100 resultados para Formal languages
em Queensland University of Technology - ePrints Archive
Resumo:
Technical Report to accompany Ownership for Reasoning About Parallelism. Documents type system which captures effects and the operational semantics for the language which is presented as part of the paper.
Resumo:
Current regulatory requirements on data privacy make it increasingly important for enterprises to be able to verify and audit their compliance with their privacy policies. Traditionally, a privacy policy is written in a natural language. Such policies inherit the potential ambiguity, inconsistency and mis-interpretation of natural text. Hence, formal languages are emerging to allow a precise specification of enforceable privacy policies that can be verified. The EP3P language is one such formal language. An EP3P privacy policy of an enterprise consists of many rules. Given the semantics of the language, there may exist some rules in the ruleset which can never be used, these rules are referred to as redundant rules. Redundancies adversely affect privacy policies in several ways. Firstly, redundant rules reduce the efficiency of operations on privacy policies. Secondly, they may misdirect the policy auditor when determining the outcome of a policy. Therefore, in order to address these deficiencies it is important to identify and resolve redundancies. This thesis introduces the concept of minimal privacy policy - a policy that is free of redundancy. The essential component for maintaining the minimality of privacy policies is to determine the effects of the rules on each other. Hence, redundancy detection and resolution frameworks are proposed. Pair-wise redundancy detection is the central concept in these frameworks and it suggests a pair-wise comparison of the rules in order to detect redundancies. In addition, the thesis introduces a policy management tool that assists policy auditors in performing several operations on an EP3P privacy policy while maintaining its minimality. Formal results comparing alternative notions of redundancy, and how this would affect the tool, are also presented.
Resumo:
Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of protocols that allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user information. They are important in preserving users’ privacy in today’s open environment. Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary insights for modeling and verification of PEPs in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying the CPN-based formal approach to proving the correctness of PEPs.
Resumo:
A configurable process model describes a family of similar process models in a given domain. Such a model can be configured to obtain a specific process model that is subsequently used to handle individual cases, for instance, to process customer orders. Process configuration is notoriously difficult as there may be all kinds of interdependencies between configuration decisions.} In fact, an incorrect configuration may lead to behavioral issues such as deadlocks and livelocks. To address this problem, we present a novel verification approach inspired by the ``operating guidelines'' used for partner synthesis. We view the configuration process as an external service, and compute a characterization of all such services which meet particular requirements using the notion of configuration guideline. As a result, we can characterize all feasible configurations (i.\,e., configurations without behavioral problems) at design time, instead of repeatedly checking each individual configuration while configuring a process model.
Resumo:
In a digital world, users’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is normally managed with a system called an Identity Management System (IMS). There are many types of IMSs. There are situations when two or more IMSs need to communicate with each other (such as when a service provider needs to obtain some identity information about a user from a trusted identity provider). There could be interoperability issues when communicating parties use different types of IMS. To facilitate interoperability between different IMSs, an Identity Meta System (IMetS) is normally used. An IMetS can, at least theoretically, join various types of IMSs to make them interoperable and give users the illusion that they are interacting with just one IMS. However, due to the complexity of an IMS, attempting to join various types of IMSs is a technically challenging task, let alone assessing how well an IMetS manages to integrate these IMSs. The first contribution of this thesis is the development of a generic IMS model called the Layered Identity Infrastructure Model (LIIM). Using this model, we develop a set of properties that an ideal IMetS should provide. This idealized form is then used as a benchmark to evaluate existing IMetSs. Different types of IMS provide varying levels of privacy protection support. Unfortunately, as observed by Jøsang et al (2007), there is insufficient privacy protection in many of the existing IMSs. In this thesis, we study and extend a type of privacy enhancing technology known as an Anonymous Credential System (ACS). In particular, we extend the ACS which is built on the cryptographic primitives proposed by Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, and Shoup. We call this system the Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, Shoup - Anonymous Credential System (CLS-ACS). The goal of CLS-ACS is to let users be as anonymous as possible. Unfortunately, CLS-ACS has problems, including (1) the concentration of power to a single entity - known as the Anonymity Revocation Manager (ARM) - who, if malicious, can trivially reveal a user’s PII (resulting in an illegal revocation of the user’s anonymity), and (2) poor performance due to the resource-intensive cryptographic operations required. The second and third contributions of this thesis are the proposal of two protocols that reduce the trust dependencies on the ARM during users’ anonymity revocation. Both protocols distribute trust from the ARM to a set of n referees (n > 1), resulting in a significant reduction of the probability of an anonymity revocation being performed illegally. The first protocol, called the User Centric Anonymity Revocation Protocol (UCARP), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked in a user-centric manner (that is, the user is aware that his/her anonymity is about to be revoked). The second protocol, called the Anonymity Revocation Protocol with Re-encryption (ARPR), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked by a service provider in an accountable manner (that is, there is a clear mechanism to determine which entity who can eventually learn - and possibly misuse - the identity of the user). The fourth contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a protocol called the Private Information Escrow bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). This protocol is designed to address the performance issue of CLS-ACS by applying the CLS-ACS in a federated single sign-on (FSSO) environment. Our analysis shows that PIEMCP can both reduce the amount of expensive modular exponentiation operations required and lower the risk of illegal revocation of users’ anonymity. Finally, the protocols proposed in this thesis are complex and need to be formally evaluated to ensure that their required security properties are satisfied. In this thesis, we use Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) and its corresponding state space analysis techniques. All of the protocols proposed in this thesis have been formally modeled and verified using these formal techniques. Therefore, the fifth contribution of this thesis is a demonstration of the applicability of CPN and its corresponding analysis techniques in modeling and verifying privacy enhancing protocols. To our knowledge, this is the first time that CPN has been comprehensively applied to model and verify privacy enhancing protocols. From our experience, we also propose several CPN modeling approaches, including complex cryptographic primitives (such as zero-knowledge proof protocol) modeling, attack parameterization, and others. The proposed approaches can be applied to other security protocols, not just privacy enhancing protocols.
Resumo:
We define a semantic model for purpose, based on which purpose-based privacy policies can be meaningfully expressed and enforced in a business system. The model is based on the intuition that the purpose of an action is determined by its situation among other inter-related actions. Actions and their relationships can be modeled in the form of an action graph which is based on the business processes in a system. Accordingly, a modal logic and the corresponding model checking algorithm are developed for formal expression of purpose-based policies and verifying whether a particular system complies with them. It is also shown through various examples, how various typical purpose-based policies as well as some new policy types can be expressed and checked using our model.
Resumo:
Variants of the same process can be encountered within one organization or across different organizations. For example, different municipalities, courts, and rental agencies all need to support highly similar processes. In fact, procurement and sales processes can be found in almost any organization. However, despite these similarities, there is also the need to allow for local variations in a controlled manner. Therefore, many academics and practitioners have advocated the use of configurable process models (sometimes referred to as reference models). A configurable process model describes a family of similar process models in a given domain. Such a model can be configured to obtain a specific process model that is subsequently used to handle individual cases, for instance, to process customer orders. Process configuration is notoriously difficult as there may be all kinds of interdependencies between configuration decisions. In fact, an incorrect configuration may lead to behavioral issues such as deadlocks and livelocks. To address this problem, we present a novel verification approach inspired by the “operating guidelines” used for partner synthesis. We view the configuration process as an external service, and compute a characterization of all such services which meet particular requirements via the notion of configuration guideline. As a result, we can characterize all feasible configurations (i. e., configurations without behavioral problems) at design time, instead of repeatedly checking each individual configuration while configuring a process model.
Resumo:
As business process management technology matures, organisations acquire more and more business process models. The resulting collections can consist of hundreds, even thousands of models and their management poses real challenges. One of these challenges concerns model retrieval where support should be provided for the formulation and efficient execution of business process model queries. As queries based on only structural information cannot deal with all querying requirements in practice, there should be support for queries that require knowledge of process model semantics. In this paper we formally define a process model query language that is based on semantic relationships between tasks. This query language is independent of the particular process modelling notation used, but we will demonstrate how it can be used in the context of Petri nets by showing how the semantic relationships can be determined for these nets in such a way that state space explosion is avoided as much as possible. An experiment with three large process model repositories shows that queries expressed in our language can be evaluated efficiently.
Resumo:
To provide privacy protection, cryptographic primitives are frequently applied to communication protocols in an open environment (e.g. the Internet). We call these protocols privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) which constitute a class of cryptographic protocols. Proof of the security properties, in terms of the privacy compliance, of PEPs is desirable before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well-established for proving the security of cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal language of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various privacy properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides insights into the modelling and analysis of PEPs in general, and demonstrates the benefit of applying a CPN-based formal approach to the privacy compliance verification of PEPs.
Resumo:
In his paper “Approaches to Modeling Business Processes. A Critical Analysis of BPMN, Workflow Patterns and YAWL”, Egon Börger criticizes the work of the Workflow Patterns Initiative in a rather provocative manner. Although the workflow patterns and YAWL are well established and frequently used, Börger seems to misunderstand the goals and contributions of the Workflow Patterns Initiative. Therefore, we put the workflow patterns and YAWL in their historic context. Moreover, we address some of the criticism of Börger by pointing out the real purpose of the workflow patterns and their relationship to formal languages (Petri nets) and real-life WFM/BPM systems.