Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints

We establish an argument for fiscal restraints which is based on the idea that politicians are experts in the meaning of the credence good literature. A budget maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. Voters, being able to observe the budget but not the necessary level of spending, attenuate the government’s spending level via electoral control. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government will choose if the level of spending ensuring the politicians reelection is not sufficient to ensure the state’s ability to provide services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are required.

Bailing out the FEG : is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) approaching its own fiscal cliff?

This article discusses what recent statistics and public reports reveal about the funding of GEERS (now the FEG) and its bottom line. The article examines (1) whether there has been a “blowout” in the scheme which guarantees the recovery of employee entitlements in liquidations and (2) what might be done to put the scheme on a firmer fiscal footing.

Influence and increased funding in Canadian public libraries : the case of Alberta in fiscal year 2009–10

This exploratory case study examined the role of social influence in the decision-making process to increase public library funding in the Canadian province of Alberta in the 2009–10 fiscal year. Using Robert Cialdini’s theory of factors of influence (i.e., commitment and consistency, authority, liking, social proof, scarcity, and reciprocity) as a framework for analysis, findings show that consistency and commitment and authority were relevant and that liking was also important. These findings are consistent with Cialdini’s theory, which suggests that the quality of relationships is one factor that can most strongly influence a decision maker. This study gives insight into the factors motivating those involved in public library funding allocation decisions. No prior studies have examined the construct of influence in decision making about funding for public libraries at any level of government.

Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers : the case of India

This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India.