Feminist Disability Theory: Domestic Violence Against Women with a Disability

Women with a disability continue to experience social oppression and domestic violence as a consequence of gender and disability dimensions. Current explanations of domestic violence and disability inadequately explain several features that lead women who have a disability to experience violent situations. This article incorporates both disability and material feminist theory as an alternative explanation to the dominant approaches (psychological and sociological traditions) of conceptualising domestic violence. This paper is informed by a study which was concerned with examining the nature and perceptions of violence against women with a physical impairment. The emerging analytical framework integrating material feminist interpretations and disability theory provided a basis for exploring gender and disability dimensions. Insight was also provided by the women who identified as having a disability in the study and who explained domestic violence in terms of a gendered and disabling experience. The article argues that material feminist interpretations and disability theory, with their emphasis on gender relations, disablism and poverty, should be used as an alternative tool for exploring the nature and consequences of violence against women with a disability.

Out of their minds: legal theory in neural networks

This paper examines the use of connectionism (neural networks) in modelling legal reasoning. I discuss how the implementations of neural networks have failed to account for legal theoretical perspectives on adjudication. I criticise the use of neural networks in law, not because connectionism is inherently unsuitable in law, but rather because it has been done so poorly to date. The paper reviews a number of legal theories which provide a grounding for the use of neural networks in law. It then examines some implementations undertaken in law and criticises their legal theoretical naïvete. It then presents a lessons from the implementations which researchers must bear in mind if they wish to build neural networks which are justified by legal theories.

Tax and equality in 1972: The case of Lodge v FCT

This paper is part of a larger project described at http://www.law.uq.edu.au/australian-feminist-judgments-project as follows: This project draws its inspiration from two significant recent developments in law and feminist scholarship. The first has been the emergence in Canada and the UK of feminist judgment-writing projects, in which feminist academics, lawyers and activists have written alternative judgments in a series of legal cases, imagining the different decision that might have been made by a feminist judge hearing the case. The second has been the incremental shift in recent years in the number of women judges and Magistrates presiding in courts and tribunals throughout Australia. As part of this project, a group of scholars will write alternative feminist judgments. This paper is one of the alternative feminist judgements. The case used for this discussion is Lodge v Federal Commissioner of Tax [1972] HCA 49. In that case, a woman, earning income by way of commission in her occupation as a law costs clerk, which she carried out at her home, claimed to deduct from her assessable income child care fees that enabled her to devote time and attention to her work. The High Court held that no right to a deduction had arisen. It found that, although the purpose of the expenditure was for gaining assessable income, it did not take place in, or in the course of, preparing bills of cost. Further, the expenditure was of a ‘private or domestic’ nature. This seminal taxation decision, which prevents deductions for childcare, has broad financial ramifications for workers in the home and those with childcare responsibilities. It designates childcare duties as ‘private’, notwithstanding the need for these in order, particularly for women, to work in the public sphere.

A 'deleterious' effect? : Australian legal education and the production of the legal identity

A body of critical legal scholarship argues that, by the time they have completed their studies, students who enter legal education holding social ideals and intending to use their legal education to achieve social change, have become cynical about the ability of the law to do so and no longer possess such ideals. This is explained by critical scholars to be the result of a process of ideological indoctrination, aimed at ensuring that graduates uphold the narrow and conservative interests of the legal profession and capitalist society, being exercised by law schools acting as adjuncts of the legal profession, and exercised upon the passive body of the law student. By using Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject to interrogate the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, this thesis intends to suggest a way of thinking differently to the approach taken by many critical legal scholars. It then uses an analytics of government (based on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’) to consider the construction of the legal identity differently. It examines the ways in which the governance of the legal identity is rationalised, programmed, and implemented, in three Queensland law schools. It also looks at the way that five prescriptive texts to ‘surviving’ law school suggest students establish and practise a relation to themselves in order to construct their own legal identities. Overall, this analysis shows that governance is not simply conducted in the profession’s interests, but occurs due to a complex arrangement of different practices, which can lead to the construction of skilled legal professional identities as well as ethical lawyer-citizens that hold an interest in justice. The implications of such an analytics provide the basis for original ways of understanding legal education, and legal education scholarship.

Post-colonial law : legal establishments from past empires are illegitimate

The extant literature covering the plights of indigenous people resident to the African continent consistently targets colonial law as an obstacle to the recognition of indigenous rights. Whereas colonial law is argued to be archaic and in need of review, which it is, this article argues the new perspective that colonial law is illegitimate for ordering the population it presides over – specifically in Africa. It is seen, in five case studies, that post-colonial legal structures have not considered the legitimacy of colonial law and have rather modified a variety of statutes as country contexts dictated. However, the modified statutes are based on an alien theoretical legality, something laden with connotations that hark to older and backward times. It is ultimately argued that the legal structures which underpin ex-colonies in Africa need considerable revision so as to base statutes on African theoretical legality, rather than imperialistic European ones, so as to maximise the law’s legitimacy.

In search of Chinese jurisprudence : does Chinese legal tradition have a place in China's future?

Questions the extent to which Westerrn commercial laws adopted by China, particularly in its Company Laws of 1993 and 1995, are comptaible with China's different cultural and legal traditions. Suggests that Western concepts of the rule of law and of corporate governance are alient to China. Outlines the development of the Western legal tradition. based on Judaeo-Christian beliefs and legal rationalism. Compares this with the deveopment of the Chinese legal tradtion, based on Confucianism and legalism. Proposes ways in which the two traditions could be reconciled more effectively.

A communitarian theory of the education rights of students with disabilities

There is a lack of writing on the issue of the education rights of people with disabilities by authors of any theoretical persuasion. While the deficiency of theory may be explained by a variety of historical, philosophical and practical considerations, it is a deficiency which must be addressed. Otherwise, any statement of rights rings out as hollow rhetoric unsupported by sound reason and moral rectitude. This paper attempts to address this deficiency in education rights theory by postulating a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with disabilities. The theory is developed from communitarian writings on the role of education in democratic society. The communitarian school, like the community within which it nests, is inclusive. Schools both reflect and model the shape of communitarian society and have primary responsibility for teaching the knowledge and virtues which will allow citizens to belong to and function within society. Communitarians emphasise responsibilities, however, as the corollary of rights and require the individual good to yield to community good when the hard cases arise. The article not only explains the basis of the right to an inclusive education, therefore, but also engages with the difficult issue of when such a right may not be enforceable.

Legal education and the 'idealistic student': using Foucault to unpack the critical legal narrative

It appears that few of the students holding ‘socially idealistic’ goals upon entering law school actually maintain these upon graduation. The critical legal narrative, which explains and seeks to act upon this shift in the graduate’s ‘legal identity’, posits that these ideals are repressed through power relations that create passive receptacles into which professional ideologies can be deposited, in the interests of those advantaged by the social and legal status quo. Using the work of Michel Foucault, this paper unpacks the assumptions underpinning this narrative, particularly its arguments about ideology, power, and the subject. In doing so, it will argue this narrative provides an untenable basis for political action within legal education. By interrogating this narrative, this paper provides a new way of understanding the construction of the legal identity through legal education, and a new basis for political action within law school.

Legal Theories : Contexts and Practices [2nd ed.]

Legal Theories: Contexts and Practices presents legal theory as a living and evolving entity. The reader is brought into its story as an active participant who is challenged to think about where they sit within the history and traditions of legal theory and jurisprudence. This second edition explores how lawyers and the courts adopt theoretical and jurisprudential positions and how they are influenced by the historical, social, cultural, and legal conditions characteristic of the time in which they live. It considers how legal theories, too, are influenced by those conditions, and how these combined forces influence and continue to affect contemporary legal thinking and legal interpretation.

A creature of statute: Copyright law and legal formalism

This article argues that copyright law is not just a creature of statute, but it is also a social and imaginative contruct. It evaluates a number of critiques of legal formalism. Part 1 examines whether the positive rules and principles of copyright law are the product of historical contingency and political expediency. Part 2 considers the social operation of copyright law in terms of its material effects and cultural significance. Part 3 investigates the future of copyright law, in light of the politics of globalisation and the impact of new information technologies.

Retrospectivity and the rule of law

This book analyses and refines the arguments for and against retrospective rule making, concluding that there is one really strong argument against it: the expectation that, if an individual's actions are considered by a future court, the legal consequences of that action will be determined by the law that was discoverable at the time the action was performed. This argument, which goes to the heart of the rule of law, is generally determinative. However, in some cases the argument does not run and this book suggests that, in some areas of law, reliance should be actively discouraged by prospective warnings that the law is subject to change.

The paradox of transparency : short-termism and the institutionalisation of Australian capital markets

As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being 'captured' by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter-intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short-termism.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Modernising charity : steps to an alternative architecture for common law charity jurisprudence

This chapter addresses the question, how can the common law concept of charity law be modernised? There are difficulties with the present jurisprudential conception. The focus of the chapter is not on those difficulties, however, but rather on the development of an alternative architecture for common law jurisprudence. The conclusion to which the chapter comes is that charity law can be modernised by a series of steps to include all civil society organisations. It is possible if the ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose is abandoned in favour of a contemporary, not technical concept of charitiable purpose. This conclusion is reached by proposing a framework, developed from the common law concept of charities, that reconciles into a cohesive jurisprudential architecture all of the laws applying to civil society organisations, not just charities. In this section, first the argument is contextualised in an idea of society and located in a gap in legal theory. An analogy is then offered to introduce the problems in the legal theory applying, not just to charities, but more broadly to civil society organisations. The substantive challenge of mapping an alternative jurisprudence is then taken in steps. The final substantive section conceptualises the changes inherent in a move beyond charities to a jurisprudence centred on civil society organisations and how this would bring legal theory into line with sectoral analysis in other disciplines.