Awards before and after the Nobel Prize : a Matthew effect and/or a ticket to one's own funeral?

The primary aim of this descriptive exploration of scientists’ life cycle award patterns is to evaluate whether awards breed further awards and identify researcher experiences after reception of the Nobel Prize. To achieve this goal, we collected data on the number of awards received each year for 50 years before and after Nobel Prize reception by all 1901–2000 Nobel laureates in physics, chemistry, and medicine or physiology. Our results indicate an increasing rate of awards before Nobel reception, reaching the summit precisely in the year of the Nobel Prize. After this pinnacle year, awards drop sharply. This result is confirmed by separate analyses of three different disciplines and by a random-effects negative binomial regression model. Such an effect, however, does not emerge for more recent Nobel laureates (1971–2000). In addition, Nobelists in medicine or physiology generate more awards shortly before and after prize reception, whereas laureates in chemistry attract more awards as time progresses.

Ceremony analysis : strengths and weaknesses

We investigate known security flaws in the context of security ceremonies to gain an understanding of the ceremony analysis process. The term security ceremonies is used to describe a system of protocols and humans which interact for a specific purpose. Security ceremonies and ceremony analysis is an area of research in its infancy, and we explore the basic principles involved to better understand the issues involved.We analyse three ceremonies, HTTPS, EMV and Opera Mini, and use the information gained from the experience to establish a list of typical flaws in ceremonies. Finally, we use that list to analyse a protocol proven secure for human use. This leads to a realisation of the strengths and weaknesses of ceremony analysis.

Towards a secure human-and-computer mutual authentication protocol

We blend research from human-computer interface (HCI) design with computational based crypto- graphic provable security. We explore the notion of practice-oriented provable security (POPS), moving the focus to a higher level of abstraction (POPS+) for use in providing provable security for security ceremonies involving humans. In doing so we high- light some challenges and paradigm shifts required to achieve meaningful provable security for a protocol which includes a human. We move the focus of security ceremonies from being protocols in their context of use, to the protocols being cryptographic building blocks in a higher level protocol (the security cere- mony), which POPS can be applied to. In order to illustrate the need for our approach, we analyse both a protocol proven secure in theory, and a similar proto- col implemented by a �nancial institution, from both HCI and cryptographic perspectives.

Security ceremonies : including humans in cryptographic protocols

Whether by using electronic banking, by using credit cards, or by synchronising a mobile telephone via Bluetooth to an in-car system, humans are a critical part in many cryptographic protocols daily. We reduced the gap that exists between the theory and the reality of the security of these cryptographic protocols involving humans, by creating tools and techniques for proofs and implementations of human-followable security. After three human research studies, we present a model for capturing human recognition; we provide a tool for generating values called Computer-HUman Recognisable Nonces (CHURNs); and we provide a model for capturing human perceptible freshness.