184 resultados para Goldberg, dan
Resumo:
Australian law similar to that of United States -- Australian law requires copyright must subsist in plaintiff's material and defendent's work must infringe plaintiff's copyright to find defendent liable for illegal copying -- subsistence -- infringement -- two cases that touch on 'look and feel' issue -- passing-off -- look and feel of computer program deserves protection
Resumo:
Induction is an interesting model of legal reasoning, since it provides a method of capturing initial states of legal principles and rules, and adjusting these principles and rules over time as the law changes. In this article I explain how Artificial Intelligence-based inductive learning algorithms work, and show how they have been used in law to model legal domains. I identify some problems with implementations undertaken in law to date, and create a taxonomy of appropriate cases to use in legal inductive inferencing systems. I suggest that inductive learning algorithms have potential in modeling law, but that the artificial intelligence implementations to date are problematic. I argue that induction should be further investigated, since it has the potential to be an extremely useful mechanism for understanding legal domains.
Resumo:
Commercial legal expert systems are invariably rule based. Such systems are poor at dealing with open texture and the argumentation inherent in law. To overcome these problems we suggest supplementing rule based legal expert systems with case based reasoning or neural networks. Both case based reasoners and neural networks use cases-but in very different ways. We discuss these differences at length. In particular we examine the role of explanation in existing expert systems methodologies. Because neural networks provide poor explanation facilities, we consider the use of Toulmin argument structures to support explanation (S. Toulmin, 1958). We illustrate our ideas with regard to a number of systems built by the authors
Resumo:
In this paper we provide an overview of a number of fundamental reasoning formalisms in artificial intelligence which can and have been used in modelling legal reasoning. We describe deduction, induction and analogical reasoning formalisms, and show how they can be used separately to model legal reasoning. We argue that these formalisms can be used together to model legal reasoning more accurately, and describe a number of attempts to integrate the approaches.
Resumo:
The operation of the law rests on the selection of an account of the facts. Whether this involves prediction or postdiction, it is not possible to achieve certainty. Any attempt to model the operation of the law completely will therefore raise questions of how to model the process of proof. In the selection of a model a crucial question will be whether the model is to be used normatively or descriptively. Focussing on postdiction, this paper presents and contrasts the mathematical model with the story model. The former carries the normative stamp of scientific approval, whereas the latter has been developed by experimental psychologists to describe how humans reason. Neil Cohen's attempt to use a mathematical model descriptively provides an illustration of the dangers in not clearly setting this parameter of the modelling process. It should be kept in mind that the labels 'normative' and 'descriptive' are not eternal. The mathematical model has its normative limits, beyond which we may need to critically assess models with descriptive origins.
Resumo:
CAAS is a rule-based expert system, which provides advice on the Victorial Credit Act 1984. It is currently in commercial use, and has been developed in conjunction with a law firm. It uses an object-oriented hybrid reasoning approach. The system was initially prototyped using the expert system shell NExpert Object, and was then converted into the C++ language. In this paper we describe the advantages that this methodology has, for both commercial and research development.
Resumo:
In the legal domain, it is rare to find solutions to problems by simply applying algorithms or invoking deductive rules in some knowledge‐based program. Instead, expert practitioners often supplement domain‐specific knowledge with field experience. This type of expertise is often applied in the form of an analogy. This research proposes to combine both reasoning with precedents and reasoning with statutes and regulations in a way that will enhance the statutory interpretation task. This is being attempted through the integration of database and expert system technologies. Case‐based reasoning is being used to model legal precedents while rule‐based reasoning modules are being used to model the legislation and other types of causal knowledge. It is hoped to generalise these findings and to develop a formal methodology for integrating case‐based databases with rule‐based expert systems in the legal domain.
Resumo:
In this article the authors continue the Artificial Intelligence and the law debate begun with Moles' 1991 article. In it the authors answer the latest criticisms made by Moles and others as they explain and argue the case for the practical benefits to be gained by AI systems involving the law.