Forecasting time-varying value-at-risk

In this thesis we are interested in financial risk and the instrument we want to use is Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is the maximum loss over a given period of time at a given confidence level. Many definitions of VaR exist and some will be introduced throughout this thesis. There two main ways to measure risk and VaR: through volatility and through percentiles. Large volatility in financial returns implies greater probability of large losses, but also larger probability of large profits. Percentiles describe tail behaviour. The estimation of VaR is a complex task. It is important to know the main characteristics of financial data to choose the best model. The existing literature is very wide, maybe controversial, but helpful in drawing a picture of the problem. It is commonly recognised that financial data are characterised by heavy tails, time-varying volatility, asymmetric response to bad and good news, and skewness. Ignoring any of these features can lead to underestimating VaR with a possible ultimate consequence being the default of the protagonist (firm, bank or investor). In recent years, skewness has attracted special attention. An open problem is the detection and modelling of time-varying skewness. Is skewness constant or there is some significant variability which in turn can affect the estimation of VaR? This thesis aims to answer this question and to open the way to a new approach to model simultaneously time-varying volatility (conditional variance) and skewness. The new tools are modifications of the Generalised Lambda Distributions (GLDs). They are four-parameter distributions, which allow the first four moments to be modelled nearly independently: in particular we are interested in what we will call para-moments, i.e., mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. The GLDs will be used in two different ways. Firstly, semi-parametrically, we consider a moving window to estimate the parameters and calculate the percentiles of the GLDs. Secondly, parametrically, we attempt to extend the GLDs to include time-varying dependence in the parameters. We used the local linear regression to estimate semi-parametrically conditional mean and conditional variance. The method is not efficient enough to capture all the dependence structure in the three indices —ASX 200, S&P 500 and FT 30—, however it provides an idea of the DGP underlying the process and helps choosing a good technique to model the data. We find that GLDs suggest that moments up to the fourth order do not always exist, there existence appears to vary over time. This is a very important finding, considering that past papers (see for example Bali et al., 2008; Hashmi and Tay, 2007; Lanne and Pentti, 2007) modelled time-varying skewness, implicitly assuming the existence of the third moment. However, the GLDs suggest that mean, variance, skewness and in general the conditional distribution vary over time, as already suggested by the existing literature. The GLDs give good results in estimating VaR on three real indices, ASX 200, S&P 500 and FT 30, with results very similar to the results provided by historical simulation.

Agency Conflicts and Corporate Payout Policies: A Global Study

We investigate the roles of finn and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policics. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 42 countries from 2001 to 2006, we show there is a form of "pecking order" in investors' ability to extract cash (whether as dividends only or share repurchases) from firms. Although investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors seem to take whatever cash they can get, even though the amount may be small, and with scant regard for investment opportunities and firm level agency conflicts. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in non insider-dominated firms.

A longitudinal study of corporate earnings guidance in Australia’s continuous disclosure environment

Since the introduction of a statutory‐backed continuous disclosure regime (CDR) in 1994, regulatory reforms have significantly increased litigation risk in Australia for failure to disclose material information or for false and misleading disclosure. However, there is almost no empirical research on the impact of the reforms on corporate disclosure behaviour. Motivated by the absence of research and using management earnings forecasts (MEFs) as a disclosure proxy, this study examines (1) why managers issue earnings forecasts, (2) what firm‐specific factors influence MEF characteristics, and (3) how MEF behaviour changes as litigation risk increases. Based on theories in information economics, a theoretical framework for MEF behaviour is formulated which includes antecedent influencing factors related to firms‟ internal and external environments. Applying this framework, hypotheses are developed and tested using multivariate models and a large sample of hand-collected MEFs (7,213) issued by top 500 ASX-listed companies over the 1994 to 2008 period. The results reveal strong support for the hypotheses. First, MEFs are issued to reduce information asymmetry, litigation risk and signal superior performance. Second, firms with better financial performance, smaller earnings changes, and lower operating uncertainty provide better quality MEFs. Third, forecast frequency and quality (accuracy, timeliness and precision) noticeably improve as litigation risk increases. However, managers appear to be still reluctant to disclose earnings forecasts when there are large earnings changes, and an asymmetric treatment of news type continues to prevail (a good news bias). Thus, the findings generally provide support for the effectiveness of the CDR regulatory reforms in improving disclosure behaviour and will be valuable to market participants and corporate regulators in understanding the implications of management forecasting decisions and areas for further improvement.

The impact of regulatory reforms on the earnings forecasting behaviour of IPO firms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to jointly assess the impact of regulatory reform for corporate fundraising in Australia (CLERP Act 1999) and the relaxation of ASX admission rules in 1999, on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in initial public offer (IPO) prospectuses. The relaxation of ASX listing rules permitted a new category of new economy firms (commitments test entities (CTEs))to list without a prior history of profitability, while the CLERP Act (introduced in 2000) was accompanied by tighter disclosure obligations and stronger enforcement action by the corporate regulator (ASIC). Design/methodology/approach – All IPO earnings forecasts in prospectuses lodged between 1998 and 2003 are examined to assess the pre- and post-CLERP Act impact. Based on active ASIC enforcement action in the post-reform period, IPO firms are hypothesised to provide more accurate forecasts, particularly CTE firms, which are less likely to have a reasonable basis for forecasting. Research models are developed to empirically test the impact of the reforms on CTE and non-CTE IPO firms. Findings – The new regulatory environment has had a positive impact on management forecasting behaviour. In the post-CLERP Act period, the accuracy of prospectus forecasts and their revisions significantly improved and, as expected, the results are primarily driven by CTE firms. However, the majority of prospectus forecasts continue to be materially inaccurate. Originality/value – The results highlight the need to control for both the changing nature of listed firms and the level of enforcement action when examining responses to regulatory changes to corporate fundraising activities.

Corporate, risk, mining camps and knowledge/power

Australia is currently in the midst of a major resources boom. However the benefits from the boom are unevenly distributed, with state governments collecting billions in royalties, and mining companies billions in profits. The costs are borne mostly at a local level by regional communities on the frontier of the mining boom, surrounded by thousands of men housed in work camps. The escalating reliance on non–resident workers housed in camps carries significant risks for individual workers, host communities and the provision of human services and infrastructure. These include rising rates of fatigue–related death and injuries, rising levels of alcohol–fuelled violence, illegally erected and unregulated work camps, soaring housing costs and other costs of living, and stretched basic infrastructure undermining the sustainability of these towns. But these costs have generally escaped industry, government and academic scrutiny. This chapter directs a critical gaze at the hopelessly compromised industry–funded research vital to legitimating the resource sector’s self–serving knowledge claims that it is committed to social sustainability and corporate responsibility. The chapter divides into two parts. The first argues that post–industrial mining regimes mask and privatise these harms and risks, shifting them on to workers, families and communities. The second part links the privatisation of these risks with the political economy of privatised knowledge embedded in the approvals process for major resource sector projects.

Corporate profit and impression management in developing markets

In this study, we examine how organisations in Fiji communicate or legitimise their profit. We base the need for understanding this phenomenon on the following premise. Organisations are part of a wider society, and in competition for scarce resources. Organisations obtain the rights to consume resources upon conception, but must continually legitimise their rights of existence and the need to access the resources. Legitimacy is the ability to continue to justify one’s authority to exist in a society. Organisations rights to resources are contractual, and have a moral obligation to act in a responsible manner and justify their outcomes, actions, and activities to external stakeholders. Such justifications would be an attempt at legitimizing their existence by some form of impression management. Impression management refers to the process by which individuals attempt to influence the impression of others (Melo et al. 2009). In corporate reporting, impression management occurs when management selects, display, and presents that information in a manner that distorts readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Neu 1991; Patten 2002), and is managed best through disclosures (O’Donovan 2002). In developing economies, there is significant Government protection that creates near-monopoly sectors and industries. The rendered protection permits organisations to provide essential services to the community at reasonable costs. Organisations in these sectors and industries have an ominous need to legitimise their position and actions. The bond between the organisations and the society is much stronger, making organisations devote more effort in communicating their activities. Protection permits organisations to make reasonable profits to sustain their operations. Society may not accept abnormal profits from operational efficiencies. Profit is fundamental to the society’s perception of an organisation, amplifying the need for the firm to justify a level of profit. Abnormal profit for organisations construes bad news, and organisations would make relevant disclosures to manage stakeholder impressions on profit (Patten 2002). Organisations can manage impressions by disclosing information in a particular way. That is, organisations would want to put the impression that the abnormal profit is justified and the society will obtain its benefits in future. Such form of impression management requires unambiguous disclosure of information. The readability of corporate disclosures is an important indicator of organisational abnormal profit-related legitimacy efforts in developing economies.

The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.