Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers–cheating experts problem.

Tariff strategies and small open economies

In this paper we examine the issue of optimal tariffs for a small economy that trades with a large economy. We define ‘small’ and ‘large’ in the sense that the world prices are determined solely by the large country, and, therefore, the small country faces exogenously given world prices. Within this framework it is shown that there exist situations in which the small country has an incentive to behave as a Stackelberg leader by committing itself to a non-zero optimal tariff. Although the small country is unable to directly affect world prices, by pre-committing to a non-zero trade tax it may induce a reduction of the large country's optimal trade tax, thereby indirectly improving its terms of trade and welfare. JEL Classification: F13, F35