Does charity begin and end at home for tax exemptions?

Charitable organisations have remained exempt from income tax in Australia since the first comprehensive state income tax legislation in 18841 through to the current Income Tax Assessment Act 1977. The charitable exemption was also part of the English income tax legislation from its inception in 1799. The Federal Treasurer has released exposure draft legislation which seeks to remove taxation exemptions from some tax exempt organisations that perform any of their activities outside Australia or make trust distributions overseas. The proposed legislation is in response to alleged tax avoidance arrangements which involve tax exempt organisations and charitable trusts. The paper begins by describing the current charity tax exemption provisions under the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA). It then turns to tracing the background policy history of the amendments which appear to be at odds with the form and intent of the proposed provisions. The proposed amendments and their practical consequences are then closely scrutinised and found wanting in a number of respects. Alternative strategies are suggested to arrive at an equitable solution to the avoidance mischief.

Charitable bequests a specific case of gift giving

Over the last 5 years, charities have acknowledged that bequests are a source of income with the potential for enormous growth. As the population ages the number of possible bequest donors will increase. Charities are implementing bequest campaigns to target the older donors, and the need for research is evident...

Small business entity tax concessions : through the eyes of the practitioner

The often competing imperatives of equity, simplicity and efficiency in the income tax regime, particularly the notion of simplicity, has been most evident within Australia’s small business sector over the last decade. In an attempt to provide tax simplification and reduce the tax compliance burden faced by Australian small businesses, provisions collectively referred to as the ‘simplified tax system’ or STS were introduced. The STS was designed to provide eligible small businesses with the option of adopting a range of ‘simplified’ tax measures designed to simplify their tax affairs whilst at the same time, reducing their tax compliance costs. Ultimately, a low take-up rate and accompanying criticisms led to a remodelled and rebadged concessionary regime known as the ‘Small Business Entity’ (SBE) regime which came into effect from 1 July 2007. This paper, through a pilot study, investigates the SBE regime though the eyes of the practitioner. In line the Australian Federal Government’s objective of simplification and reduced compliance costs, the purpose of the study was to (1) determine the extent to which the SBE concessions are being adopted by tax practitioners on behalf of their clients, (2) gain an understanding as to which individual SBE tax concessions are most favoured by practitioners, (3) determine the primary motivation as to why tax practitioners recommend particular SBE concessions to their clients, and (4) canvass the opinions of practitioners as to whether they believed that the introduction of the SBE concessions had met their stated objective of reducing tax compliance costs for small businesses. The findings of this research indicate that, while there is a perception that the SBE concessions are worth embracing, contrary to the policy intent, the reasons behind adopting the concessions was the opportunity to minimise a clients’ tax liability. It was revealed that adopting particular concessions had nothing to do with compliance costs savings and, in fact, the SBE concessions merely added another layer of complexity to an already cumbersome and complex tax code, which resulted in increased compliance costs for their small businesses clients. Further, the SBE concessions allowed tax practitioners the opportunity to engage in effective tax minimisation, thereby fulfilling the client advocacy role of the tax practitioner in maximising their clients’ tax preferences.

Charity tax exemptions : a stitch in time saves nine

The Industry Commission has recently released a wide ranging draft report on charitable organisations. Part of the Inquiry's terms of reference required the Commission to examine the appropriateness of the taxation treatment of charities. The findings of the draft report when combined with the recommendations of the Federal Parliament's Follow the Yellow Brick Road Report point to a systematic review by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) of its dealings with charitable organisations. Generally prevention rather than cure is the better strategy in taxation issues. This article raises a number of issues charitable organisations might consider as part of their prevention strategy. As the ATO administers all the taxes discussed in this article and as the tests for exemption are similar, charitable organisations should find that "getting it right" for one tax means that their affairs will be in order for most taxes.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

Australia's adoption of an international tax regime : to engage or not to engage?

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia's future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process.

A select and annotated bibliography of nonprofit taxation

It seems likely that the Industry Commission Inquiry on Charitable Organisations will include a reference to examine the state of taxation and charities. There will no doubt be discussions on the taxation benefits enjoyed by charities. These benefits include not only the exemption from being liable for income tax and enjoying the status of being a "deductible body" for the purpose of gifts, but also fringe benefits tax, sales tax, land tax, stamp duty, financial institutions duty, local government rates and charges as well as electricity, gas, telephone and motor vehicle concessions.

The 1998 tax reform proposal fringe benefits tax and nonprofit organisations

Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) is a tax payable by employers on the value of certain fringe benefits that have been provided to their employees or to associates of those employees. It was introduced on 1 July 1986 to improve the equity of the taxation system because non-salary and wage benefits were escaping the taxation base. FBT ensures that tax is paid on those fringe benefits provided in place of, or in addition to, salary or wages of employees.

Tax morale, Eastern Europe and European enlargement

This study tries to remedy the current lack of tax compliance research analyzing tax morale in 10 Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. By exploring tax morale differences between 1999 and 2008 we show that tax morale has decreased in 7 out of 10 Eastern European countries. This lack of sustainability may support the incentive based conditionality hypothesis that European Union has only a limited ability to influence tax morale over time. We observe that events and processes at the country level are crucial to understanding tax morale. Factors such as perceived government quality, trust in the justice system and the government are positively correlated with tax morale in 2008.

A new legal avenue for pricing GHG emissions? To trade or to tax?

In a September 2010 media release the Prime Minister of Australia presented the terms of reference for the newly established Multi-Party Climate Change Committee. Although the Committee is charged with considering climate change mitigation measures in general, specifically the Committee must consider an appropriate mechanism for the establishment of a carbon price. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the mechanisms to be considered by the Climate Change Committee, including the use of emissions trading and carbon levies in other jurisdictions. This article argues that for any effective investigation of a carbon price for Australia to occur, a thorough knowledge of other jurisdictions’ methods for carbon pricing is essential.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

Neither an international tax, nor an international taxing body exists. Rather, there are domestic taxing rules adopted by jurisdictions which, coupled with double tax treaties, apply to cross-border transactions and international taxation issues. International bodies such as the OECD and UN, which provide guidance on tax issues, often steer and supplement these domestic adoptions but have no binding international taxing powers. These pragmatic realities, together with the specific use of the word ‘regime’ within the tax community, lead many to argue that an international tax regime does not exist. However, an international tax regime should be defined no differently to any other area of international law and when we step outside the confines of tax law to consider the definition of a ‘regime’ within international relations it is possible to demonstrate that such a regime is very real. The first part of this article, by defining an international tax regime in a broader and more traditional context, also outlining both the tax policy and principles which frame that regime, reveals its existence. Once it is accepted that an international tax regime exists, it is possible to consider its adoption by jurisdictions and subsequent constraints it places on them. Using the proposed changes to transfer pricing laws as the impetus for assessing Australia’s adoption of the international tax regime, the constraints on sovereignty are assessed through a taxonomy of the level adoption. This reveals the subsequent constraints which flow from the broad acceptance of an international tax regime through to the specific adoption of technical detail. By undertaking this analysis, the second part of this article demonstrates that Australia has inherently adopted an international tax regime, with a move towards explicit adoption and a clear embedding of its principles within the domestic tax legislation.