Using a public key registry for improved trust and scalability in national E-health systems

An increasing number of countries are faced with an aging population increasingly needing healthcare services. For any e-health information system, the need for increased trust by such clients with potentially little knowledge of any security scheme involved is paramount. In addition notable scalability of any system has become a critical aspect of system design, development and ongoing management. Meanwhile cryptographic systems provide the security provisions needed for confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Cryptographic key management, however, must be secure, yet efficient and effective in developing an attitude of trust in system users. Digital certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure has long been the technology of choice or availability for information security/assurance; however, there appears to be a notable lack of successful implementations and deployments globally. Moreover, recent issues with associated Certificate Authority security have damaged trust in these schemes. This paper proposes the adoption of a centralised public key registry structure, a non-certificate based scheme, for large scale e-health information systems. The proposed structure removes complex certificate management, revocation and a complex certificate validation structure while maintaining overall system security. Moreover, the registry concept may be easier for both healthcare professionals and patients to understand and trust.

Democratic systems

Digital signature is a breakthrough of modern cryptographic systems. A (t, n) threshold digital signature allows every set of cardinality t or more (out-of n) co-signers to authenticate a message. In almost all existing threshold digital signatures the threshold parameter t is fixed. There are applications, however, in which the threshold parameter needs to be changed from time to time. This paper considers such a scenario, in order to discuss relevant problems, and proposes a model that solves the related problems.

Group law computations on Jacobians of hyperelliptic Curves

We derive an explicit method of computing the composition step in Cantor’s algorithm for group operations on Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves. Our technique is inspired by the geometric description of the group law and applies to hyperelliptic curves of arbitrary genus. While Cantor’s general composition involves arithmetic in the polynomial ring F_q[x], the algorithm we propose solves a linear system over the base field which can be written down directly from the Mumford coordinates of the group elements. We apply this method to give more efficient formulas for group operations in both affine and projective coordinates for cryptographic systems based on Jacobians of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves in general form.

Signal authentication and integrity schemes for next generation global navigation satellite systems

This paper describes a number of techniques for GNSS navigation message authentication. A detailed analysis of the security facilitated by navigation message authentication is given. The analysis takes into consideration the risk of critical applications that rely on GPS including transportation, finance and telecommunication networks. We propose a number of cryptographic authentication schemes for navigation data authentication. These authentication schemes provide authenticity and integrity of the navigation data to the receiver. Through software simulation, the performance of the schemes is quantified. The use of software simulation enables the collection of authentication performance data of different data channels, and the impact of various schemes on the infrastructure and receiver. Navigation message authentication schemes have been simulated at the proposed data rates of Galileo and GPS services, for which the resulting performance data is presented. This paper concludes by making recommendations for optimal implementation of navigation message authentication for Galileo and next generation GPS systems.

Strengthening and formally verifying privacy in identity management systems

In a digital world, users’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is normally managed with a system called an Identity Management System (IMS). There are many types of IMSs. There are situations when two or more IMSs need to communicate with each other (such as when a service provider needs to obtain some identity information about a user from a trusted identity provider). There could be interoperability issues when communicating parties use different types of IMS. To facilitate interoperability between different IMSs, an Identity Meta System (IMetS) is normally used. An IMetS can, at least theoretically, join various types of IMSs to make them interoperable and give users the illusion that they are interacting with just one IMS. However, due to the complexity of an IMS, attempting to join various types of IMSs is a technically challenging task, let alone assessing how well an IMetS manages to integrate these IMSs. The first contribution of this thesis is the development of a generic IMS model called the Layered Identity Infrastructure Model (LIIM). Using this model, we develop a set of properties that an ideal IMetS should provide. This idealized form is then used as a benchmark to evaluate existing IMetSs. Different types of IMS provide varying levels of privacy protection support. Unfortunately, as observed by Jøsang et al (2007), there is insufficient privacy protection in many of the existing IMSs. In this thesis, we study and extend a type of privacy enhancing technology known as an Anonymous Credential System (ACS). In particular, we extend the ACS which is built on the cryptographic primitives proposed by Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, and Shoup. We call this system the Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, Shoup - Anonymous Credential System (CLS-ACS). The goal of CLS-ACS is to let users be as anonymous as possible. Unfortunately, CLS-ACS has problems, including (1) the concentration of power to a single entity - known as the Anonymity Revocation Manager (ARM) - who, if malicious, can trivially reveal a user’s PII (resulting in an illegal revocation of the user’s anonymity), and (2) poor performance due to the resource-intensive cryptographic operations required. The second and third contributions of this thesis are the proposal of two protocols that reduce the trust dependencies on the ARM during users’ anonymity revocation. Both protocols distribute trust from the ARM to a set of n referees (n > 1), resulting in a significant reduction of the probability of an anonymity revocation being performed illegally. The first protocol, called the User Centric Anonymity Revocation Protocol (UCARP), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked in a user-centric manner (that is, the user is aware that his/her anonymity is about to be revoked). The second protocol, called the Anonymity Revocation Protocol with Re-encryption (ARPR), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked by a service provider in an accountable manner (that is, there is a clear mechanism to determine which entity who can eventually learn - and possibly misuse - the identity of the user). The fourth contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a protocol called the Private Information Escrow bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). This protocol is designed to address the performance issue of CLS-ACS by applying the CLS-ACS in a federated single sign-on (FSSO) environment. Our analysis shows that PIEMCP can both reduce the amount of expensive modular exponentiation operations required and lower the risk of illegal revocation of users’ anonymity. Finally, the protocols proposed in this thesis are complex and need to be formally evaluated to ensure that their required security properties are satisfied. In this thesis, we use Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) and its corresponding state space analysis techniques. All of the protocols proposed in this thesis have been formally modeled and verified using these formal techniques. Therefore, the fifth contribution of this thesis is a demonstration of the applicability of CPN and its corresponding analysis techniques in modeling and verifying privacy enhancing protocols. To our knowledge, this is the first time that CPN has been comprehensively applied to model and verify privacy enhancing protocols. From our experience, we also propose several CPN modeling approaches, including complex cryptographic primitives (such as zero-knowledge proof protocol) modeling, attack parameterization, and others. The proposed approaches can be applied to other security protocols, not just privacy enhancing protocols.

Privacy compliance verification in cryptographic protocols

To provide privacy protection, cryptographic primitives are frequently applied to communication protocols in an open environment (e.g. the Internet). We call these protocols privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) which constitute a class of cryptographic protocols. Proof of the security properties, in terms of the privacy compliance, of PEPs is desirable before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well-established for proving the security of cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal language of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various privacy properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides insights into the modelling and analysis of PEPs in general, and demonstrates the benefit of applying a CPN-based formal approach to the privacy compliance verification of PEPs.

Network security metrics and performance for healthcare systems management

While enhanced cybersecurity options, mainly based around cryptographic functions, are needed overall speed and performance of a healthcare network may take priority in many circumstances. As such the overall security and performance metrics of those cryptographic functions in their embedded context needs to be understood. Understanding those metrics has been the main aim of this research activity. This research reports on an implementation of one network security technology, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), to assess security performance. This research simulates sensitive healthcare information being transferred over networks, and then measures data delivery times with selected security parameters for various communication scenarios on Linux-based and Windows-based systems. Based on our test results, this research has revealed a number of network security metrics that need to be considered when designing and managing network security for healthcare-specific or non-healthcare-specific systems from security, performance and manageability perspectives. This research proposes practical recommendations based on the test results for the effective selection of network security controls to achieve an appropriate balance between network security and performance

On the zeros of the Abelian integrals for a class of Liénard systems

A planar polynomial differential system has a finite number of limit cycles. However, finding the upper bound of the number of limit cycles is an open problem for the general nonlinear dynamical systems. In this paper, we investigated a class of Liénard systems of the form x'=y, y'=f(x)+y g(x) with deg f=5 and deg g=4. We proved that the related elliptic integrals of the Liénard systems have at most three zeros including multiple zeros, which implies that the number of limit cycles bifurcated from the periodic orbits of the unperturbed system is less than or equal to 3.