Lawyers behaving badly in mediations : lessons for legal educators

This article will discuss some real life case examples of what will be termed “lawyers behaving badly” where it will be argued that legal representatives have not performed as effectively as they could have in mediation settings. These instances of “lawyer misbehaviour” will be grouped under several broad headings: the Process Thwarter, the Zealous Adversarial Advocate, the Misguided Advisor, the Distributive Bargainer, the Passive Advocate, and the Legal Takeover. Reflecting on these situations will provide guidance to legal educators as to the specific areas of dispute resolution knowledge and skills that future lawyers need to learn and develop.

Rights versus reality : the difficulty of providing 'access to English' in Queensland courts

This project reviewed the success of the Aboriginal English in the Courts booklet which was published by the Department of Justice and Attorney-General in 2000, with a view to improving access to the courts for speakers of Aboriginal English in Queensland. Surveys and interview were conducted with judges, magistrates, prosecutors, legal aid lawyers and courts registry staff. The feedback from the research has shown that the handbook has had little impact on ‘access to English’ in Queensland courts. The problems relate to the tension between protecting the rights of the accused under an adversarial system and legitimately introducing the issues of language uncertainty to the court in a non-prejudicial manner. In addition, the interviews have brought to light emerging language issues in remote communities that cannot be remedied under existing language policy mechanisms, such as the provision of interpreters or friends of court.

In defence of Victoria's Children's Court : its value and role in the child protection system

Australian child protection systems have been subject to sustained and significant criticism for many decades. As a central part of that system Children’s Courts have been implicated: three recent inquiries into the child protection system in Victoria all criticised the Family Division of the Children’s Court.1 In the resulting debate two diametrically opposed points of view surfaced about the Children’s Court and the role that legal procedures and professionals should play in child protection matters. On one side bodies like the Children’s Court of Victoria, Victoria Legal Aid (‘VLA’), the Law Institute of Victoria (‘LIV’), and the Federation of Community Legal Centres (‘FCLC’) argued that the Children’s Court plays a vital role in child protection and should continue to play that role.2 On the other side a coalition of human service and child protection agencies called for major change including the removal of the Children’s Court from the child protection system. Victoria’s Department of Human Services (‘DHS’) has been critical of the Court3 as have community sector organisations like Anglicare, Berry Street, MacKillop Family Services and the Salvation Army — all agencies the DHS funds to deliver child protection services.4 Victoria’s Child Safety Commissioner has also called for major reform, publicly labelling the Court a ‘lawyers’ playground’ and recommending abolishing the Court’s involvement in child protection completely.

Charity law, advocacy and the aid/watch decision : compatibility of charitable purposes and political objects — the view from Australia

Introduction In 1952 the Nathan report stated that: Some of the most valuable activities of voluntary societies consist, however, in the fact that they may be able to stand aside from and criticize State action or inaction, in the interests of the inarticulate man in the street. Some 60 years later it remained the case that if a voluntary society wanted to gain or retain charitable status then, contrary to the Nathan report, the one thing it could not do was set itself up with the purpose of criticizing State action or inaction. This legal position was adopted by the authorities in Australia with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) noting in Taxation Ruling TR2005/21: 102. An institution or fund is not charitable if its purpose is advocating a political party or cause, attempting to change the law or government policy, or propagating or promoting a particular point of view. So, why, if it is such a valuable activity, have governments steadfastly refused to allow charities to have as their purpose the freedom to advocate in this way and how has this situation been affected by the recent High Court of Australia decision in Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation? This article proposes to address such questions. Beginning with some background history, it explains that, initially, the current constraints did not apply. Then it looks at the nature of these constraints: how does the law define what constitutes the type of political activity that a charity must not undertake? What is the rationale for prohibition? How has the judiciary contributed to the development of the law in this area in recent years? This will lead into a consideration of the Aid/Watch case and the implications arising from the recent final decision. The article concludes by reflecting on what has changed and why the view on this contentious matter now looks different from Australia.

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Significant reform of the laws regulating charities is under way in Australia. The reforms cover almost every facet of the relationship between charities and government and the process has brought to the surface different assumptions about the role of charities in society, their entitlement to fiscal and other privileges and the scope and nature of regulation that can or should be imposed on the charities. This paper explores these broader issues in the context of the Aid/Watch case, involving an organisation used by citizens to challenge the State. Such organisations occupy contested space as to what does and does not constitute a charity. Accordingly the case provides a useful perspective from which to consider the broader issues in the relationship between government and charity. This paper seeks to build on the contribution made by other academics, by exploring the constitutional significance of political purposes and drawing from philosophy to provide context and meaning to potentially significant aspects of the judgment that might be missed when it is analysed only in terms of legal precedent through the narrow lens of the existing four heads of charity. Revenue implications for taxation of charities and political parties are also considered and it is suggested that in practice, if not in theory, the fence between them has come down.

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.

Perpetuating Racism: Legal Education, Race and Social Justice

By presenting the results of a content analysis of Australian undergraduate legal education, this paper examines the extent to which issues of race, ethnicity, discrimination, and multiculturalism feature within this component of the moral, ethical, and professional development of legal professionals. It will demonstrate that instead of encouraging a deep, critical and contextual understanding of such issues, legal education provides a relatively superficial one, which has important implications for the role that legal professionals play in overcoming injustices such as institutional racism, and the kinds of social reform that they are likely to undertake.