Fair value accounting for non-current assets and audit fees: Evidence from Australian companies

We investigate the association between asset revaluations of non-current assets and audit fees, using a sample of ASX 300 companies from the years 2003–2007.We report that there is a significant increase in the audit fees paid when non-financial assets (PPEs, investment properties and intangible assets) are measured at fair values. Moreover, we provide evidence that an independent valuer or appraiser significantly weakens the positive association between asset revaluations and audit fees. Furthermore, companies whose noncurrent assets are revalued upwards and those that revalue their non-current assets upwards every year have significantly higher audit fees. Additional tests provide empirical evidence that the strength of corporate governance has a moderating effect on the level of audit fees. This study contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of fair value accounting. The findings suggest agency costs associated with fair value estimates may offset the benefits from the use of fair value accounting.

Social Audit Regulation Within the NGO Sector: Practices of NGOs Operating in Bangladesh and Indonesia

Social audit is one of those important mechanisms for strengthening NGOs’ accountability to poor communities (as NGOs’ key beneficiaries). However, conducting social audits within the NGO sector often rests on the individual interests and priorities of donors or NGOs themselves, effectively resulting in self-selection bias, and limiting the effectiveness and usefulness of social audits as a control and evaluation mechanism. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the prevalence, scale, and scope of social audits within the NGO sector, particularly NGOs engaging in microenterprise development programs. Accordingly, this study examined 20 NGOs operating in two countries - Bangladesh and Indonesia. Data were collected from publicly available sources and in-depth interviews with senior executives of the participating NGOs. Further, 10 interviews were conducted with a small sample of beneficiaries (individuals or groups from four of the participating NGOs) in order to gain an understanding of beneficiaries’ perceptions of the NGOs’ social audit mechanism. The findings reveal a range of approaches to social audit among NGOs, as well as the usefulness and limitations of this mechanism for strengthening NGO accountability, particularly to beneficiaries. Findings highlight that within the NGOs investigated the conduct of social audits remained voluntary and was strongly dependant on donors’ requirements. As social audit regulation within the NGO sector is minimal, the findings provide regulators with valuable guidance for better understanding the value of social audit as a mechanism to strengthen accountability of the NGO sector, particularly accountability to beneficiaries.

The effect of internal audit function quality and internal audit contribution to external audit on audit fees

Corporate governance mandates and listing rules identify internal audit functions (IAF) as a central internal control mechanism. External audits are expected to assess the quality of IAF before placing reliance on its work. We provide evidence on the effect of IAF quality and IAF contribution to external audit on audit fees. Using data from a matched survey of both external and internal audits, we extend prior research which is based mainly on internal audits' assessment and conducted predominantly in highly developed markets. We find a positive relationship between IAF quality and audit fees as well as a reduction in audit fees as a result of external auditors' reliance on IAF. The interaction between IAF quality and IAF contribution to external audit suggests that high quality IAF induces greater external auditor reliance on internal auditors' work and thus result in lower external audit fees.

Assessing taxpayer response to legislative changes: A case study of ‘in-house’ fringe benefits rules

On 22 October 2012, the Australian Federal Government announced the removal of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession when used as part of a salary packaging arrangement. At the time of the announcement, the Federal Government predicted that the removal of the concession would contribute additional tax revenue of $445 million over the following four years as well as an increase of GST payments to the States and Territories. However, anecdotal evidence at the same time indicated that the Australian employer response was to immediately stop providing employees with such in-house fringe benefits via salary sacrificing arrangements. Data presented in this article, collected from a combination of interviews with tax managers of four Australian entities as well as a review of the published archival data, confirms that the abolition of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession was perceived as a negative change, whereby employees were considered the ‘big losers’ despite assertions by the Federal Government to the contrary. Using a conceptual map of tax rule change developed by Oats and Sadler, this article seeks to understand the reasons for this fringe benefits tax change and taxpayer response. In particular, the economic and political factors, and the responses of the relevant taxpayers (employers) are explored. Drawing on behavioural economic concepts, the actions, attitudes and response of employers to the rule change are also examined. The research findings suggest that the decision by Australian employers to cease providing the in-house fringe benefits as part of a salary-packaging arrangement after the legislative amendment was impacted by more than simple rational behaviour.

Principals of audit: Testing, data and ‘implicated advocacy’

Historically, school leaders have occupied a somewhat ambiguous position within networks of power. On the one hand, they appear to be celebrated as what Ball (2003) has termed the ‘new hero of educational reform'; on the other, they are often ‘held to account’ through those same performative processes and technologies. These have become compelling in schools and principals are ‘doubly bound’ through this. Adopting a Foucauldian notion of discursive production, this paper addresses the ways that the discursive ‘field’ of ‘principal’ (within larger regimes of truth such as schools, leadership, quality and efficiency) is produced. It explores how individual principals understand their roles and ethics within those practices of audit emerging in school governance, and how their self-regulation is constituted through NAPLAN – the National Assessment Program, Literacy and Numeracy. A key effect of NAPLAN has been the rise of auditing practices that change how education is valued. Open-ended interviews with 13 primary and secondary school principals from Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales asked how they perceived NAPLAN's impact on their work, their relationships within their school community and their ethical practice.

A preliminary analysis of the impact of UN MDGs and RIO+20 on corporate social accountability practices

This chapter explores the impact of UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Rio + 20 in improving Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. While MDGs and Rio + 20 have suggested additive guidelines for improving CSR practices, they do not provide a strong legislative mandate. We find both MDGs and Rio + 20 have had limited cumulative effect on CSR practices and discourses within the corporate reports. UN bodies should bring a new policy and regulatory framework that addresses limitations in the principles espoused in the MDGs and Rio + 20. An independent monitoring system (a social compliance audit mechanism) can be mandated in an attempt to make incremental substantive change.

Fair values and audit fees: Evidence from asset revaluations in Australia

This paper examines the association between the level of audit fees paid and asset revaluations, one use of fair value accounting. This Australian study also investigates attributes of asset revaluations and the association with the level of audit fees paid. We find that firms choosing the revaluation model incur higher audit fees than those that chose the cost model; asset revaluations made by directors lead to the firm incurring higher audit fees than for those made by external independent appraisers; and revaluation of investment properties leads to lower audit fees. The findings suggest that asset revaluations can result in higher agency costs and audit fees vary with the reliability of the revaluations and the class of assets being revalued.