Israel's airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar facility : a test case for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence?

This article analyses the legality of Israel’s 2007 airstrike on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility at Al-Kibar—an incident that has been largely overlooked by international lawyers to date. The absence of a threat of imminent attack from Syria means Israel’s military action was not a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defence. Yet, despite Israel’s clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force there was remarkably little condemnation from other states, suggesting the possibility of growing international support for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This article argues that the muted international reaction to Israel’s pre-emptive action was the result of political factors, and should not be seen as endorsement of the legality of the airstrike. As such, a lack of opinio juris means the Al-Kibar episode cannot be viewed as extending the scope of the customary international law right of self-defence so as to permit the use of force against non-imminent threats. However, two features of this incident—namely, Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the international community’s apparent lack of concern over legality—are also evident in other recent uses of force in the ‘war on terror’ context. These developments may indicate a shift in state practice involving a downgrading of the role of international law in discussions of the use of force. This may signal a declining perception of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum, at least in cases involving minor uses of force.

Borders, mobility and technologies of control

Territorial borders are taking on a new significance, the implications of which are relatively unexplored within the discipline of criminology. This book presents the first systematic attempt to develop a critical criminology of the border and offers a unique treatment of the impact of globalisation and mobility. It focuses on borders and the significance of the activities which take place on and around them. For many the border is an everyday reality, a space in which to live, a land necessary to cross. For states the border space increasingly requires protection and defence; is at the centre of state ideology and performance; is the site for investing significant political and material resources, and is ultimately ungovernable. Providing a wealth of case material from Australia, Europe and North America, it is for students, academics, and practitioners working in the areas of criminology, migration, human geography, international law and politics, globalisation, sociology and cultural anthropology.

Access to protection for 'Offshore Entry Persons' aka asylum seekers

In 2001, amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made possible the offshore processing of protection claims. The same amendments also foreshadowed the processing of claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia according to non-statutory procedures. After disbanding offshore processing the then Rudd Labor Government commenced processing of protection claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia under the Refugee Status Assessment process (RSA). The RSA process sought to substitute well established legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, as interpreted by the courts, with administrative guidelines and decision-making immune from judicial review. This approach was rejected by the High Court in the cases M61 and M69. This article analyses these developments in light of Australia’s international protection obligations, as well as considering the practical obstacles that continue to confront offshore entry persons as they pursue judicial review of adverse refugee status determinations after the High Court’s decision.

Female genital mutilation : legal, attitudinal and practical reform

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a cultural practice common in many Islamic societies. It involves the deliberate, non-therapeutic physical modification of young girls’ genitalia. FGM can take several forms, ranging from less damaging incisions to actual removal of genitalia and narrowing or even closing of the vagina. While often thought to be required by religion, FGM both predates and has no basis in the Koran. Rather, it is a cultural tradition, motivated by a patriarchal social desire to control female bodies to ensure virginity at marriage (preserving family honour), and to prevent infidelity by limiting sexual desire. In the USA and Australia in 2010, peak medical bodies considered endorsing the medical administration of a ‘lesser’ form of FGM. The basis for this was pragmatic: it would be preferable to satisfy patients’ desire for FGM in medically-controlled conditions, rather than have these patients seek it, possibly in more severe forms, under less safe conditions. While arguments favouring medically-administered FGM were soon overcome, the prospect of endorsing FGM illuminated the issue in these two Western countries and beyond. This paper will review the nature of FGM, its physical and psychological health consequences, and Australian laws prohibiting FGM. Then, it will scan recent developments in Africa, where FGM has been made illegal by a growing number of nations and by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003 (the Maputo Protocol), but is still proving difficult to eradicate. Finally, based on arguments derived from theories of rights, health evidence, and the historical and religious contexts, this paper will ask whether an absolute human right against FGM can be developed.

Points of convergence and divergence : normative, institutional and operational relationships between R2P and POC

As an international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has gained substantial influence and institutional presence—and created no small controversy—in the ten years since its first conceptualisation. Conversely, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC) has a longer pedigree and enjoys a less contested reputation. Yet UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 has thrown into sharp relief the relationship between the two. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 follow exactly the process envisaged by R2P in response to imminent atrocity crimes, yet the operative paragraphs of the resolutions themselves invoke only PoC. This article argues that, while the agendas of PoC and R2P converge with respect to Security Council action in cases like Libya, outside this narrow context it is important to keep the two norms distinct. Peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, international lawyers, individual states and regional organisations are required to act differently with respect to the separate agendas and contexts covered by R2P and PoC. While overlap between the two does occur in highly visible cases like Libya, neither R2P nor PoC collapses normatively, institutionally or operationally into the other.