Assessing taxpayer response to legislative changes: A case study of ‘in-house’ fringe benefits rules

On 22 October 2012, the Australian Federal Government announced the removal of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession when used as part of a salary packaging arrangement. At the time of the announcement, the Federal Government predicted that the removal of the concession would contribute additional tax revenue of $445 million over the following four years as well as an increase of GST payments to the States and Territories. However, anecdotal evidence at the same time indicated that the Australian employer response was to immediately stop providing employees with such in-house fringe benefits via salary sacrificing arrangements. Data presented in this article, collected from a combination of interviews with tax managers of four Australian entities as well as a review of the published archival data, confirms that the abolition of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession was perceived as a negative change, whereby employees were considered the ‘big losers’ despite assertions by the Federal Government to the contrary. Using a conceptual map of tax rule change developed by Oats and Sadler, this article seeks to understand the reasons for this fringe benefits tax change and taxpayer response. In particular, the economic and political factors, and the responses of the relevant taxpayers (employers) are explored. Drawing on behavioural economic concepts, the actions, attitudes and response of employers to the rule change are also examined. The research findings suggest that the decision by Australian employers to cease providing the in-house fringe benefits as part of a salary-packaging arrangement after the legislative amendment was impacted by more than simple rational behaviour.

Reducing tariffs according to WTO accession rules: The case of Vietnam

When Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 it was granted an accession period up to 2014. During this period tariffs would have to fall according to the accession agreement. This paper evaluates this 2007–2014 trade liberalization by building an applied general equilibrium model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The model pays careful attention to the fact that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises. The model simulations show that the WTO tariff reductions will reduce overall welfare. Moreover, the biggest loss will take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. This paper proposes other tariff reforms that will both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.