Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

Legislative and security requirements of audit material for evidentiary purpose

This research used the Queensland Police Service, Australia, as a major case study. Information on principles, techniques and processes used, and the reason for the recording, storing and release of audit information for evidentiary purposes is reported. It is shown that Law Enforcement Agencies have a two-fold interest in, and legal obligation pertaining to, audit trails. The first interest relates to the situation where audit trails are actually used by criminals in the commission of crime and the second to where audit trails are generated by the information systems used by the police themselves in support of the recording and investigation of crime. Eleven court cases involving Queensland Police Service audit trails used in evidence in Queensland courts were selected for further analysis. It is shown that, of the cases studied, none of the evidence presented was rejected or seriously challenged from a technical perspective. These results were further analysed and related to normal requirements for trusted maintenance of audit trail information in sensitive environments with discussion on the ability and/or willingness of courts to fully challenge, assess or value audit evidence presented. Managerial and technical frameworks for firstly what is considered as an environment where a computer system may be considered to be operating “properly” and, secondly, what aspects of education, training, qualifications, expertise and the like may be considered as appropriate for persons responsible within that environment, are both proposed. Analysis was undertaken to determine if audit and control of information in a high security environment, such as law enforcement, could be judged as having improved, or not, in the transition from manual to electronic processes. Information collection, control of processing and audit in manual processes used by the Queensland Police Service, Australia, in the period 1940 to 1980 was assessed against current electronic systems essentially introduced to policing in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. Results show that electronic systems do provide for faster communications with centrally controlled and updated information readily available for use by large numbers of users who are connected across significant geographical locations. However, it is clearly evident that the price paid for this is a lack of ability and/or reluctance to provide improved audit and control processes. To compare the information systems audit and control arrangements of the Queensland Police Service with other government departments or agencies, an Australia wide survey was conducted. Results of the survey were contrasted with the particular results of a survey, conducted by the Australian Commonwealth Privacy Commission four years previous, to this survey which showed that security in relation to the recording of activity against access to information held on Australian government computer systems has been poor and a cause for concern. However, within this four year period there is evidence to suggest that government organisations are increasingly more inclined to generate audit trails. An attack on the overall security of audit trails in computer operating systems was initiated to further investigate findings reported in relation to the government systems survey. The survey showed that information systems audit trails in Microsoft Corporation's “Windows” operating system environments are relied on quite heavily. An audit of the security for audit trails generated, stored and managed in the Microsoft “Windows 2000” operating system environment was undertaken and compared and contrasted with similar such audit trail schemes in the “UNIX” and “Linux” operating systems. Strength of passwords and exploitation of any security problems in access control were targeted using software tools that are freely available in the public domain. Results showed that such security for the “Windows 2000” system is seriously flawed and the integrity of audit trails stored within these environments cannot be relied upon. An attempt to produce a framework and set of guidelines for use by expert witnesses in the information technology (IT) profession is proposed. This is achieved by examining the current rules and guidelines related to the provision of expert evidence in a court environment, by analysing the rationale for the separation of distinct disciplines and corresponding bodies of knowledge used by the Medical Profession and Forensic Science and then by analysing the bodies of knowledge within the discipline of IT itself. It is demonstrated that the accepted processes and procedures relevant to expert witnessing in a court environment are transferable to the IT sector. However, unlike some discipline areas, this analysis has clearly identified two distinct aspects of the matter which appear particularly relevant to IT. These two areas are; expertise gained through the application of IT to information needs in a particular public or private enterprise; and expertise gained through accepted and verifiable education, training and experience in fundamental IT products and system.

Security assessment of code refactoring rules

Refactoring is a common approach to producing better quality software. Its impact on many software quality properties, including reusability, maintainability and performance, has been studied and measured extensively. However, its impact on the information security of programs has received relatively little attention. In this work, we assess the impact of a number of the most common code-level refactoring rules on data security, using security metrics that are capable of measuring security from the viewpoint of potential information flow. The metrics are calculated for a given Java program using a static analysis tool we have developed to automatically analyse compiled Java bytecode. We ran our Java code analyser on various programs which were refactored according to each rule. New values of the metrics for the refactored programs then confirmed that the code changes had a measurable effect on information security.

A framework for security analysis of key derivation functions

This paper presents a comprehensive formal security framework for key derivation functions (KDF). The major security goal for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys from a private seed value where the derived cryptographic keys are indistinguishable from random binary strings. We form a framework of five security models for KDFs. This consists of four security models that we propose: Known Public Inputs Attack (KPM, KPS), Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM) and Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk [6], which we refer to as Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack(CCS). These security models are simulated using an indistinguisibility game. In addition we prove the relationships between these five security models and analyse KDFs using the framework (in the random oracle model).

Security analysis of linearly filtered NLFSRs

Non-linear feedback shift register (NLFSR) ciphers are cryptographic tools of choice of the industry especially for mobile communication. Their attractive feature is a high efficiency when implemented in hardware or software. However, the main problem of NLFSR ciphers is that their security is still not well investigated. The paper makes a progress in the study of the security of NLFSR ciphers. In particular, we show a distinguishing attack on linearly filtered NLFSR (or LF-NLFSR) ciphers. We extend the attack to a linear combination of LF-NLFSRs. We investigate the security of a modified version of the Grain stream cipher and show its vulnerability to both key recovery and distinguishing attacks.

Reconsidering the agency of a privately appointed receiver and manager in three specific circumstances

Where a secured lender elects to appoint a receiver and manager, the appointment document standardly provides for the receiver and manager to act as the agent of the debtor. This article considers the significance of this agency in the context of three specific issues that have the potential to arise in the receivership of a corporate borrower across all Australian jurisdictions.

Security evaluation of Rakaposhi Stream Cipher

Rakaposhi is a synchronous stream cipher, which uses three main components: a non-linear feedback shift register (NLFSR), a dynamic linear feedback shift register (DLFSR) and a non-linear filtering function (NLF). NLFSR consists of 128 bits and is initialised by the secret key K. DLFSR holds 192 bits and is initialised by an initial vector (IV). NLF takes 8-bit inputs and returns a single output bit. The work identifies weaknesses and properties of the cipher. The main observation is that the initialisation procedure has the so-called sliding property. The property can be used to launch distinguishing and key recovery attacks. The distinguisher needs four observations of the related (K,IV) pairs. The key recovery algorithm allows to discover the secret key K after observing 29 pairs of (K,IV). Based on the proposed related-key attack, the number of related (K,IV) pairs is 2(128 + 192)/4 pairs. Further the cipher is studied when the registers enter short cycles. When NLFSR is set to all ones, then the cipher degenerates to a linear feedback shift register with a non-linear filter. Consequently, the initial state (and Secret Key and IV) can be recovered with complexity 263.87. If DLFSR is set to all zeros, then NLF reduces to a low non-linearity filter function. As the result, the cipher is insecure allowing the adversary to distinguish it from a random cipher after 217 observations of keystream bits. There is also the key recovery algorithm that allows to find the secret key with complexity 2 54.

Security analysis of Australian and E.U. e-passport implementation

This paper makes a formal security analysis of the current Australian e-passport implementation using model checking tools CASPER/CSP/FDR. We highlight security issues in the current implementation and identify new threats when an e-passport system is integrated with an automated processing system like SmartGate. The paper also provides a security analysis of the European Union (EU) proposal for Extended Access Control (EAC) that is intended to provide improved security in protecting biometric information of the e-passport bearer. The current e-passport specification fails to provide a list of adequate security goals that could be used for security evaluation. We fill this gap; we present a collection of security goals for evaluation of e-passport protocols. Our analysis confirms existing security weaknesses that were previously identified and shows that both the Australian e-passport implementation and the EU proposal fail to address many security and privacy aspects that are paramount in implementing a secure border control mechanism. ACM Classification C.2.2 (Communication/Networking and Information Technology – Network Protocols – Model Checking), D.2.4 (Software Engineering – Software/Program Verification – Formal Methods), D.4.6 (Operating Systems – Security and Privacy Protection – Authentication)

Formal security analysis of Australian e-passport implementation

This paper provides a detailed description of the current Australian e-passport implementation and makes a formal verification using model checking tools CASPER/CSP/FDR. We highlight security issues present in the current e-passport implementation and identify new threats when an e-passport system is integrated with an automated processing systems like SmartGate. Because the current e-passport specification does not provide adequate security goals, to perform a rational security analysis we identify and describe a set of security goals for evaluation of e-passport protocols. Our analysis confirms existing security issues that were previously informally identified and presents weaknesses that exists in the current e-passport implementation.

Security analysis of the non-aggressive challenge response of the DNP3 Protocol using a CPN Model

Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is the de-facto communication protocol for power grids. Standard-based interoperability among devices has made the protocol useful to other infrastructures such as water, sewage, oil and gas. DNP3 is designed to facilitate interaction between master stations and outstations. In this paper, we apply a formal modelling methodology called Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) to create an executable model representation of DNP3 protocol. The model facilitates the analysis of the protocol to ensure that the protocol will behave as expected. Also, we illustrate how to verify and validate the behaviour of the protocol, using the CPN model and the corresponding state space tool to determine if there are insecure states. With this approach, we were able to identify a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the DNP3 protocol.

Model for internal porosity development of different shaped foods

Three particular geometrical shapes of foods were prepared from food materials. Cuboidal (aspect ratio = 1:1, 2:1, 3:1) , cylindrical (length: dameter = 1:1, 2:1, 3:1) and spheres were selected from potato, beans and peas respectively. Internal porosity was determined from solid density (theoretical)and particle density (experimental) during fluidised bed drying at different moisture contents. Solid density was calculated using formulae (conservation of mass and volume) already published in the literature by previous researchers. Determined porosity values were correlated with moisture ratio for different geometrical shapes.

Improved Security Analysis of Fugue-256 (Poster)

We present some improved analytical results as part of the ongoing work on the analysis of Fugue-256 hash function, a second round candidate in the NIST’s SHA3 competition. First we improve Aumasson and Phans’ integral distinguisher on the 5.5 rounds of the final transformation of Fugue-256 to 16.5 rounds. Next we improve the designers’ meet-in-the-middle preimage attack on Fugue-256 from 2480 time and memory to 2416. Finally, we comment on possible methods to obtain free-start distinguishers and free-start collisions for Fugue-256.

Security Analysis of salt||password Hashes

Protection of passwords used to authenticate computer systems and networks is one of the most important application of cryptographic hash functions. Due to the application of precomputed memory look up attacks such as birthday and dictionary attacks on the hash values of passwords to find passwords, it is usually recommended to apply hash function to the combination of both the salt and password, denoted salt||password, to prevent these attacks. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of salt||password hashing application. We show that when hash functions based on the compression functions with easily found fixed points are used to compute the salt||password hashes, these hashes are susceptible to precomputed offline birthday attacks. For example, this attack is applicable to the salt||password hashes computed using the standard hash functions such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 that are based on the popular Davies-Meyer compression function. This attack exposes a subtle property of this application that although the provision of salt prevents an attacker from finding passwords, salts prefixed to the passwords do not prevent an attacker from doing a precomputed birthday attack to forge an unknown password. In this forgery attack, we demonstrate the possibility of building multiple passwords for an unknown password for the same hash value and salt. Interestingly, password||salt (i.e. salts suffixed to the passwords) hashes computed using Davies-Meyer hash functions are not susceptible to this attack, showing the first security gap between the prefix-salt and suffix-salt methods of hashing passwords.