The Black Label: trade mark dilution, culture jamming, and the no logo movement

This article considers the ongoing debate over the appropriation of well-known and famous trade marks by the No Logo Movement for the purposes of political and social critique. It focuses upon one sensational piece of litigation in South Africa, Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International. In this case, a group called Laugh It Off Promotions subjected the trade marks of the manufacturers of Carling Beer were subjected to parody, social satire, and culture jamming. The beer slogan “Black Label” was turned into a T-Shirt entitled “Black Labour/ White Guilt”. In the ensuing litigation, the High Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Appeal were of the opinion that the appropriation of the mark was a case of hate speech. However, the Constitutional Court of South Africa disagreed, finding that the parodies of a well-known, famous trade mark did not constitute trade mark dilution. Moseneke J observed that there was a lack of evidence of economic or material harm; and Sachs J held that there is a need to provide latitude for parody, laughter, and freedom of expression. The decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa provides some important insights into the nature of trade mark dilution, the role of parody and satire, and the relevance of constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Arguably, the ruling will be of help in the reformation of trade mark dilution law in other jurisdictions – such as the United States. The decision in Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International demonstrates that trade mark law should not be immune from careful constitutional scrutiny.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.

The High Court of Australia and the Marlboro Man: The Battle Over the Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products

In 2012, the High Court of Australia handed down a landmark decision on the plain packaging of tobacco products. This chapter considers the historic ruling in the case of JT International SA v Commonwealth; British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd v Commonwealth. This chapter explores several themes in the decision. First, it highlights the historical work by the High Court of Australia on the role of health regulation, the use of health warnings, and tobacco control. Second, the chapter considers the High Court of Australia's view that intellectual property law promotes the public interest.Third, it explores the High Court of Australia’s analysis of the constitutional law on acquisition of property on just terms. Finally, this chapter contends that the High Court of Australia's ruling on plain packaging of tobacco products will spark an 'Olive Revolution' — and will encourage superior courts and policy-makers to follow suit.

The High Court and the Marlboro Man: The plain packaging decision

The High Court of Australia’s ruling on the plain packaging of tobacco products is one of the great constitutional cases of our age. The ruling will resonate throughout the world - as other countries will undoubtedly seek to emulate Australia’s plain packaging regime.

Voter behaviour and constitutional change in Australia since 1967

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.

The 2008 declaration of independence by the Hong Kong Court and anomalies in the Hong Kong Company Law

Discusses two aspects of Hong Kong law: 1) the judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in A Solicitor v The Law Society of Hong Kong on whether Hong Kong courts were bound, post-1997, by pre-1997 House of Lords or Privy Council decisions, by pre-1997 decisions of their own, or by post-1997 overseas decisions from any jurisdiction; and 2) the need for clarification in the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance of whether a company can have a single legal representative, the ultra vires rule and the duties of company directors

Liability of principal contractor for independent subcontractor considered by the High Court

Case note of Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 258 ALR 673 ----- In Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 83 ALJR 1086 ; 258 ALR 673 the High Court considered the liability of a principal contractor for the negligence of independent subcontractors on a building site. In its decision, the court considered the nature and the scope of the duty owed by principals to independent contractors.

High Court changes position on standard of care of learner drivers

Since the High Court decision of Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376, a person who voluntarily undertakes to instruct a learner driver of a motor vehicle is owed a lower standard of care than that owed to other road users. The standard of care was still expressed to be objective; however, it took into account the inexperience of the learner driver. Therefore, a person instructing a learner driver was owed a duty of care the standard being that of a reasonable learner driver. This ‘special relationship’ was said to exist because of the passenger’s knowledge of the driver’s inexperience and lack of skill. On 28 August 2008 the High Court handed down its decision in Imbree v McNeilly [2008] HCA 40, overruling Cook v Cook.

High Court decision on duty owed by licensee to patron

In a previous column of Queensland Lawyer,1 the case of Scott v CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 256 ALR 512 was discussed. Special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania was granted and on 10 November 2009 the High Court handed down its decision.

Locking away the mysteries of fair basis : Lockwood v Doric in the High Court

This article updates a previous article on the Lockwood v Doric fair basing case in the Full Court of the Federal Court which was recently appealed to the High Court. The High Court's decision provides a new and welcome level of clarity in this difficult area of patent law. With this new clarity we can finally lock away some of the mysteries that have plagued the area for some time. Already, indications are that Lockwood's guidelines are being usefully applied in the Patent Office and Federal Court.

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.