A political economy perspective on persistent inequality, inflation, and redistribution

In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation from a political economy perspective. We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality is persistent. Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, and we find that the link between inequality and inflation within any period or over time depends on institutional and preference related parameters. Furthermore, we find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth can yield a diverse set of patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link. Relative to existing literature, our model leads to more precise predictions about the inflation-inequality correlation. To that end, results in the extant empirical literature on the inflation and inequality link need to be interpreted with caution.

Making a match: Combining theory and evidence in policy-oriented macroeconomic modeling

A persistent question in the development of models for macroeconomic policy analysis has been the relative role of economic theory and evidence in their construction. This paper looks at some popular strategies that involve setting up a theoretical or conceptual model (CM) which is transformed to match the data and then made operational for policy analysis. A dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed that is similar to standard CMs. After calibration to UK data it is used to examine the utility of formal econometric methods in assessing the match of the CM to the data and also to evaluate some standard model-building strategies. Keywords: Policy oriented economic modeling; Model evaluation; VAR models

Economic growth, inequality and technology adoption in transitional economies

The stylized facts that motivate this thesis include the diversity in growth patterns that are observed across countries during the process of economic development, and the divergence over time in income distributions both within and across countries. This thesis constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model in which technology adoption is costly and agents are heterogeneous in their initial holdings of resources. Given the households‟ resource level, this study examines how adoption costs influence the evolution of household income over time and the timing of transition to more productive technologies. The analytical results of the model constructed here characterize three growth outcomes associated with the technology adoption process depending on productivity differences between the technologies. These are appropriately labeled as „poverty trap‟, „dual economy‟ and „balanced growth‟. The model is then capable of explaining the observed diversity in growth patterns across countries, as well as divergence of incomes over time. Numerical simulations of the model furthermore illustrate features of this transition. They suggest that that differences in adoption costs account for the timing of households‟ decision to switch technology which leads to a disparity in incomes across households in the technology adoption process. Since this determines the timing of complete adoption of the technology within a country, the implications for cross-country income differences are obvious. Moreover, the timing of technology adoption appears to be impacts on patterns of growth of households, which are different across various income groups. The findings also show that, in the presence of costs associated with the adoption of more productive technologies, inequalities of income and wealth may increase over time tending to delay the convergence in income levels. Initial levels of inequalities in the resources also have an impact on the date of complete adoption of more productive technologies. The issue of increasing income inequality in the process of technology adoption opens up another direction for research. Specifically increasing inequality implies that distributive conflicts may emerge during the transitional process with political- economy consequences. The model is therefore extended to include such issues. Without any political considerations, taxes would leads to a reduction in inequality and convergence of incomes across agents. However this process is delayed if politico-economic influences are taken into account. Moreover, the political outcome is sub optimal. This is essentially due to the fact that there is a resistance associated with the complete adoption of the advanced technology.

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

Limited information estimation and evaluation of DSGE models

We advance the proposition that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models should not only be estimated and evaluated with full information methods. These require that the complete system of equations be specified properly. Some limited information analysis, which focuses upon specific equations, is therefore likely to be a useful complement to full system analysis. Two major problems occur when implementing limited information methods. These are the presence of forward-looking expectations in the system as well as unobservable non-stationary variables. We present methods for dealing with both of these difficulties, and illustrate the interaction between full and limited information methods using a well-known model.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

A Tradable Permit System in an Intertemporal Economy

It is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy, a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates (i.e., rewards for holding permits). To find the rates, however, we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices, which is difficult to obtain. This study intends to solve this problem in two ways. First, we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule. For example, if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant, then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate. As is the case for global warming, if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program, the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self-recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions. As a second approach, we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank, as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits. However, we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Reducing tariffs according to WTO accession rules: The case of Vietnam

When Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 it was granted an accession period up to 2014. During this period tariffs would have to fall according to the accession agreement. This paper evaluates this 2007–2014 trade liberalization by building an applied general equilibrium model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The model pays careful attention to the fact that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises. The model simulations show that the WTO tariff reductions will reduce overall welfare. Moreover, the biggest loss will take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. This paper proposes other tariff reforms that will both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality.

kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.