Problem-solving courts, therapeutic jurisprudence and the constitution : if two is company, is three a crowd?

Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most successful in administering an independent and impartial problem solving court.

Socio-Spatial Approaches To Literacy Studies: Rethinking the Social Constitution and Politics of Space

Literacy studies have begun to examine the spatial dimension of literacy practices in a way that foregrounds space, and that considers space as constitutive to human relations and practices. This chapter provides an introduction to spatial literacy research, providing a guide to key theorists, themes, and studies that have shaped historical and new developments in spatial approaches to literacy practice and pedagogy. It begins by reconceptualising socio-spatial approaches to literacy research and defines terms. Intersections with related social theories are examined, with an emphasis on critical approaches and the politics of space. It clarifies the relationship between socio-spatial and socio-cultural paradigms, revisiting the spatial in seminal socio-cultural research. It covers new ground,including networks, flows, and deterritorialisation of literacy practice. The chapter concludes with challenges and recommendations for future language research and educational practice.

A social licence to operate: Corporate social responsibility, local communities and the constitution of global production networks

This article contributes to the theorization of the role of informal regulation (undertaken by leading firms) in the ongoing organization of global production networks. It does so through a qualitative case study of BHP Billiton's Ravensthorpe Nickel Operation (RNO) in the rural Shire of Ravensthorpe in Western Australia. This less tangible, and to date under-researched, dimension of global production networks is foregrounded through a focus on the corporate social responsibility strategy implemented by RNO in the service of achieving and/or demonstrating a broader ‘social licence to operate’. This ‘licence’ functions – beyond the corporation – as a legitimated and legitimating multi-scalar mechanism through which to gain and maintain access to mineral resources and thus to establish viable and ongoing global production networks. Further, this informal regulation is shown to shape social relations and qualities of place conducive to competitive global mineral extraction and to facilitate the positioning of local communities and places in mineral global production networks.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.