR between the two given terms is then guaranteed by the transitivity of FIR. Finally, we show applications of the work, e.g. on key exchanges and encryption schemes. In the future, the tool should be extended easily to cover many schemes. This work continues previous research of ours on use of compilers to aid in automated proofs for key exchange.

A hybrid shifting bottleneck procedure algorithm for the parallel-machine job-shop scheduling problem

In practice, parallel-machine job-shop scheduling (PMJSS) is very useful in the development of standard modelling approaches and generic solution techniques for many real-world scheduling problems. In this paper, based on the analysis of structural properties in an extended disjunctive graph model, a hybrid shifting bottleneck procedure (HSBP) algorithm combined with Tabu Search metaheuristic algorithm is developed to deal with the PMJSS problem. The original-version SBP algorithm for the job-shop scheduling (JSS) has been significantly improved to solve the PMJSS problem with four novelties: i) a topological-sequence algorithm is proposed to decompose the PMJSS problem into a set of single-machine scheduling (SMS) and/or parallel-machine scheduling (PMS) subproblems; ii) a modified Carlier algorithm based on the proposed lemmas and the proofs is developed to solve the SMS subproblem; iii) the Jackson rule is extended to solve the PMS subproblem; iv) a Tabu Search metaheuristic algorithm is embedded under the framework of SBP to optimise the JSS and PMJSS cases. The computational experiments show that the proposed HSBP is very efficient in solving the JSS and PMJSS problems.