Communication and essentialism: Grounding the shared reality of a social category

Essentialism is an ontological belief that there exists an underlying essence to a category. This article advances and tests in three studies the hypothesis that communication about a social category, and expected or actual mutual validation, promotes essentialism about a social category. In Study 1, people who wrote communications about a social category to their ingroup audiences essentialized it more strongly than those who simply memorized about it. In Study 2, communicators whose messages about a novel social category were more elaborately discussed with a confederate showed a stronger tendency to essentialize it. In Study 3, communicators who elaborately talked about a social category with a naive conversant also essentialized the social category. A meta-analysis of the results supported the hypothesis that communication promotes essentialism. Although essentialism has been discussed primarily in perceptual and cognitive domains, the role of social processes as its antecedent deserves greater attention.

Psychological essentialism, implicit theories, and intergroup relations

Research on implicit person theories shows that beliefs about the malleability of human attributes have important implications for social cognition, interpersonal behavior, and intergroup relations. We argue that these implications can be understood within the framework of psychological essentialism, which extends work on implicit theories in promising directions. We review evidence that immutability beliefs covary with a broader set of essentialist beliefs, and that these essentialist beliefs are associated with stereotyping and prejudice. We then present recent studies indicating that associations between implicit person theories and stereotyping may be explained in terms of essentialist beliefs, implying a significant role for these beliefs in the psychology of group perception. Finally, we propose ways in which research and theory on essentialist beliefs might clarify and advance research on implicit person theories.

Editorial : knowledge-based development of cities : a myth or reality?

Urban development in the first decade of the 21st century has faced many challenges ranging from rapid to shrinking urbanisation, from emerging knowledge economy to global division of labour and from globalisation to climate change. Along with these challenges new concepts, such as essentialism, environmentalism and dematerialism, are emerged and started to influence the way urban development plans are prepared and visions for the development of cities are made. Beyond this, scholars, practitioners and decision-makers have also started to discuss the need for an new urban planning and development approach in order to achieve a development that is sustainable and knowledge-based. Limited successful examples of alternative planning and development approaches showcased potentials of moving towards a new plan-making mindset in the era of knowledge economy. This paper presents a new urban planning and development approach that is taking application ground in many parts of the globe, namely knowledge-based urban development. After providing the theoretical foundation and conceptual framework of knowledge-based urban development the paper discusses whether knowledge-based development of cities is a myth or a reality.

Knowledge-based development of cities : a myth or reality?

Urban development in the 21st decade of the 21st century has faced many challenges ranging from rapid to shrinking urbanisation, from emerging knowledge economy to global division of labour and from globalisation to climate change. Along with with these challenges new concepts, such as essentialism, environmentalism and dematerialism, are emerged and started to influence the way urban development plans are prepared and visions for the development of cities are made. Beyond this, scholars, practitioners and decision-makers have also started to discuss the need for an new urban planning and development approach in order to achieve a development that is sustainable and knowledge-based. Limited successful examples of alternative planning and development approaches showcased potentials of moving towards a new plan-making mindset in the era of knowledge economy. This paper presents a new urban planning and development approach that is taking application ground in many parts of the globe, namely knowledge-based urban development. After providing the theoretical foundation and conceptual framework of knowledge-based urban development the paper discusses whether knowledge-based development of cities is a myth or a reality.

Review of "Violence, Prejudice and Sexuality" by Stephen Tomsen (Routledge, New York and London, 2009)

Tomsen’s book Violence, Prejudice and Sexuality engages with important questions about sexuality and anti homosexual sentiment that criminologists have grappled with for some time. Tomsen’s work refines these questions in the context of essentialism, and notes how this concept has enabled only very specific ways of thinking about and analysing violence, prejudice, and sexuality. Indeed, thinking about the nexus between these three concepts are now almost taken for granted. As Tomsen demonstrates in his discussion of historical understandings of sexual desire, although social constructionism and queer perspectives have challenged essentialist notions of sexuality, research has in many respects upheld a binary understanding of heterosexuality as normal and homosexuality as abnormal. Interestingly, essentialist binaries like this have been conveniently employed in more recent times when activists align with minority status to gain basic human rights. While no one could deny the importance of access to rights and justice, Tomsen notes the danger inherent in arguments like this that draw on essentialism. He argues we are working through similar dichotomies of heterosexuality as normal and homosexuality as abnormal set up in very early research on sexual desire. The key difference now is that, in the rush towards public and political citizenship, ‘heterosexuals are recast as “perpetrators” and homosexuals as “victims”’ (Tomsen 2009: 16). Violence, Prejudice and Sexuality importantly notes this is no less an essentialist dichotomy and no less divisive....

Attributing and denying humanness to others

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other—human nature—those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon’s cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.

More human than you: Attributing humanness to self and others

People typically evaluate their in-groups more favorably than out-groups and themselves more favorably than others. Research on infrahumanization also suggests a preferential attribution of the “human essence” to in-groups, independent of in-group favoritism. The authors propose a corresponding phenomenon in interpersonal comparisons: People attribute greater humanness to themselves than to others, independent of self-enhancement. Study 1 and a pilot study demonstrated 2 distinct understandings of humanness—traits representing human nature and those that are uniquely human—and showed that only the former traits are understood as inhering essences. In Study 2, participants rated themselves higher than their peers on human nature traits but not on uniquely human traits, independent of selfenhancement. Study 3 replicated this “self-humanization” effect and indicated that it is partially mediated by attribution of greater depth to self versus others. Study 4 replicated the effect experimentally. Thus, people perceive themselves to be more essentially human than others.