Voter behaviour and constitutional change in Australia since 1967

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Constitutional legitimacy : an international ill and gap in the literature?

The central argument of this work is that “democratic constitutional legitimacy”[2] probably does not currently exist in the politics of any country internationally. This inherent problem in constitutionalism is an endemic governance problem most citizenries should be dealing with, only that we are not in a large extent doing so and haven’t been historically. This position was ascertained using a form of Beck and Grande’s (2010) cosmopolitan methodology in my doctoral thesis (which we shall return to). It is argued that every constitution is in need of considerable rethinking so as to bring its statutes in line with the interests of the plurality of individuals it oversees. Finally, this work attempts to show that research in this area of democratic constitutional legitimacy is lacking in the literature as only a few scholars presently engage the issue (namely Simone Chambers).

Country of Origin and Internet Publication : Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital Age

Historically, determining the country of origin of a published work presented few challenges, because works were generally published physically – whether in print or otherwise – in a distinct location or few locations. However, publishing opportunities presented by new technologies mean that we now live in a world of simultaneous publication – works that are first published online are published simultaneously to every country in world in which there is Internet connectivity. While this is certainly advantageous for the dissemination and impact of information and creative works, it creates potential complications under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), an international intellectual property agreement to which most countries in the world now subscribe. Under the Berne Convention’s national treatment provisions, rights accorded to foreign copyright works may not be subject to any formality, such as registration requirements (although member countries are free to impose formalities in relation to domestic copyright works). In Kernel Records Oy v. Timothy Mosley p/k/a Timbaland, et al. however, the Florida Southern District Court of the United States ruled that first publication of a work on the Internet via an Australian website constituted “simultaneous publication all over the world,” and therefore rendered the work a “United States work” under the definition in section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, subjecting the work to registration formality under section 411. This ruling is in sharp contrast with an earlier decision delivered by the Delaware District Court in Håkan Moberg v. 33T LLC, et al. which arrived at an opposite conclusion. The conflicting rulings of the U.S. courts reveal the problems posed by new forms of publishing online and demonstrate a compelling need for further harmonization between the Berne Convention, domestic laws and the practical realities of digital publishing. In this article, we argue that even if a work first published online can be considered to be simultaneously published all over the world it does not follow that any country can assert itself as the “country of origin” of the work for the purpose of imposing domestic copyright formalities. More specifically, we argue that the meaning of “United States work” under the U.S. Copyright Act should be interpreted in line with the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law to limit its application to only those works with a real and substantial connection to the United States. There are gaps in the Berne Convention’s articulation of “country of origin” which provide scope for judicial interpretation, at a national level, of the most pragmatic way forward in reconciling the goals of the Berne Convention with the practical requirements of domestic law. We believe that the uncertainties arising under the Berne Convention created by new forms of online publishing can be resolved at a national level by the sensible application of principles of statutory interpretation by the courts. While at the international level we may need a clearer consensus on what amounts to “simultaneous publication” in the digital age, state practice may mean that we do not yet need to explore textual changes to the Berne Convention.

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Significant reform of the laws regulating charities is under way in Australia. The reforms cover almost every facet of the relationship between charities and government and the process has brought to the surface different assumptions about the role of charities in society, their entitlement to fiscal and other privileges and the scope and nature of regulation that can or should be imposed on the charities. This paper explores these broader issues in the context of the Aid/Watch case, involving an organisation used by citizens to challenge the State. Such organisations occupy contested space as to what does and does not constitute a charity. Accordingly the case provides a useful perspective from which to consider the broader issues in the relationship between government and charity. This paper seeks to build on the contribution made by other academics, by exploring the constitutional significance of political purposes and drawing from philosophy to provide context and meaning to potentially significant aspects of the judgment that might be missed when it is analysed only in terms of legal precedent through the narrow lens of the existing four heads of charity. Revenue implications for taxation of charities and political parties are also considered and it is suggested that in practice, if not in theory, the fence between them has come down.

Human rights, the law, cyber-security and democracy : after the European Convention

Many commentators have treated the internet as a site of democratic freedom and as a new kind of public sphere. While there are good reasons for optimism, like any social space digital space also has its dark side. Citizens and governments alike have expressed anxiety about cybercrime and cyber-security. In August 2011, the Australian government introduced legislation to give effect to Australia becoming a signatory to the European Convention on Cybercrime (2001). At the time of writing, that legislation is still before the Parliament. In this article, attention is given to how the legal and policy-making process enabling Australia to be compliant with the European Convention on Cybercrime came about. Among the motivations that informed both the development of the Convention in Europe and then the Australian exercise of legislating for compliance with it was a range of legitimate concerns about the impact that cybercrime can have on individuals and communities. This article makes the case that equal attention also needs to be given to ensuring that legislators and policy makers differentiate between legitimate security imperatives and any over-reach evident in the implementation of this legislation that affects rule of law principles, our capacity to engage in democratic practices, and our civic and human rights.

Implementation of the MARPOL Convention in developing countries

Over the years a large set of international conventions have been adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization for prevention of vessel-source marine pollution. However, most of developing countries failed to effectively implement these conventions. Against this backdrop, this article aims to assess the inherent suitability of the MARPOL Convention for implementation in developing countries. It also examines the role of global community for effective implementation of the MARPOL Convention and identifies the legal and institutional bottlenecks in the current implementation regime.

Implementation of the MARPOL Convention in Bangladesh

Vessel-source marine pollution is one of the main sources of marine pollution in Bangladesh. Due to unfettered operation of vessels, the country has been exposed to massive pollution that is causing a serious imbalance in the marine environment. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to demonstrate that the regulatory system of Bangladesh should be strengthened and made more effective in the light of international instruments to ensure the conservation and sustainable management of its marine environment. With this aim the article examines the present status of implementation of the MARPOL Convention in Bangladesh

Environmental constitutional reform in the developing world : shifting the perspective of international law?

In recent years a growing number of states have chosen to recognise environmental issues in their national constitutions. Some have added declarations about the value of the environment, some have sought to restrict or regulate government’s ability to take action which would potentially harm the environment, while others have proclaimed that citizens possess a right to an environment of a particular quality. A survey of these constitutional provisions reveals that the majority of reform in this area has come from developing states, including a number of states which have been designated as among the least developed countries in the world. The increasing focus on constitutional environmental rights appears to represent a shift in the attitude of developing and emerging economies, which could in turn be influential in setting the tone of the environmental rights debate more broadly, with potential to shape the future development of international law in the area. This chapter examines constitutional environmental rights in an attempt to determine whether consistent state practice can in fact be identified in this area which might form the basis of an emerging norm. It will also analyse some of the potential contributing factors to the proliferation of a constitutional right to a good environment among developing states, and the implications for the development of customary international law.

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments : are the rules appropriate?

The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is an aspect of private international law, and concerns situations where a successful party to litigation seeks to rely on a judgment obtained in one court, in a court in another jurisdiction. The most common example where the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may arise is where a party who has obtained a favourable judgment in one state or country may seek to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country. This occurs because there is no sufficient asset in the state or country where the judgment was rendered to satisfy that judgment. As technological advancements in communications over vast geographical distances have improved exponentially in recent years, there has been an increase in cross-border transactions, as well as litigation arising from these transactions. As a result, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is of increasing importance, since a party who has obtained a judgment in cross-border litigation may wish to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country, where the defendant’s assets may be located without having to re-litigate substantive issues that have already been resolved in another court. The purpose of the study is to examine whether the current state of laws for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the European Community are in line with modern-commercial needs. The study is conducted by weighing two competing objectives between the notion of finality of litigation, which encourages courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to them, on the one hand, and the adequacy of protection to safeguard the recognition and enforcement proceedings, so that there would be no injustice or unfairness if a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced, on the other. The findings of the study are as follows. In both Australia and the United States, there is a different approach concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by courts interstate or in a foreign country. In order to maintain a single and integrated nation, there are constitutional and legislative requirements authorising courts to give conclusive effects to interstate judgments. In contrast, if the recognition and enforcement actions involve judgments rendered by a foreign country’s court, an Australian or a United States court will not recognise and enforce the foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number of requirements and does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify its non-recognition and non-enforcement. In the European Community, the Brussels I Regulation which governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments among European Union Member States has created a scheme, whereby there is only a minimal requirement that needs to be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement. Moreover, a judgment that is rendered by a Member State and based on any of the jurisdictional bases set forth in the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member State without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis. However, there are concerns as to the adequacy of protection available under the Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the judgment-enforcing Member States, as well as those against whom recognition or enforcement is sought. This dissertation concludes by making two recommendations aimed at improving the means by which foreign judgments are recognised and enforced in the selected jurisdictions. The first is for the law in both Australia and the United States to undergo reform, including: adopting the real and substantial connection test as the new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and enforcement; liberalising the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real and substantial connection test; extending the application of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia to include at least its important trading partners; and implementing a federal statutory scheme in the United States to govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The second recommendation is to introduce a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The convention will be a convention double, which provides uniform standards for the rules of jurisdiction a court in a contracting state must exercise when rendering a judgment and a set of provisions for the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.