National electronic conveyancing : outline of national law and rules

This article will outline the impact of the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (ECNL) and the draft Model Participation Rules (MPR) on conveyancing practice and the obligations of lawyers and conveyancers.

Electronic conveyancing in Australia: Is anyone concerned about security?

Three proof requirements as essential for a sustainable land registration system. These were proof of identity, proof of ownership, and authority to deal. Our attention in this paper is drawn to the latter two requirements and will ask whether the introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to proof of ownership and authority to deal. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is sustainable for another 160 years.

Australasian Torrens automation, its integrity, and the three proof requirements

New Zealand and Australia are leading the world in terms of automated land registry systems. Landonline was introduced some ten years ago for New Zealand, and the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (ECNL) is to be released over the next few years in support of a national electronic conveyancing system to be used throughout Australia. With the assistance of three proof requirements, developed for this purpose, this article measures the integrity of both systems as against the old, manual Torrens system. The authors take the position that any introduced system should at least have the same level of integrity and safety as the originally conceived manual system. The authors argue both Landonline and ECNL, as presently set up, have less credibility than the manual system as it was designed to operate, leading to the possibility of increased fraud or misuse.

The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the National Electronic Conveyancing System : an analysis

Public key cryptography, and with it,the ability to compute digital signatures, have made it possible for electronic commerce to flourish. It is thus unsurprising that the proposed Australian NECS will also utilise digital signatures in its system so as to provide a fully automated process from the creation of electronic land title instrument to the digital signing, and electronic lodgment of these instruments. This necessitates an analysis of the fraud risks raised by the usage of digital signatures because a compromise of the integrity of digital signatures will lead to a compromise of the Torrens system itself. This article will show that digital signatures may in fact offer greater security against fraud than handwritten signatures; but to achieve this, digital signatures require an infrastructure whereby each component is properly implemented and managed.

Electronic conveyancing in Australia : is anyone concerned about security?

We have previously suggested that three proof requirements are essential for a sustainable land registration system. These were proof of identity, proof of ownership and authority to deal. Our attention in this article is drawn to the security framework that surrounds these requirements. We will ask whether the introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to them. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is sustainable for another 160 years. We also canvass some more incremental suggestions that evolve out of what we currently do, as well as outlining some comparative externally sourced ideas as to how the transfer and ownership of land can be made safer for all citizens. Such a goal is imperative when land transfer and secure property ownership is a critical component of the economic infrastructure of a modern society.

Changes to the REIQ contract and conveyancing case law update

The Reference Schedule to the REIQ houses and land contract and the lots in a Community Titles Scheme (“CTS”) contract has been amended to contain provision for disclosure concerning the installation of an approved safety switch. This section will not be required to be completed if the land is vacant (in the case of the houses and land contract) or if the present use is a commercial use (in the case of the lots in a CTS contract).

Going through the obstruction, the Torrens System Assurance Fund and contemporary solutions : a tale weaved from a story of a nun, a romantic triangle and sibling corruption

Private title insurance has been the subject of much debate by law reform bodies and academics. This article adds a new dimension to the discussion by analysing its role against a recent scenario where a nun was betrayed by the actions of her brother, and compensation payable from the assurance fund, after much challenge by the registrar, amounted to in excess of $4 million.We ask whether the slow burning of title insurance into the psyche of Australian home purchasers will see state-based assurance fundings looking to minismise their role in the Torrens system. We also query how the rather more immediate electronic establishment of electronic conveyancing will alter the balance between the assurance fund, private title insurance and the increasing responsibilities on stakeholdes involved in conveyancing.

Land fraud and inappropriate dealings in an electronic environment : An Australian and New Zealand perspective

The thesis presented in this paper is that the land fraud committed by Matthew Perrin in Queensland and inflicted upon Roger Mildenhall in Western Australia demonstrates the need for urgent procedural reform to the conveyancing process. Should this not occur, then calls to reform the substantive principles of the Torrens system will be heard throughout the jurisdictions that adopt title by registration, particularly in those places where immediate indefeasibility is still the norm. This paper closely examines the factual matrix behind both of these frauds, and asks what steps should have been taken to prevent them occurring. With 2012 bringing us Australian legislation embedding a national e-conveyancing system and a new Land Transfer Act for New Zealand we ask what legislative measures should be introduced to minimise the potential for such fraud. In undertaking this study, we reflect on whether the activities of Perrin and the criminals responsible for stealing Mildenhall's land would have succeeded under the present system for automated registration utilised in New Zealand.

Identity fraud and torrens - minimising the risks and allocating the loss to achieve a sustainable system

Immediate indefeasibility is the cornerstone of the Torrens system of land registration. However, when combined with the apparent ease in which forged mortgages become registered, the operation of this doctrine can come into question. This article seeks to argue that, rather than question indefeasibility, the focus should be on the verification of identity of parties to land transactions. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the Torrens system can retain immediate indefeasibility as its paramount principle, yet achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. With the dawn of a new era of electronic conveyancing about to begin, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss.

Identity verification in conveyancing : the failure of current legislative and regulatory measures, and recommendations for change

"Defrauding land titles systems impacts upon us all. Those who deal in land include ordinary citizens, big business, small business, governments, not-for-profit organisation, deceased estates...Fraud here touches almost everybody." the thesis presented in this paper is that the current and disparate steps taken by jurisdictions to alleviate land fraud associated with identity-based crimes are inadequate. The centrepiece of the analysis is the consideration of two scenarios that have recently occurred. One is the typical scenario where a spouse forges the partner's signature to obtain a mortgage from a financial institution. The second is atypical. It involves a sophisticated overseas fraud duping many stakeholders involved in the conveyancing process. After outlining these scenarios, we will examine how identity verification requirements of the United Kingdom, Ontario, the Australian states, and New Zealand would have been applied to these two frauds. Our conclusion is that even though some jurisdictions may have prevented the frauds from occurring, the current requirements are inadequate. We use the lessons learnt to propose what we consider core principles for identity verification in land transactions.

The changing face of conveyancing responsibility

In this note the authors examine two cases, one from Australia, the other from New Zealand, both of which explore the responsibility of legal practitioners engaged as professionals in the buying and selling of land. What is shown is that the allocation of risk and responsibility is constantly under scrutiny for those involved in the conveyancing process, something which the nascent Australian electronic conveyancing protocols will only heighten.

Accounting for risk: The advent of capped conveyancing title insurance

Title insurance companies originating from America, have, in the past 15 years become part of the Australian conveyancing landscape. However for most residential freehold owners, their activities would be a mystery. A purchaser does not routinely obtain title insurance, with the companies presently focussing on servicing the mortgagee sector. While the lack of penetration in the residential purchaser market may be attributed to the consumer’s lack of knowledge, evidence from Ontario and New Zealand illustrates that title insurance is likely to become an additional cost in the conveyancing process in Australia. In this article we highlight the reasons why, and demonstrate how title insurers have, by working with the legal profession been able to subtly move the risk of responsibility for compensation for loss, (at least in the first instance) from the state to the insurer, but with the added benefit for the state and the conveyancing agents that the cost of the insurance is ultimately borne by the consumer. In New Zealand this development is being accelerated by the introduction of capped conveyancing title insurance. Whether title insurance will become part of the conveyancing process is no longer the relevant question for Australia, (it undoubtedly will), but the unknown issue is just how title insurance companies will work with conveyancing agents to infiltrate the market, and what response this infiltration will have in terms of the state’s view as to their continued role in the provision of assurance. We suggest that developments from New Zealand in relation to capped conveyancing insurance are likely to be replicated in Australia in the near future, and that the state’s role in providing an assurance fund will continue, though the state may seek to expand the areas in which the right to compensation is restricted.

Identity fraud and land registration systems : an Australian perspective

There is no doubt that fraud in relation to land transactions is a problem that resonates amongst land academics, practitioners, and stakeholders involved in conveyancing. As each land registration and conveyancing process increasingly moves towards a fully electronic environment, we need to make sure that we understand and guard against the frauds that can occur. What this paper does is examine the types of fraud that have occurred in paper-based conveyancing systems in Australia and considers how they might be undertaken in the National Electronic Conveyancing System (NECS) that is currently under development. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the conveyancing system adopted can achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. As we sit on the cusp of a new era of electronic conveyancing, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss. Importantly it also recognises that the electronic environment will see new opportunities for those with criminal intent to undermine the integrity of land transactions. An appreciation of this now, can see the appropriate measures put in place to minimise the risk.

Contract Law [4th ed.]

The fourth edition of Contract Law provides a comprehensive review of the principles of contract law. Complex topics are explained in a clear and accessible style that and illustrated by succinct cases. This text is also available with a casebook which gives students access to an expanded selection of primary and secondary materials.