Foreign direct investment and technology spillovers in sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an effective conduit for technology transfer through technology spillovers to domestically owned firms in the host country. This study analyses the significance of productivity externalities of FDI to local firms, in terms of both intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, using firm-level data from Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The results show evidences in support of intra- and inter-industry productivity spillovers from FDI for Kenya and Zimbabwe. © 2010 Taylor & Francis.

Do pollutions deter foreign direct investment in China?

The scale of environmental problems in China is clearly evident. This paper analyses foreign direct investment (FDI) in China with a finite mixture model, also known as latent class model to understand the relationship between FDI and several pollutions. This is used to regresses FDI as function covariates including pollutants. The results reveal that FDI is affected by pollutants. There are cases reducing pollution deters foreign investment in China.

International regulation of large-scale land acquisition involving foreign entities

Outlines some of the potential risks or actual harms that result from large-scale land leases or acquisitions and the relevant human rights and environmental law principles.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.