Damages for personal injuries in Queensland : interest please!

The article revises established principles relating to the awarding of damages to the date of judgment and discusses decisions in the High Court and in the Supreme Court of Queensland which have caused significant changes to the manner of assessments of interest. Its purpose is to provide for practitioners involved in personal injuries litigation in Queensland a current set of guidelines as to the manner in which the wide discretion to award interest may be expected to be exercised.

The Workcover Queensland Act: exploring injured workers payout options : Part 1

The article provides an overview of the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Workcover Queensland Act 1996 (Access to damages), and of the matters which, consequent on these provisions, practitioners must evaluate when advising an injured worker contemplating the commencement of a common law action for damages.

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.

In conversation with the Honourable Ian Callinan AC

When, in 1977, the Australian electorate provided a double majority to effect a change of section 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution requiring judges of the High Court of Australia to retire at the age of 70 years old, I doubt we understood the continuing capacity of these esteemed members of the judiciary. For the opportunity to sit and talk with Ian Callinan AC who, in compliance with that amendment, retired from the High Court in September 2007, I needed to wait until he returned from The Hague where he was sitting as a Judge ad hoc on the International Court of Justice. Although a native of Casino, New South Wales, Mr Callinan is regarded as a Queenslander. Indeed, he grew up in Brisbane, finished high school at Brisbane Grammar and graduated in law at The University of Queensland. Appointed in 1978 as a Queen’s Counsel, Mr Callinan enjoyed this period of his legal career and we discussed an aspect of the Christopher Skase case, which reinforced my belief that Mr Callinan is an incredibly skilful advocate. On 14 September 1998, ABC Four Corners broadcasted the views of some prominent Australians on the appointment of Mr Callinan to the High Court. In assessing the type of person Mr Callinan is, Tony Morris QC said: “Ian Callinan isn't a coward”, while former Commonwealth Attorney-General, Michael Lavarch, said: “He was regarded as an absolutely outstanding criminal lawyer within the Queensland legal profession, I mean really a top-notch advocate”. I was not interested in raising any of the controversial issues that Mr Callinan has encountered as an advocate in high profile matters. I wanted to know how he felt about his time on the High Court, what his thoughts are on the operation of the High Court, the IP cases he decided, the real life issues that he feels impact on counsel who are appearing before the High Court and the people he regarded as role models. During our conversation, Mr Callinan laughed often and when he did his eyes lit up, revealing his passion for life. He is an incredibly genuine Australian who loved his time as a barrister, enjoyed his role on the High Court, enjoys his current job as mediator, loves writing novels, has a great desire for continual improvement in the quality of legal education and legal advocacy and sees a need for change in IP law. When I asked: “So, what might the future hold for you?”, he laughed and said: “Well, at my age I don’t have a long horizon time”. I said: “Just enjoy the journey?”, to which Mr Callinan responded: “Exactly”.

Religion, Charity and Human Rights

For the first time in 400 years a number of leading common law nations have, fairly simultaneously, embarked on charity law reform leading to an encoding of key definitional matters in charity legislation. This book provides an analysis of international case law developments on the ever growing range of issues now being generated by clashes between human rights, religion and charity law. Kerry O'Halloran identifies and assesses the agenda of 'moral imperatives', such as abortion and gay marriage that delineate the legal interface and considers their significance for those with and those without religious belief. By assessing jurisdictional differences in the law relating to religion/human rights/charity the author provides a picture of the evolving 'culture wars' that now typify and differentiates societies in western nations including the USA, England and Wales, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

Legislative impact on the mortgagee’s exercise of power of sale : the need for rationalisation

Throughout Australia, regulation of the power of sale is highly inconsistent. In response to the uncertain nature of the mortgagee’s duty at common law, many legislatures have intervened. As a result, there has been a proliferation of statutory formula conferring varying degrees of protection on mortgagors. The differences in approach indicate a lack of consensus as to the best method of regulation. This article exposes the extent of the inconsistency and provides a comparative assessment of the various provisions with reference to the policy concerns that underpin legislative intervention. The article identifies a number of deficiencies associated with existing provisions and concludes that mortgagees and mortgagors alike would benefit from improved clarity and consistency. To that end, the article proposes a model provision that seeks to address the deficiencies identified.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms have also been established to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in all jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

Double effect and palliative care excuses

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Children and consent to medical treatment

This chapter provides a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of legislative provisions and common law principles regarding children and the law of consent to medical treatment. When can children provide their own consent? Can parents consent on behalf of their children, and if so, under what circumstances and why? Is court authority ever required, and if so, when, and why? What new contexts are providing fresh challenges to legal principles, parents, medical practitioners, and most importantly, children?

Scrutinising the other : incapacity, suspicion and manipulation in a death investigation

In common law countries like England, Australia, the USA and Canada, certain deaths come to be investigated through the coronial system. These include sudden, unnatural or suspicious deaths as well as those which appear to be the result of naturally occurring disease but the precise cause is unknown. When a reportable death occurs in Australia, a number of professional groups become involved in its investigation – police, coroners, pathologists and counsellors. While research has demonstrated the importance of training and education for staff in the context of criminal investigations – with its over-representation of vulnerable and marginalised populations – this is less likely to occur in the context of death investigations, despite such investigations also involving the over-representation of vulnerable populations. This paper, part of larger funded research on the decision-making of coronial professionals in the context of cultural and religious difference, explores the ways in which cultural and religious minority groups – in this case Islam, Judaism and Indigeneity – become differently positioned during the death investigation based upon how they are perceived as ‘other’. Our research raises three issues. First, positioning as ‘the other’ is dependent on the professional training of the staff member, with police and pathologists far more likely than coroners to be suspicious or ignorant of difference. Second, specific historical and contemporary events effect the Othering of religious and cultural difference. Third, the grieving practices associated with religious and cultural difference can be collectively Othered through their perceived opposition to modernity.

When coroners care too much: Therapeutic jurisprudence and suicide findings

In common law countries such as England and Australia, violent and otherwise unnatural deaths are investigated by coroners who make findings as to the “manner of death”. This includes determining whether the deceased person intentionally caused their own death. Previous research (Tait and Carpenter 2013a, 2013b, 2014) has suggested that coroners are reluctant to reach such determinations, citing the stigma of suicide and a need for sensitivity to grieving and traumatized families. Based on interviews with both English and Australian coroners, this paper explores whether an ‘ethic of care’ evident in English and Australian coronial suicide determinations, can be understood as an application of the ‘practices and techniques’ of therapeutic jurisprudence. Based on the ways in which coroners position the law as a potential therapeutic agent, we investigate how they understand their role and position as legal actors, and the effects of their decision making in the context of suspected suicides.

Bank guarantees and the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries

A bank guarantee has traditionally been viewed as a cash equivalent. This view is supported by the operation of the autonomy principle. However, the autonomy principle is subject to certain recognised exceptions both at common law and under statute. One of these exceptions is commonly referred to as the negative stipulation or underlying contract exception. In recent times the operation of this particular exception has given rise to a wealth of case law. This article examines whether this recent case law appropriately recognises the reasonable expectations of the beneficiary of a bank guarantee that a bank guarantee should function not only as a security but as a risk allocation device.

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.

Legal duties following the discharge of mental health patients

In the recent decision of Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter and New England Local Health District v Simon, the High Court of Australia held that a hospital and its medical staff owed no common law duty of care to third parties claiming for mental harm, against the background of statutory powers to detain mentally ill patients. This conclusion was based in part on the statutory framework and in part on the inconsistency which would arise if such a duty was imposed. If such a duty was imposed in these circumstances, the consequence may be that doctors would generally detain rather than discharge mentally ill persons to avoid the foreseeable risk of harm to others. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the policy of the mental health legislation , which favours personal liberty and discharge rather than detention unless no other care of a less restrictive kind is appropriate and reasonably available.