Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in most jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

Children and consent to medical treatment

This chapter deals with the law concerning children and consent to medical treatment. Where a child under the age of 18 requires medical treatment, issues arise as to who may lawfully consent to the treatment and under what circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, consent may be given by the child’s parent or guardian; the child; or a court. The chapter provides a thorough treatment of Australian law about these issues and circumstances.

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Advance directives, autonomy and the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment

As Australian society 1s agemg, individuals are increasingly concerned about managing their future, including making decisions about the medical treatment they may wish to receive or refuse if they lose decision-making capacity. To date, there has been relatively little research into the extent to which legal regulation allows competent adults to make advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment that will bind health professionals and others when a decision needs to be made at a future time. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the research by presenting the results of research into the legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In the five papers that comprise this thesis, the law that governs this area is examined, and the ethical principle of autonomy is used to critically evaluate that law. The principal finding of this research is that the current scheme of regulation is ineffective to adequately promote the right of a competent adult to make binding advance directives about refusal of medical treatment. The research concludes that legislation should be enacted to enable individuals to complete an advance directive, only imposing restrictions to the extent that this is necessary to promote individual autonomy. The thesis first examines the principle of autonomy upon which the common law (and some statutory law) is expressed to be based, to determine whether that principle is an appropriate one to underpin regulation. 1 The finding of the research is that autonomy can be justified as an organising principle on a number of grounds: it is consistent with the values of a liberal democracy; over recent decades, it is a principle that has been even more prominent within the discipline of medical ethics; and it is the principle which underpins the legal regulation of a related topic, namely the contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. Next, the thesis reviews the common law to determine whether it effectively achieves the goal of promoting autonomy by allowing a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing treatment that will operate if he or she later loses decision-making capacity. 2 This research finds that conunon law doctrine, as espoused by the judiciary, prioritises individual choice by recognising valid advance directives that refuse treatment as binding. However, the research also concludes that the common law, as applied by the judiciary in some cases, may not be effective to promote individual autonomy, as there have been a number of circumstances where advance directives that refuse treatment have not been followed. The thesis then examines the statutory regimes in Australia that regulate advance directives, with a focus on the regulation of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment.3 This review commences with an examination ofparliamentary debates to establish why legislation was thought to be necessary. It then provides a detailed review of all of the statutory regimes, the extent to which the legislation regulates the form of advance directives, and the circumstances in which they can be completed, will operate and can be ignored by medical professionals. The research finds that legislation was enacted mainly to clarify the common law and bring a level of certainty to the field. Legislative regimes were thought to provide medical professionals with the assurance that compliance with an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will not expose them to legal sanction. However, the research also finds that the legislation places so many restrictions on when an advance directive refusing treatment can be made, or will operate, that they have not been successful in promoting individual autonomy.

Refusal of medical treatment : a child's prerogative?

Society has a need for children to be able to make health care decisions. Homeless children need access to health care. Parents may not be accessible or competent to consent to their child’s health care. The familial relationship may have broken down. Children may not want their parents to know about drug, alcohol or pregnancy related issues. There is legal and academic support for the right of children to make autonomous decisions with respect to their health care. However what these decisions cover and who can make them is not clear. Whether or not a minor has capacity and is therefore competent to consent to medical treatment is a question of law. Some states of Australia have enacted legislation, while others rely on the common law to determine this issue. At common law a minor is capable of giving consent to medical treatment when he or she achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be able to understand fully what is proposed. Known as ‘Gillick competence’ this is a well known principle of law. The question posed by this paper is whether the decision of a ‘Gillick competent’ child can and should be overridden by the court?

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in all jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

Doctors' knowledge of the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

Objectives To examine the level of knowledge of doctors about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity, and factors associated with a higher level of knowledge. Design, setting and participants Postal survey of all specialists in emergency medicine, geriatric medicine, intensive care, medical oncology, palliative medicine, renal medicine and respiratory medicine on the AMPCo Direct database in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Survey initially posted to participants on 18 July 2012 and closed on 31 January 2013. Main outcome measures Medical specialists’ levels of knowledge about the law, based on their responses to two survey questions. Results Overall response rate was 32%. For the seven statements contained in the two questions about the law, the mean knowledge score was 3.26 out of 7. State and specialty were the strongest predictors of legal knowledge. Conclusions Among doctors who practise in the end-of-life field, there are some significant knowledge gaps about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity. Significant consequences for both patients and doctors can flow from a failure to comply with the law. Steps should be taken to improve doctors’ legal knowledge in this area and to harmonise the law across Australia.

Children and consent to medical treatment

This chapter provides a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of legislative provisions and common law principles regarding children and the law of consent to medical treatment. When can children provide their own consent? Can parents consent on behalf of their children, and if so, under what circumstances and why? Is court authority ever required, and if so, when, and why? What new contexts are providing fresh challenges to legal principles, parents, medical practitioners, and most importantly, children?

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment : criminal responsibility for established medical practice?

The law recognises the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment even if this will lead to death. Guardianship and other legislation also facilitates the making of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. Despite this apparent endorsement that such decisions can be lawful, doubts have been raised in Queensland about whether decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment would contravene the criminal law, and particularly the duty imposed by the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide the “necessaries of life”. This article considers this tension in the law and examines various arguments that might allow for such decisions to be made lawfully. It ultimately concludes, however, that criminal responsibility may still arise and so reform is needed.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : Part 1 (New South Wales)

This is the first article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in New South Wales. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training medical professionals receive on issues such as advance directives and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in New South Wales.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : Part 2 (Queensland)

This is the second article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in Queensland, including the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training medical professionals receive on issues such as advance health directives and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in Queensland.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : part 3 (Victoria)

This is the final article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in Victoria. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training that medical professionals receive on issues such as refusal of treatment certificates and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in Victoria. The article also draws together themes from the series as a whole, including conclusions about the need for more and better medical education and about law reform generally.

Withholding and withdrawal of ‘futile’ life-sustaining treatment : unilateral medical decision-making in Australia and New Zealand

This article examines the law in Australia and New Zealand that governs the withholding and withdrawal of ‘futile’ life-sustaining treatment. Although doctors have both civil and criminal law duties to treat patients, those general duties do not require the provision of treatment that is deemed to be futile. This is either because futile treatment is not in a patient’s best interests or because stopping such treatment does not breach the criminal law. This means, in the absence of a duty to treat, doctors may unilaterally withdraw or withhold treatment that is futile; consent is not required. The article then examines whether this general position has been altered by statute. It considers a range of suggested possible legislation but concludes it is likely that only Queensland’s adult guardianship legislation imposes a requirement to obtain consent to withhold or withdraw such treatment.

Medical education and law: Withholding/withdrawing treatment from adults without capacity

BACKGROUND Law is increasingly involved in clinical practice, particularly at the end of life, but undergraduate and postgraduate education in this area remains unsystematic. We hypothesised that attitudes to and knowledge of the law governing withholding/withdrawing treatment from adults without capacity (the WWLST law) would vary and demonstrate deficiencies among medical specialists. AIMS We investigated perspectives, knowledge and training of medical specialists in the three largest (populations and medical workforces) Australian states, concerning the WWLST law. METHODS Following expert legal review, specialist focus groups, pre-testing and piloting in each state, seven specialties involved with end-of-life care were surveyed, with a variety of statistical analyses applied to the responses. RESULTS Respondents supported the need to know and follow the law. There were mixed views about its helpfulness in medical decision-making. Over half the respondents conceded poor knowledge of the law; this was mirrored by critical gaps in knowledge that varied by specialty. There were relatively low but increasing rates of education from the undergraduate to continuing professional development (CPD) stages. Mean knowledge score did not vary significantly according to undergraduate or immediate postgraduate training, but CPD training, particularly if recent, resulted in greater knowledge. Case-based workshops were the preferred CPD instruction method. CONCLUSIONS Teaching of current and evolving law should be strengthened across all stages of medical education. This should improve understanding of the role of law, ameliorate ambivalence towards the law, and contribute to more informed deliberation about end-of-life issues with patients and families.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.