The home stigma : adverse selection in ADRs and the home capital market environment

We investigate whether characteristics of the home country capital environment, such as information disclosure and investor rights protection continue to affect ADRs cross-listed in the U.S. Using microstructure measures as proxies for adverse selection, we find that characteristics of the home markets continue to be relevant, especially for emerging market firms. Less transparent disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights and weaker legal institutions are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. Developed market firms appear to be affected by whether or not home business laws are common law or civil law legal origin. Our finding contributes to the bonding literature. It suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. should not be viewed as a substitute for improvement in the quality of local institutions, and attention must be paid to improve investor protection in order to achieve the full benefits of improved disclosure. Improvement in the domestic capital market environment can attract more investors even for U.S. cross-listed firms.

Is there timing ability in currency markets? Evidence from ADR issuances

Is there timing ability in the exchange rate markets? We address this question by examining foreign firms' decisions to issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Specifically, we test whether foreign firms consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions and, in doing so, display some ability to time their local exchange rate market. We study ADR issuances in the U.S. stock market between 1976 and 2003. We find that foreign firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar and before their local currency becomes abnormally weak. This evidence is statistically significant even after controlling for local and U.S. past and future stock market performance and predicable exchange rate movements. Currency market timing is especially significant i) for value companies, relatively small (yet absolutely large) companies issuing relatively large amounts of ADRs, companies with higher currency exposure, manufacturing companies, and emerging market companies, ii) during currency crises (when mispricings are rife) and after the integration of the issuer's local financial market with the world capital markets, iii) when the ADR issue raises capital for the issuing firm (Level III ADR), and iv) regardless of the identity of the underwriting investment bank. Currency market timing is also economically significant since it translates into total savings for the issuing firms of about $646 million (or 1.86% of the total capital-raising ADR issue volume). In contrast, we find no evidence of currency timing ability in a control sample made of non-capital raising ADRs (Level II ADRs). These findings suggest that some companies may have, at least occasionally, private information about foreign exchange.

On collective unintelligence

The idea of collective unintelligence is examined in this paper to highlight some of the conceptual and practical problems faced in modeling groups. Examples drawn from international crises and economics provide illustrative problems of collective failures to act in intelligent ways, despite the inputs and efforts of many skilled and intelligent parties. Choices made of “appropriate” perceptions, analysis and evaluations are examined along with how these might be combined. A simple vector representation illustrates some of the issues and creative possibilities in multi-party actions. Revealed as manifest (un-)intelligence are the resolutions of various problems and potentials that arise in dealing with the “each and all” of a group (wherein items are necessarily non-parallel and of unequal valency). Such issues challenge those seeking to model collective intelligence, but much may be learned.

Islamic project financing implementation for sustainable infrastructure development in Indonesia

Islamic financing in Indonesia infrastructure projects development has not been optimally implemented. Therefore this paper serves as a catalyst to explore alternative financial scheme such as Islamic financing for infrastructure development. The purpose of this paper is to explore the enablers and barriers in implementing Islamic project financing for public infrastructure development. The findings are then culminated into enablers and barriers in the implementation of Islamic project financing. The two main enablers are the readily availability of huge fund that can be used to support infrastructure projects; and the acceptability of the concept of shariah-compliant financing. On the other hand, the barriers include: high cost of funding; lack of financial institution capability; lack of government policy and regulation; insufficient government support and commitment; conflict between infrastructure and Islamic finance business practices; profit oriented mindset; lack of understanding of Islamic project financing knowledge in infrastructure; and insufficient project preparation.

Paper, prices and politics : an evaluation of the Swedish support to the Bai Bang project in Vietnam : a Sida evaluation report

Sweden’s protest against the Vietnam War was given tangible form in 1969 through the decision to give economic aid to the Government of North Vietnam. The main outcome was an integrated pulp and paper mill in the Vinh Phu Province north-west of Hanoi. Known as Bai Bang after its location, the mill became the most costly, one of the longest lasting and the most controversial project in the history of Swedish development cooperation. In 1996 Bai Bang produced at its full capacity. Today the mill is exclusively managed and staffed by the Vietnamese and there are plans for future expansion. At the same time a substantial amount of money has been spent to reach these achievements. Looking back at the cumbersome history of the project the results are against many’s expectations. To learn more about the conditions for sustainable development Sida commissioned two studies of the Bai Bang project. Together they touch upon several important issues in development cooperation over a period of almost 30 years: the change of aid paradigms over time, the role of foreign policy in development cooperation, cultural obstacles, recipient responsibility versus donor led development etc. The two studies were commissioned by Sida’s Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit which is an independent department reporting directly to Sida’s Board of Directors. One study assesses the financial and economic viability of the pulp and paper mill and the broader development impact of the project in Vietnam. It has been carried out by the Centre for International Economics, an Australian private economic research agency. The other study analyses the decision-making processes that created and shaped the project over a period of two decades, and reflects on lessons from the project for development cooperation in general. This study has been carried out by the Chr. Michelsen Institute, a Norweigan independent research institution.

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.