The doctrine of double effect

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Beware the doctrine of election!

The operation of the doctrine of election, as it applies in a conveyancing context, was recently considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P and White and Fryberg JJ) in Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149.

Israel's airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar facility : a test case for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence?

This article analyses the legality of Israel’s 2007 airstrike on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility at Al-Kibar—an incident that has been largely overlooked by international lawyers to date. The absence of a threat of imminent attack from Syria means Israel’s military action was not a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defence. Yet, despite Israel’s clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force there was remarkably little condemnation from other states, suggesting the possibility of growing international support for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This article argues that the muted international reaction to Israel’s pre-emptive action was the result of political factors, and should not be seen as endorsement of the legality of the airstrike. As such, a lack of opinio juris means the Al-Kibar episode cannot be viewed as extending the scope of the customary international law right of self-defence so as to permit the use of force against non-imminent threats. However, two features of this incident—namely, Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the international community’s apparent lack of concern over legality—are also evident in other recent uses of force in the ‘war on terror’ context. These developments may indicate a shift in state practice involving a downgrading of the role of international law in discussions of the use of force. This may signal a declining perception of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum, at least in cases involving minor uses of force.

The doctrine of command responsibility in the midst of war : legal fallacy or reflection of reality

The history of war is blighted with astonishing reminders of man’s ability to cast his sense of humanity aside and inflict unspeakable harm upon one another. The ruthless bombing of Dresden, the callousness of the Nazi concentration camps and the massacre of the Tutsis are but a few of the atrocities that have haunted our past. In response to these atrocities, society has imposed an ever-increasing number of laws and rules to regulate warfare. Amongst these is the doctrine of command responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility states that a commander is criminally liable for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew or should have known of their crimes. This paper will examine whether the doctrine is an appropriate and realistic legal standard to hold commanders accountable to or whether the doctrine is more a reflection of social sentiment and legal rhetoric. If the doctrine, and indeed the law of war in general, is unrealistic then the law cannot fulfil its purpose - that is, the prevention of atrocities. Instead of being solely a reflection of moral authority and social sentiments the law must also be a tool that guides and shapes the decisions and actions of the military through the chaotic and brutal nature of war...

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.

Prosecution history estoppel in the UK?

The doctrine of 'prosecution history estoppel' (PH estoppel) as developed in the United States has strong intuitive appeal, especially when applied to counterbalance a related patent law principle, the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrines are receiving increasing attention in US patent decisions, to the point where one patent litigator recently compared them to "two cars that keep bumping fenders. They are frequently returned to the shop for repairs". Could PH estoppel find its way into UK patent law? This article briefly examines the doctrine, its evolution in the US and the problems associated with importing the doctrine into the UK. As the EU legislation stands, Article 69 and the Protocol to the European Patent Convention (EPC) pose serious obstacles to using the doctrine directly in claim construction. However there appears to be some scope to apply the doctrine as a limited form of defence in infringement actions.

The need for legislative reform of the privity doctrine in commercial contracts in Malaysia : a comparative analysis

This thesis commences with the proposition that the first limb of the doctrine of privity causes injustice to third party beneficiaries in Malaysia, particularly in commercial contracts. The doctrine of privity has been the subject of criticism by the judiciary and academic commentators in common law jurisdictions, mainly directed at the first limb of the doctrine, whereby only parties to a contract can sue and be sued. The first limb prevents a third party from enforcing benefits conferred on them by those contracts thereby resulting in third parties suffering loss and injustice to those parties. In several common law countries, such as England, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, legislative reform of the doctrine has occurred. The legislative reform has abrogated to a significant extent the doctrine of privity in commercial contracts. Malaysia is a common law country, where the doctrine of privity is still applied to contracts. An analysis of Malaysian case law demonstrates that the most affected third party beneficiaries are those seeking to enforce insurance and construction contracts. While a small number of other third parties to commercial contracts, such as agreements to pay for work done, sale and purchase agreements and tenancy agreements are also affected, the detriment is not as significant. As a consequence, this thesis focuses primarily on the impact of the doctrine of privity on commercial contracts in the areas of insurance and construction in Malaysia The thesis aims to recommend appropriate reforms to address the injustices arising from the privity doctrine for third parties seeking to obtain the benefit of insurance and construction contracts, which may also benefit third parties to other types of commercial contracts. While the Malaysian insurance, consumer protection, negotiable instruments and agency laws allow third party beneficiaries to enforce benefits in contracts, the rights are found to be inadequate. As not all third parties seeking to enforce an insurance or construction contract can rely upon the legislation, the injustice arising from the doctrine of privity remains and needs to be addressed. To achieve this aim, a comparative analysis of the rights of third party beneficiaries under insurance and construction contracts in Malaysia, Australia and England is undertaken. The results of the analysis are used to identify appropriate elements for a legislative framework guided by the three essential criteria for effective law reform developed in the thesis. The three criteria are certainty, public interest and justice. The thesis recommends first the enactment of general legislation applicable to all commercial contracts including insurance contracts. Secondly, the thesis recommends specific targeted legislation to address the injustice faced by third party beneficiaries in construction contracts.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Social defence and international reconstructon : illustrating the governance of post-war criminological discourse

This article examines the technocratic priorities of criminological discourse following the Second World War. In doing so, it charts the role and influence of the United Nations and the doctrine of social defence, and traces those shifts and events that have forged a nexus between criminological endeavour and processes of governance. This article aims to illustrate that social defence and international reconstruction provide a useful framework for understanding the links between power/knowledge and the pragmatic orientations of criminological scholarship.

Utmost good faith in insurance : reform overdue?

Considerable attention has been devoted to the duty or doctrine of utmost good faith in the academic literature and in the courts. This attention ranges from an analysis of the precise legal basis for the duty through a consideration of the continuing nature of that duty in the post-contract environment.It is quite clear that all contracts of insurance are subject to this duty of utmost good faith. What is less clear and certain are the incidents attendant upon such a duty and the scope of the obligations that such a duty imposes. This article examines the relative positions that have been reached in England and Australia and concludes with some recommendations for legislative reform to this area of the law.

Joinder to a later unsigned document?

It is well known that a statutory requirement of formality is associated with contracts concerning land. In this regard, s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides: No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum. To constitute a sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate description of the property, the price and any other essential terms. It is also accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied reference to any other document. In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia

Care and decision-making at the end of life that promotes comfort and dignity is widely endorsed by public policy and the law. In ethical analysis of palliative care interventions that are argued potentially to hasten death, these may be deemed to be ethically permissible by the application of the doctrine of double effect, if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain and not cause death. In part because of the significance of ethics in the development of law in the medical sphere, this doctrine is also likely to be recognized as part of Australia’s common law, although hitherto there have been no cases concerning palliative care brought before a court in Australia to test this. Three Australian States have, nonetheless, created legislative defences that are different from the common law with the intent of clarifying the law, promoting palliative care, and distinguishing it from euthanasia. However, these defences have the potential to provide less protection for doctors administering palliative care. In addition to requiring a doctor to have an appropriate intent, the defences insist on adherence to particular medical practice standards and perhaps require patient consent. Doctors providing end-of-life care in these States need to be aware of these legislative changes. Acting in accordance with the common law doctrine of double effect may not provide legal protection. Similar changes are likely to occur in other States and Territories as there is a trend towards enacting legislative defences that deal with the provision of palliative care.