Happenings and sensational journalism [O acontecimento e o sensacional no jornalismo]

EM artigo anteriormente publicado (AGUIAR, 2008a), concluímos que as críticas elaboradas por certos autores (SOUSA, 2000; KURTZ, 1993; MARSHALL, 2003; MARCONDES FILHO, 1988), ao classificarem um determinado modo de jornalismo como sensacionalista, parecem querer opor uma imaginária constituição democrática do espaço público e da cultura legítima a uma suposta disfunção narcotizante do entretenimento, que promoveria o conformismo social e reforçaria as normas sociais. O jornalismo sensacionalista, nesse entendimento, veicularia apenas a ampla trivialidade e o excesso de diversão estaria “matando” os ideais iluministas da sociedade moderna, tal como aposta Postman (1986). Entretanto, pode-se ver nestas críticas aquilo que Edgar Morin define, ao estudar cultura de lazer, como a má impressão causada pelo divertimento e pela evasão aos “moralistas dessa confederação helvética do espírito que são as letras e a universidade” (MORIN, 2002).

What is a good project manager? Reconceptualizing the “do” : an Aristotelian perspective

In Social Science (Organization Studies, Economics, Management Science, Strategy, International Relations, Political Science…) the quest for addressing the question “what is a good practitioner?” has been around for centuries, with the underlying assumptions that good practitioners should lead organizations to higher levels of performance. Hence to ask “what is a good “captain”?” is not a new question, we should add! (e.g. Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; Söderlund, 2004, p. 190). This interrogation leads to consider problems such as the relations between dichotomies Theory and Practice, rigor and relevance of research, ways of knowing and knowledge forms. On the one hand we face the “Enlightenment” assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded in “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). In the project management space, this aims at addressing one of the fundamental problems in the field: projects still do not deliver their expected benefits and promises and therefore the socio-economical good (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Bredillet, 2010, Lalonde et al., 2012). The Cartesian tradition supporting projects research and practice for the last 60 years (Bredillet, 2010, p. 4) has led to the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management, despite the sum of research, development of standards, best & good practices and the related development of project management bodies of knowledge (Packendorff, 1995, p. 319-323; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 2–6, Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 436–7; Winter et al., 2006, p. 638). Referring to both Hodgson (2002) and Giddens (1993), we could say that “those who expect a “social-scientific Newton” to revolutionize this young field “are not only waiting for a train that will not arrive, but are in the wrong station altogether” (Hodgson, 2002, p. 809; Giddens, 1993, p. 18). While, in the postmodern stream mainly rooted in the “practice turn” (e.g. Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), the shift from methodological individualism to social viscosity and the advocated pluralism lead to reinforce the “functional stupidity” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1194) this postmodern stream aims at overcoming. We suggest here that addressing the question “what is a good PM?” requires a philosophy of practice perspective to complement the “usual” philosophy of science perspective. The questioning of the modern Cartesian tradition mirrors a similar one made within Social science (Say, 1964; Koontz, 1961, 1980; Menger, 1985; Warry, 1992; Rothbard, 1997a; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Boisot & McKelvey, 2010), calling for new thinking. In order to get outside the rationalist ‘box’, Toulmin (1990, p. 11), along with Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 655), suggests a possible path, summarizing the thoughts of many authors: “It can cling to the discredited research program of the purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”) agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th century traditions, and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were side-tracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for the future” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). Thus, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many authors build on “pre-modern” philosophies such as the Aristotelian one (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012). It is perhaps because the post-modern stream emphasizes a dialogic process restricted to reliance on voice and textual representation, it limits the meaning of communicative praxis, and weaking the practice because it turns away attention from more fundamental issues associated with problem-definition and knowledge-for-use in action (Tedlock, 1983, p. 332–4; Schrag, 1986, p. 30, 46–7; Warry, 1992, p. 157). Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20—21). By contrast with the modernist one-dimensional thinking and relativist and pluralistic post-modernism, we suggest, in a turn to an Aristotelian pre-modern lens, to re-conceptualise (“re” involving here a “re”-turn to pre-modern thinking) the “do” and to shift the perspective from what a good PM is (philosophy of science lens) to what a good PM does (philosophy of practice lens) (Aristotle, 1926a). As Tsoukas & Cummings put it: “In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for example, ’what is a good captain’?’ is not to come up with a list of attributes that good captains share (as modem contingency theorists would have it), but to point out the things that those who are recognized as good captains do.” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) Thus, this conversation offers a dialogue and deliberation about a central question: What does a good project manager do? The conversation is organized around a critic of the underlying assumptions supporting the modern, post-modern and pre-modern relations to ways of knowing, forms of knowledge and “practice”.

Proposing and developing a definition and conceptual framework for health care resilience to cope with disasters [Resiliencia: Propuesta y desarrollo de la definicion y del marco conceptual en relacion a los desastres en el ambito sanitario]

La creación del término resiliencia en salud es un paso importante hacia la construcción de comunidades más resilientes para afrontar mejor los desastres futuros. Hasta la fecha, sin embargo, parece que hay poca literatura sobre cómo el concepto de resiliencia en salud debe ser definido. Este artículo tiene como objetivo construir un enfoque de gestión de desastres de salud integral guiado por el concepto de resiliencia. Se realizaron busquedas en bases de datos electrónicas de salud para recuperar publicaciones críticas que pueden haber contribuido a los fines y objetivos de la investigación. Un total de 61 publicaciones se incluyeron en el análisis final de este documento, que se centraron en aquéllas que proporcionan una descripción completa de las teorías y definiciones de resiliencia ante los desastres y las que proponen una definición y un marco conceptual para la capacidad de resiliencia en salud. La resiliencia es una capacidad inherente de adaptación para hacer frente a la incertidumbre del futuro. Esto implica el uso de múltiples estrategias, un enfoque de riesgos máximos y tratar de lograr un resultado positivo a través de la vinculación y cooperación entre los distintos elementos de la comunidad. Resiliencia en salud puede definirse como la capacidad de las organizaciones de salud para resistir, absorber, y responder al impacto de los desastres, mientras mantiene las funciones esenciales y se recupera a su estado original o se adapta a un nuevo estado. Puede evaluarse por criterios como la robustez, la redundancia, el ingenio y la rapidez e incluye las dimensiones clave de la vulnerabilidad y la seguridad, los recursos y la preparación para casos de desastre, la continuidad de los servicios esenciales de salud, la recuperación y la adaptación. Este nuevo concepto define las capacidades en gestión de desastres de las organizaciones sanitarias, las tareas de gestión, actividades y resultados de desastres juntos en una visión de conjunto integral, y utiliza un enfoque integrado y con un objetivo alcanzable. Se necesita urgentemente investigación futura de su medición

Optimism : what it is and its relevance in the school context

"For myself, I am an optimist - it does not seem to be much use to be anything else". Winston Churchill Optimism has its modern roots in philosophy dating back to the 17th century in the writings of philosophers such as Descartes and Voltaire (Domino & Conway, 2001). Previous to these philosophical writings, the concept of optimism was revealed in the teaching of many of the great spiritual traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity (Miller, Richards, & Keller, 2001). In the 20th century, optimism became defined in juxtaposition to pessimism, sometimes conceptualized as a bipolar unidimensional construct and by others as two related but separate constructs (Garber, 2000). Contemporary models (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Seligman, 1991) have increasingly focused on distinguishing optimism-pessimism as a general dispositional orientation, as described by expectancy theory, and as an explanatory process, described by explanatory style theory.

Is that all there is? The limitations of global/local, PISA, and the dilemma of transnational curriculum research

Sob o rótulo da globalização, as ciências humanas e sociais têm sido forçadas a rever seu pensamento para encontrar novas maneiras de falar sobre as situações de mudança ao nosso redor e para reorientar-se conceitualmente em um aparente ‘mundo sem fronteiras’. Este artigo analisa algumas dessas formas, sugerindo que a pesquisa em currículo transnacional como tarefa, como talvez inclusiva de algo para além dos estudos curriculares como subárea, tem preocupações, pontos de entrada e horizontes de promulgação amplos, inconstantes, imprevisíveis, que levantam uma série de questões e considerações éticas que exigem maior compromisso nos espaços em que as fronteiras percebidas forem transgredidas no ato da investigação. Usando os relatórios sobre os resultados do PISA como disparador intelectual, este artigo discute quatro questões que surgem no ato investigativo em currículo transnacional: a comparação como princípio de produção de conhecimento; as estratégias de agrupamento onto-teo-filosóficas e a delimitação da ética; o retorno do sujeito centrado, humanista, racional e as críticas a esse sujeito inspirado no Iluminismo; as questões relativas à causalidade, ou seja, como os processos de atribuição são forjados e que tipos de ‘legitimação via procedimento’ operam na crítica social. Em vez de sugerir uma nova ordem, este artigo busca um questionamento mais profundo dos repetitivos pressupostos ocidentalistas.