Maternal reminiscing style during early childhood predicts the age of adolescents' earliest memories

Individual differences in parental reminiscing style are hypothesized to have long-lasting effects on children’s autobiographical memory development, including the age of their earliest memories. This study represents the first prospective test of this hypothesis. Conversations about past events between 17 mother–child dyads were recorded on multiple occasions between the children’s 2nd and 4th birthdays. When these children were aged 12–13 years, they were interviewed about their early memories. Adolescents whose mothers used a greater ratio of elaborations to repetitions during the early childhood conversations had earlier memories than adolescents whose mothers used a smaller ratio of elaborations to repetitions. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that past-event conversations during early childhood have long-lasting effects on autobiographical memory.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

A crab tide

Poem

Reflexive and automatic violence: A function of aberrant perceptual inhibition

It’s commonly assumed that psychiatric violence is motivated by delusions, but here the concept of a reversed impetus is explored, to understand whether delusions are formed as ad-hoc or post-hoc rationalizations of behaviour or in advance of the actus reus. The reflexive violence model proposes that perceptual stimuli has motivational power and this may trigger unwanted actions and hallucinations. The model is based on the theory of ecological perception, where opportunities enabled by an object are cues to act. As an apple triggers a desire to eat, a gun triggers a desire to shoot. These affordances (as they are called) are part of the perceptual apparatus, they allow the direct recognition of objects – and in emergencies they enable the fastest possible reactions. Even under normal circumstances, the presence of a weapon will trigger inhibited violent impulses. The presence of a victim will also, but under normal circumstances, these affordances don’t become violent because negative action impulses are totally inhibited, whereas in psychotic illness, negative action impulses are treated as emergencies and bypass frontal inhibitory circuits. What would have been object recognition becomes a blind automatic action. A range of mental illnesses can cause inhibition to be bypassed. At its most innocuous, this causes both simple hallucinations (where the motivational power of an object is misattributed). But ecological perception may have the power to trigger serious violence also –a kind that’s devoid of motives or planning and is often shrouded in amnesia or post-rational delusions.